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Summer 1978

Leon D. Epstein — Political Science and Presidential Nominations

Alan A. Platt
Robert Leonardi — American Foreign Policy and the Postwar Italian Left

Peter K. Eisinger — Ethnic Political Transition in Boston, 1884–1933

Louis Fisher — A Political Context for Legislative Vetoes

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From the Managing Editor:

In this issue . . .

LEON D. EPSTEIN reviews selected generalizations that political scientists have developed about presidential nominations. He concludes that while the changing and uncertain circumstances of these nominations often preclude rigorous scientific propositions, cautious scholarship in this field is usefully contributing to our understanding of the nominating process.

ALAN A. PLATT and ROBERT LEONARDI analyze United States foreign policy toward the Italian Left, beginning with the years immediately after World War II and ending with a discussion of current American policy toward the *compromesso storico*.

PETER K. EISINGER examines the transition from Yankee to Irish rule in Boston in the decades around the turn of the century in order to explore the ways in which a group displaced from power adjusts to its new status. The case is treated as a possible analogue to transitions occurring at present in cities where black mayors have been elected.

LOUIS FISHER discusses the constitutional dispute over the "legislative veto," taking into account specific legal issues as well as the broader political context within which legislators and administrators operate. He singles out areas where the legislative veto can be accommodated but also where it encroaches upon matters best left to the executive and judicial branches.

JOHN F. MANLEY describes the lobbying efforts of the White House's Office of Congressional Relations during the presidencies of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. He concludes that the success of presidential leadership in domestic legislation was generally "problematic."

CHERYL BENARD discusses the hardships suffered by the Eastern and Southern European migrant workers who have been employed in the Western European industrial system since World War II and comments on the political and economic implications of the pattern.

STEPHEN A. GARRETT analyzes the influence of Eastern European ethnic groups on American foreign policy toward their homelands and argues that at least in this case the "ethnic factor" in American diplomacy has been relatively slight.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Political Science and Presidential Nominations

LEON D. EPSTEIN

Two concerns prompt this study. The first, plainer and more specific, is to use post-1976 hindsight to appraise selected generalizations that political scientists made about presidential nominations before the nominations of 1976. The second concern flows largely from the extent to which the generalizations are found to hold for the nominations of 1976 and for those that might be thought to follow. Does the appraisal lead to a favorable view of the "science" of a discipline that seeks to describe and explain politics in the present tense, now and for at least a near future? Or does it suggest that we should limit ourselves to the reconstruction of what happened, and why it happened, in the historical past? The second question arises in less than ideal conditions for scientific endeavor. Students of politics can make a stronger argument for the science of their work when they deal with quantitatively more tractable subject matter. Generalizations about presidential nominations are based on small numbers—only two major party choices every four years—a mere twenty nominations in four decades of "contemporary" politics. Even that span may be too long given recent substantial changes in the rules for delegate selection and for campaign finance. Moreover, most of the generalizations about presidential nominations that command attention, here and elsewhere, are probabilistic, predictive statements that are often untestable in any rigorous sense. Rather than stating only the relations between variables, they also try to forecast what will happen as a result of such relations.

It should be plain that I do not intend to belabor my political science colleagues for any mistaken expectations about the 1976 nominations. I had

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accepted most of their generalizations.[1] I draw these mainly from the familiar *Presidential Elections* by Nelson Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky[2] and the widely circulated final study by William Keech and Donald Matthews in the Brookings presidential election series.[3] Both books are authoritative summaries of the state of our knowledge of presidential nominations just before the 1976 process began. Although their authors (when writing the works mentioned) could not know all the new rules adopted in 1976, they were able to take into account the great expansion of presidential primaries and most other changes in delegate-selection practices that occurred after 1968. The same can be said for a number of other works cited. Older studies are noted only occasionally and with allowance for their different circumstances. Many important books and articles are omitted in order to concentrate on the generalizations rather than on the literature. No doubt my selection method neglects certain significant findings about presidential nominations. The eight generalizations chosen vary greatly in their breadth and significance. They are neither entirely discrete nor consistent as a set of principles. The first three derive from experience before as well as after 1960. Numbers four and five rest on observations that originated mainly in 1960, and numbers six and seven developed from the events of 1964, 1968, and 1972. Finally, number eight is a generalization probably only implicit in the literature but proposed here in light of the 1976 nominating experience.

1. Incumbent presidents are able to win nomination.
2. First-ballot nominations have become the norm.
3. The early front-runner, particularly in public opinion polls among a party's identifiers, usually wins the presidential nomination.
4. Washington-based candidates, especially vice-presidents and senators, are now likelier presidential nominees than are governors.
5. Contesting primaries has become crucially important.
6. Early announced and active candidacy, formerly scorned, is now profitable.
7. Ideological, or strongly issue-oriented, candidates are favored by the nominating politics of primaries and other reform practices.
8. Candidates previously unrecognized as established national party leaders, in or out of Washington, are increasingly able to win presidential nominations in the politics of the late twentieth century.

•

1. *Incumbent presidents are able to win nomination.* From 1888 (and only from that date) even unpopular elected incumbents (Taft and Hoover) secured renomination, and the four incumbents who had succeeded to the presidency by

[1] I am also grateful to several of these colleagues for their comments on an earlier draft of this essay.

[2] Specifically, to the fourth edition of *Presidential Elections* (New York: Scribner's, 1976).

[3] *The Party's Choice* (Washington: Brookings, 1976).

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the death of their predecessors also won the nominations that they sought. Among the latter, only Lyndon Johnson came close to failing a test of the generalization when he sought a second complete-term presidential renomination. His withdrawal, after a challenged start in 1968, left the generalization literally intact; it is possible that he could have won renomination if he had persisted in an increasingly bitter contest likely to diminish the value of the prize.[4] But Johnson's experience before withdrawal was politically adverse enough to raise doubts about the ease with which an incumbent could always control his party's nominating processes. When the doubts arising in 1968 are added to those that stem from President Taft's difficulties and from the paucity of tests in difficult circumstances, it is evident that the capacity of incumbent presidents to be renominated should always have been carefully hedged. So it was by Polsby and Wildavsky: "Barring catastrophic events—depression, war, scandal—the president's power is most certainly strong enough to assure him of renomination. . . ."[5] The capacity, it's true, gets more emphasis than the hedge. Like Keech and Matthews,[6] Polsby and Wildavsky call attention to the president's prestige, patronage, and other controls over potential delegates, as well as to the party's need to defend the president's record rather than to confess political bankruptcy by repudiating it.

In and of itself, President Ford's experience in 1976 evidently confirms the established generalization. Even if he had narrowly lost instead of narrowly winning the nomination, it might well be argued that the experience was confirming. Not only would such a loss have been covered by the hedge (after all, the scandal of the administration which brought him to office *was* catastrophic), but for a president as handicapped as Ford to come close to renomination surely supports the belief in the conventional power of incumbency. So Keech persuasively argued after Ford's renomination.[7] On the other hand, underlying changes in American politics may be reducing the renominating capacity of incumbent presidents even if they do not suffer from Ford's distinctive disadvantages. Insofar as a president uses party organizational ties to secure delegates, the continued decline of control by state and local leaders, with whom a president deals on patronage or other matters, would appear to make it harder to count on a compliant convention. Winning delegates in primaries, or even in caucuses, is less certain when power over these election processes belongs to candidate-centered or issue-oriented activists rather than to party regulars. Encountering the participatory nomination procedures, an incumbent president must now be able to convert his special status to political advantage in circles well beyond those of organizational and office-holding leaders.

[4] Ibid., pp. 106–107.

[5] *Presidential Elections*, p. 103.

[6] *The Party's Choice*, p. 32.

[7] William R. Keech, "The Presidential Nominations in the Context of the Previous Twenty," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1976, p. 4.

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2. *First-ballot nominations have become the norm*. They occurred at seventeen of the twenty major party conventions from 1936 to 1972. Although first-ballot nominations may not have been clearly perceived as a norm before the 1960s, no Republican deviations exist after 1948, and no Democratic ones after 1952. The facts reflect the supposed reality of a selection process in which, through polls, primaries, and the news media, a public choice is made before each convention. Delegates are there to register that choice. In 1976 the Democratic performance admirably fits the mode, and the Republican experience does not actually break from it. Just barely enough Republican delegates were uncommitted at the start of the 1976 convention to make its nomination uncertain. Otherwise Republicans, like Democrats, met to vote their preconvention commitments.

Yet, just before 1976, political scientists were uncertain whether the trend to first-ballot nominations would continue. For the Democrats in particular, it was thought that the new prohibition of statewide winner-take-all primaries, following the earlier abolition of the unit rule, would make it harder for a candidate to reach the convention with a majority.[8] Now Democratic delegates were to be awarded in proportion to votes for presidential candidates, with only a loophole in 1976 for winner-take-all at the *district* level. Without statewide winner-take-all primaries, substantial minority blocs of delegates were likely to be won by several candidates, each also encouraged by the new federal matching funds to maintain active campaigns.[9] Especially in the absence of an early and clear front-runner willing to enter the 1976 primaries, a fragmented Democratic convention seemed a serious possibility. We know that the possibility did not materialize and that an easy first-ballot nomination again confirmed the preconvention choice. Nevertheless, we may still believe that the splitting of state delegates, more pervasive under the new rules, makes it harder to achieve a preconvention majority.

One can even calculate that Carter lost delegates as a result of the various apportionment formulae: in the nineteen presidential preference primaries linked to (rather than separated from) the election of delegates, Carter actually secured 606 delegates instead of the 772 he would have won if all nineteen primaries had been operated so as to award full state delegations to the candidate with a statewide plurality.[10] Carter, it must be remembered, ran first in twelve of the nineteen primaries, apart from five other first-place finishes in eight preference polls that did not elect delegates. Although his statewide pluralities produced fewer delegates than he would have garnered under the old rules, Carter compensated to some extent by picking up substantial minorities in states that

[8] Polsby and Wildavsky, *Presidential Elections*, pp. 92–93, 99.

[9] Ibid., p. 152; and Frank J. Sorauf, *Party Politics in America* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), p. 286.

[10] Calculation from data in *Congressional Quarterly*, Vol. 34, pp. 1794–1799, 1806–1807 (July 10, 1976).

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he could not win (California is the leading example) and by winning large majorities of the delegates in his strongest states, notably in southern and border regions. But future candidates might not be similarly successful. The prohibition of winner-take-all primaries, even at the district level after 1976, could yet be a substantial impediment to first-ballot nominations.

In any event, the mere fact that nominations are made on the first convention ballot appears less significant than their registration of a more-or-less popular preconvention choice. That choice, however, is not always "consensual." Keech and Matthews so classify only eight of twenty major party nominations from 1936 to 1972, meaning that there was one obvious and acceptable choice facing little or no opposition and winning over 90 percent of the first-ballot votes. Six of the eight were incumbent presidents. They call five other nominations "semiconsensual." In each of these five instances, an early front-runner maintained his lead through the primaries and won on the first convention ballot (though twice with just over 50 percent of the delegates). The remaining seven nominations from 1936 to 1972 are in a third "nonconsensual" category in which agreement on a presidential candidate was difficult to achieve. Although first-ballot decisions were nonetheless made in four of these seven cases, the convention "had to reach agreement 'artificially,' by majority vote."[11] So the Republicans nominated Eisenhower in 1952 and Goldwater in 1964, and the Democrats Humphrey in 1968 and McGovern in 1972. The common feature, shared with the three nominations requiring more than one ballot, is sharp intraparty conflict often but not always associated with subsequent defeat in a general election.

Simply restated, not every first-ballot nomination registers a popular choice clearly determined before the convention. So the process and the result can resemble the characteristics of a multiballot nomination. President Ford's sharply contested first-ballot victory was hardly a sign of consensus either at the convention or in the preceding months. And Carter's first-ballot victory, although much less narrow and entirely predictable a month before the convention, was neither consensual nor semiconsensual in the Keech-Matthews classifications, which require such nominees to have been preprimary as well as postprimary leaders. Nor does Carter's nomination fall into the third, nonconsensual category; to fit that category, the 1976 Democratic convention would have had to have reached agreement artificially, by majority vote. And that did not characterize the nomination. In other words, the Carter nomination fits in none of the three categories, as Keech himself points out in his postconvention paper.[12]

The Keech-Matthews classification, more useful than a simple division between first and multiballot nominations, could presumably be revised or restated so as to include the Carter nomination. Or there might well be a new classification containing only two types: first, those nominations that register (on the

[11] *The Party's Choice*, p. 166; see also pp. 160–161, 162.

[12] "The Presidential Nominations," p. 9.

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first ballot) the popular preconvention choice whether or not that choice had also been an early front-runner, and second, those nominations still seriously contested on the first or subsequent ballots. We could then say that the first type was now the more prevalent, especially in the party whose candidate subsequently gets elected, but that the second still occurs as it did for the Republicans in 1976. Hence, as in the Keech-Matthews classification, the distinction would be based on relative consensus and so on a criterion more meaningful politically than the number of ballots.

•

3. *The early front-runner, particularly in public opinion polls among a party's identifiers, usually wins the presidential nomination.* Making for confident predictions before any primaries, the generalization appeared to have been fairly well established between 1936 and 1972. For seventeen of the twenty major party nominations during that period of Gallup polls, the winner was the preprimary poll leader, or, once candidacies had been announced, the leader of the first poll after an incumbent president made public his intentions not to seek re-election.[13] The exceptions (early leaders who failed) were Dewey in 1940, Kefauver in 1952, and Humphrey in 1972. The last of these exceptions is the most important since it constituted, before 1976, the only instance in which the eventual nominee (McGovern) became the poll leader by virtue of the primaries after starting far behind the front-runners (Muskie as well as Humphrey). Until 1972, therefore, primary successes seemed only to confirm what Gallup had already disclosed, contrary to an earlier contention that polls often reflected primary results.[14]

Even McGovern's convincing overturn of the 1972 front-runners could at first be treated as untypical.[15] But it was suspected that this success owed something to the Democratic party reforms and to the more numerous primaries, both of which could make it harder for a preprimary front-runner to win early delegate commitments.[16] If that were the explanation, or at least an important part of the explanation, for McGovern's defeat of the 1972 front-runners, then something like it should have been distinctly possible in 1976 because the relevant reform rules were still in effect and the primaries were more numerous than ever. In fact, Carter's successful use of the long primary campaigning season to become a front-runner closely parallels McGovern's achievement. Like McGovern, Carter came from far behind in the polls (the choice of four

[13] William H. Lucy, "Polls, Primaries, and Presidential Nominations," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 35, pp. 830–848 (November 1973), at pp. 838–839.

[14] James W. Davis, *Springboard to the White House: Presidential Primaries* (New York: Crowell, 1967), pp. 97–98.

[15] *The Party's Choice*, p. 229.

[16] Ibid., pp. 87–88; and J.R. Beniger, "Winning the Presidential Nomination: National Polls and State Primary Elections," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 40, pp. 22–38 (Spring 1976), at p. 38.

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percent of the Democrats in January and February) to become the top choice (53 percent) in the last preconvention poll.[17]

It cannot yet be suggested that these two similar, back-to-back Democratic experiences mean that we should now expect originally lower-ranking candidates regularly to overtake early front-runners. For what it's worth, we can note that Ronald Reagan did not secure the poll lead from the front-running President Ford. But we can no longer believe with any confidence that early front-runners "usually" win nominations. Perhaps we should never have had great confidence in that generalization. At least since 1956, front-runners have had to test their poll standings in primaries. Formerly, it's true, they could select only a few primaries for their tests. Nevertheless as early as 1960 John F. Kennedy could hardly have secured the nomination without a string of crucial primary successes to bolster his preprimary plurality in the Gallup poll. Of course, the Kennedy experience tends to confirm rather than to refute the generalization. He was an early front-runner who won nomination even if he needed intervening primary victories. Indeed it seemed for him, as for others before 1972, that being an early front-runner helped in winning primaries.[18] So it may yet be again. Humphrey and Muskie could have been exceptionally weak front-runners.

•

4. *Washington-based candidates, especially vice-presidents and senators, are now likelier presidential nominees than are governors.* The apparent reversal of advantages covers only a short time span, 1960 to 1972, but it pertains to all six nonincumbent nominations in that period. I count former Vice President Nixon's 1968 candidacy as "Washington-based" because, while he held no national office at the time, his public credentials were those of his previous Washington years. In addition to the successful Washington-based candidates from 1960 to 1972, most of the seriously contending but losing candidates for presidential nomination were then U.S. senators; the important exceptions, Reagan, Rockefeller, and Wallace, had achieved national recognition in ways that transcended their governorships. Thus even the exceptions displayed the advantages attributed to Washington-based candidates. Ordinarily these advantages flowed from the greater access of vice-presidents and senators, than of governors, to the national publicity media. The greater access meant that Washington-based candidates could demonstrate their familiarity with the main national and international issues.[19] The results implied that American politics were being nationalized, and the nationalization, in turn, provided a rationale for the ascendancy of Washington-based candidacies from 1960 to 1972. Neither

[17] Gallup Poll, *Press Releases*, February 15, June 20, July 15, and July 19, 1976.
[18] "Winning the Presidential Nomination," pp. 36–37.
[19] *Party Politics*, p. 300.

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their uniform success in securing nominations, nor the large number of senators and congressional representatives who sought that success, appeared accidental or transient.

Nevertheless, even before the rise of Jimmy Carter, political scientists were not so rash as to state in absolute terms the advantages of Washington-based candidates. Keech and Matthews, in their appraisal of "the opportunity structure for the presidency," note the relatively favorable position of vice-presidents and U.S. senators, but they add that "it would be a mistake to underestimate the future prospects of big-state governors as presidential nominees."[20] And in a paragraph of unusual scholarly prescience, Keech and Matthews observe that governors might have advantages in being separated from Washington politics when those politics can be identified with disasters like Vietnam and Watergate. Less prescient, however, is their treatment of big-state governors as the only likely beneficiaries of anti-Washington sentiments. Although Keech and Matthews do not flatly exclude nonmetropolitan state governors, they note the communication difficulties as well as the electoral limits suffered by governors of small states. They also observe that Landon in 1936 was the last of such governors to be nominated, and that few governors of small or medium-sized states have been seriously mentioned since then.[21]

These items still strike me as a good basis for discounting as unlikely the success of a nonmetropolitan state governor. Ex-Governor Jimmy Carter's nomination obviously contradicts the expectation, but it is hardly sufficient to cause us to expect that governors of states the size of Georgia will now generally be included among other more likely presidential candidates. Carter's experience may well be unique. After all, Governor Brown and ex-Governor Reagan, strongly competing for nomination in 1976, were from a decidedly metropolitan state. And their candidacies, along with Carter's and Wallace's, may represent only a temporary resurgence of the gubernatorial potential in a most unusual anti-Washington year. The 1976 experience shakes, but does not demolish, the generalization about the trend to Washington-based candidacies.

•

5. *Contesting primaries has become crucially important*. Suggested previously, this statement derives from the recent increase in the number of presidential primaries.[22] In the sense that the increase is so great that a candidate must contest numerous primaries in order to have a chance to win enough delegates to be nominated, the generalization states the obvious. But the 1976 experience, particularly Carter's, may indicate the wisdom of contesting virtually all primaries. Until 1976 that was not a common interpretation, even among those

[20] *The Party's Choice*, pp. 19, 21, and 25.

[21] Ibid., pp. 25–27.

[22] Austin Ranney, *Participation in American Presidential Nominations, 1976* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1977), p. 6.

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who had come to believe that contesting primaries was "crucially important." Furthermore, it was not unusual to stress, even after acknowledging the importance of primaries in McGovern's nomination, that "the primaries rarely have much independent effect on nomination outcomes."[23] Supporting that perception was the fact that from 1936 to 1972 thirteen of the fourteen front-runners before the primaries won nomination. On the other hand, also just before 1976, Polsby and Wildavsky described the new importance of primaries, indicating that their lesser role in earlier decades might be an inadequate guide to the present and future; the primaries have become "almost but not quite indispensable" for presidential nominations.[24] But Polsby and Wildavsky were not arguing that every winning candidate had to enter virtually all primaries, however indispensable they might generally have become.

In asking now how many primaries—several, most, or virtually all—it is crucially important to enter, we have come a long way since President Truman credibly dismissed the presidential primaries as eyewash. Even at the time, Truman's opinion overlooked the fact that several recent contenders (but not all) had won at least a few primaries as a means of helping to win nominations. And after 1952 all nonincumbent nominees except Humphrey in 1968 either reinforced or established their vote-getting credentials in primaries (though very marginally in Goldwater's case). But it was Kennedy's success in 1960 that made the winning of at least a substantial number of primaries look like a standard if not absolutely necessary route to nomination. So even with only half as many primaries as there came to be by 1976, James W. Davis wrote of the "Kennedy school of winning presidential nominations" as the new reality.[25] Still it was customary, before 1976, to emphasize the demonstration-effect of winning primaries rather than the number of delegates thus obtained.[26] Dewey's Oregon victory in 1948 and Kennedy's West Virginia victory in 1960 were illustrative. The timing, location, legal provisions, other contestants, and various special circumstances made certain state primaries more useful than others. Winning all or most primaries, or even entering and seriously contesting all or most primaries, was seldom conceived as necessary. Nor, in the 1960s, would it have been sufficient since the primary states elected only a minority of convention delegates. Even in 1972, when primaries elected two-thirds of the delegates, more seemed to be gained by seriously contesting only a limited selection of primaries than by campaigning in virtually all of them. At any rate, McGovern did better picking certain contests (which at the beginning was all that he could sensibly do, given his financial limitations) than Muskie did by campaigning almost everywhere. Consequently the primary system in 1972 appeared to reward a smart, or lucky, tactician who might not have gathered

[23] Keech and Matthews, *The Party's Choice*, p. 229.

[24] *Presidential Elections*, p. 111.

[25] *Springboard*, p.v. Davis's emphasis on the causal effect of primaries is criticized by Beniger, "Winning the Presidential Nomination," p. 25.

[26] Hugh Heclo, "Presidential and Prime Ministerial Selection," p. 41, in *Perspectives on Presidential Selection*, ed. by Donald W. Matthews (Washington: Brookings, 1973).

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the most popular votes in all of the primaries counted together. As Jewell wrote, "it matters not whether you win or lose, but how you play the game."[27]

In 1976, however, Democratic candidates were expected to enter more primaries if only to secure the advantages flowing from the requirement that a proportionate share of a state's delegation go to a candidate winning more than 15 percent of a statewide primary vote. Even in states using the then still-available loophole for a district level winner-take-all primary, more than one candidate could win some of a state's delegates. It was also anticipated that candidates would enter many primaries, now electing three-quarters of the delegates, partly because they attracted the public attention that had become necessary to raise money, from many small donors, under the federal matching formula. In fact, four Democratic candidates officially entered at least twenty-two primaries,[28] but they did not all campaign seriously in each state. Neither did the two Republican candidates contest all of their party's primaries. Reagan, in particular, stayed away from some northeastern states in which he might have been able to win a substantial minority vote and so end up with enough delegates to be nominated. In that perspective, Reagan's failure tends to reinforce the argument for entering all or almost all primaries.

Stronger reinforcement comes from Jimmy Carter's serious entry in virtually all primaries. His triumph, in this respect, was achieved differently from McGovern's. Although Carter too had started from nowhere in the opinion polls, like McGovern he needed a good showing in the small, relatively inexpensive, and strategically timed New Hampshire primary to secure visibility. Also like McGovern and other earlier successful users of the primary route, Carter needed major yet losing opponents in order for his victories to generate publicity. There would have been much less profit in winning as Kefauver had won in the 1952 primaries, mainly against unknowns or stand-in candidates. In fact, Carter often enough had at least one nationally recognized opponent whom he usually defeated (until he encountered Brown and Church too near the end to be fatally hurt by their victories). Most providentially, a still notorious but weakened George Wallace was available for Carter to defeat, particularly in southern primaries, and so achieve giant-killer status in the news media.

Enough has been said about the apparently special Democratic circumstances in 1976 to suggest a reluctance to conclude from Carter's experience that entering virtually all primaries has become the necessary or the most likely route to nomination, even for the candidate who starts from nowhere. And surely there ought to be a greater reluctance thus to generalize about early front-runners. They may find it possible and also expedient to concentrate on several state primaries, or even, in propitious circumstances, to avoid primaries altogether and still win nomination when none of the primary contestants approaches a convention majority. Or a well-known though not a front-running

[27] Malcolm E. Jewell, "A Caveat on the Expanding Use of Presidential Primaries," *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 2, pp. 279–284 (Summer 1974), at p. 282.

[28] *Congressional Quarterly*, Vol. 34, p. 1808 (July 10, 1976).

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challenger, like Reagan in 1976, may do very well by concentrating on the still numerous primaries in his strongest regions. But such possibilities are now less promising because they depend on the failure of anyone else to win enough primaries and not on the old situation in which only limited numbers of primary delegates were available. The primaries *are* more important than ever, and new reasons exist for a serious candidate to contest more of them. Pointing strongly in that direction is the sheer arithmetic of Carter's route to the nomination. Of the 1,166 delegates that he won from the fifty states and the District of Columbia, *apart* from originally uncommitted delegates who switched to his column in May and June, 958 came from states with one or another form of primary election.[29]

Accordingly, the 1976 experience, even more clearly than McGovern's success in 1972, shows the crucial character of the primaries. As Keech wrote after Carter's nomination, the primaries had now been decisive twice in a row in determining Democratic nominations. On the other hand, he still regarded so decisive a role for primaries as unusual.[30] So it may well be in the perspective of the past several decades. But since 1960, despite the nomination of a non-primary contestant in 1968, winning many delegates in primaries appears increasingly the key to success. Especially in the late 1970s, with more than three-quarters of the delegates chosen in primaries, it may be the only way to succeed. Furthermore, the distribution of these delegates by proportional representation plainly encourages serious contenders to enter primaries in which they do not expect to gain pluralities, and so perhaps, like Carter, more contenders will choose to contest virtually all primaries. This is not to say that Carter's experience would lead candidates to ignore the remaining caucus-convention states. The initial caucuses in Iowa provided an important Carter success, and so did the timely switch of orginally uncommitted caucus-convention delegates (notably twenty-seven of Missouri's in May). Thus even Carter's nomination route might be said to combine primaries and caucus-convention successes as projected.[31] So, in fact, did Ford's. No doubt, the combination will continue to be used as long as substantial though reduced numbers of delegates are still selected by the caucus-convention method. The more open character of the method, particularly under post-1968 Democratic rules, means that its import is not so radically different from that of primaries as it was when there were stronger state party leaders. And plainly the caucus-convention states are no longer numerous enough to detract from the crucial importance of primaries. Only in the unlikely event of a large-scale abandonment of the primary method would anyone expect the importance of entering primaries to be reduced. All that remains in question is the number that should be contested. Carter's "virtually all" was neither the usual prescription before 1976 nor the certain lesson for the future.

[29] Ibid., pp. 1794, 1806–1811.
[30] "The Presidential Nominations," pp. 2 and 5.
[31] *Party Politics*, p. 282.

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6. *Early announced and active candidacy, formerly scorned, is now profitable.* Nelson Polsby fairly claims authorship of this new wisdom because he recommended (vainly) in March 1971 that Muskie should announce as soon as possible even though Muskie, unlike McGovern (who had already announced), was a front-runner conventionally expected to remain unannounced until near the first primaries.[32] Polsby could cite John Kennedy's successful early start in 1960, and, after 1972, the advantages secured by McGovern over Muskie and Humphrey too. Believing that the successes accompanying these early announcements and the consequently early active campaigns were not fortuitous but flowed from an accommodation to the new rules of the game, Polsby and Wildavsky wrote with considerable confidence that future candidates would tend to follow the lessons of 1972. One of the lessons was that weakly led and decentralized state parties made it possible for an early candidate to pick up strength even before the primary season. Finally, Polsby and Wildavsky asserted: "Now everybody knows (or believes) that the early aspirant gets the nomination."[33] And Jimmy Carter acted as though he knew what Polsby and Wildavsky had asserted.

Perhaps, however, the short list of successful early candidacies consists only of special cases. Carter, like McGovern, was so obviously not an early front-runner that he could hope to win only by starting early. John Kennedy, while the early front-runner, had to prove in fairly early primaries that his religion was not an insuperable handicap. Hence it does not follow that early candidacy is a probable necessity or even very useful for most front-runners. Muskie's failure is not readily attributed to his unwillingness to announce as early as McGovern did, or as early as Polsby advised. Nor can it be established that the failures of Carter's various opponents—at least of those who announced in time for the full primary season—resulted from later announcements than Carter's.

A different question arises about candidates who actually delay their entry until the primaries are either well under way or already ended. Humphrey probably entered the 1972 primaries too late to win, and his nonentry route in 1976 turned out to be unsuccessful. Moreover, the late 1976 entries of Senator Church and Governor Brown were also ineffectual despite convincing victories, especially by Brown, over Carter in the few primaries that they actively contested. Having never been front-runners, however, Church and Brown would not, even according to the wisdom gained from 1960 to 1972, have been expected to secure nomination without longer campaigns. Humphrey's experience provides a better test of the new generalization. Here was a front-runner seeking to recapture a nomination he had won in 1968 without primary campaigns but with the help of an incumbent president and under different party rules. He did not fail by much in 1972, and in 1976 he was by no means out of contention or a pre-

[32] *Political Promises* (New York: Oxford, 1974), pp. 17–20.

[33] *Presidential Elections*, p. 116 (see also pp. 88 and 101).

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dictable loser until the very end of the primaries. Although his chances were almost certainly reduced by the changes in delegate selection after 1968, they still existed. So they also exist for front-running national figures of the future. Humphrey's failures display the risks of waiting, just as the successes of John Kennedy, McGovern, and Carter indicate the advantages of early starts, but we do not yet have an iron law stating the necessity, as well as the profitability, of an early start in winning future nominations. Indeed, even for 1972 and 1976, are we sure that the early Democratic starters would have succeeded if Senator Edward Kennedy, rather than Senator Hubert Humphrey, had made himself the available, though unannounced, front-runner?

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7. *Ideological, or strongly issue-oriented, candidates are favored by the nominating politics of primaries and other reform practices.* Often discussed since Goldwater's nomination in 1964, although subsequently associated with the new Democratic party rules under which McGovern won nomination in 1972, the generalization rests heavily on a belief in the rise of an ideological activism that the new rules facilitated but did not produce. The phenomenon was most familiarly expounded, and deplored, by Polsby and Wildavsky. Their view is that primaries generally, and those held under proportional or districting rules in particular, favor candidates with intense followings, that is, candidates from the far left or right, not from a moderate center.[34] Polsby and Wildavsky, however, do not say that the system favors only far left Democrats and far right Republicans; rather the way is open to a candidate with any kind of intense ideological following in either party. Accordingly, George Wallace's right-wing appeal in the 1964 and 1972 Democratic primaries is taken into account. Without Wallace, one suspects that the generalization might well have been stated so as to apply only to the Democratic left and the Republican right.

In any case, centrism and moderation are regarded as inherently disadvantaged as stimulants for the party-activist enthusiasm now needed to win presidential nominations. But centrism and moderation, assumed to be the formula for winning general elections but not primaries, are just the qualities that professional politicians would seek if they could pick the nominee, as they were thought to have been able to do in less participatory days. The intense issue-oriented activists are thus perceived to be farther from a party's rank-and-file voters. As "purists," these activists are unfavorably compared with professionals, especially at party conventions.[35] And purism seemed to be enjoying a long-term increase.

There was a fairly broad expectation that the tendencies favoring ideological candidates would continue in 1976. The Democratic abolition of winner-take-all primaries was often thought likely to encourage intense issue-oriented follow-

[34] *Presidential Elections*, pp. 99, 114.

[35] Ibid., pp. 89, 137, 228, and 234–235.

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ings in many states where they had been disadvantaged by their minority status.[36] Nor did the new federal campaign finance legislation appear to work against ideological candidacies. Only the legal prohibition against large individual contributions could have been calculated adversely to affect such candidates, and then only on the assumption that ideological candidates were especially dependent on a few large contributors, at least when beginning their campaigns as relatively unknown public figures. McGovern had critically benefited from large contributors, notably from one unusually generous donor. So, however, had many other kinds of candidates. And at the same time certain ideological candidates (including Wallace, Goldwater, and McGovern himself at later stages of his campaign) had been most effective in collecting many small contributions from nonrich followers. Indeed ideological candidates, possessing relatively large numbers of intense supporters, seemed to be in a better position to do without the large contributor. Furthermore, their capacity to tap many individuals for modest contributions was now rewarded by federal funds matching each individual donation only up to $250.

Altogether, then, we looked for more successful ideological candidates in 1976 than there actually were. Only Reagan's near-miss clearly supports the pre-1976 tendency. Trailing President Ford by 20 percentage points in the last preconvention Gallup poll among Republican identifiers, Reagan's great delegate strength is a tribute to ideological politics as well as to the personality symbolizing those politics. On the Democratic side, Udall's failure, after Harris's, seemed to show the limitations rather than the attractions of strong issue-orientation. And Carter's success was not built on anything like the expected left or right molds; insofar as he had an ideological position, it was of the moderate or centrist type that had been thought to suffer under the new order. Nor was Carter the only important Democratic candidate to practice such nonideological politics. His most formidable late opponent, Governor Brown, was similarly hard to classify in the familiar left-right terms. And Hubert Humphrey, waiting obtrusively outside the primary arena as the only likely alternative to Carter in the late spring, was also a kind of centrist; despite a decidedly liberal stance on domestic economic issues, he presented himself as the traditional party candidate around whom almost all Democrats could unite.

It is difficult though tempting to treat the Democratic experience of 1976 as exceptional in its deviation from ideological nominating politics. Perhaps, from

[36] Not every scholar agreed that all of the newest changes in nominating politics favored noncentrist Democratic aspirants. Just before the 1976 campaign, James T. Lengle and Byron Shafer cogently projected a different tendency from the Democratic party's rule against winner-take-all primaries. The rule, they argued, would not only decrease the importance of the largest competitive states but also increase the importance of less competitive states; the latter could be so overwhelmingly won by a given candidate pursuing a relatively conservative strategy, perhaps regionally based, as to produce nearly unanimous state delegations for the candidate despite PR or the districting that remained possible in 1976. "Primary Rules, Political Power, and Social Change," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 70, pp. 25–40 (March 1976). Carter's successful pattern of delegate gathering is at least consonant with the Lengle-Shafer projection.

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the perspective of the very late twentieth century, Carter's nonideological success will seem an aberration from the trend of the times. But just now it looms so impressively large as to raise serious questions whether we have been correct in perceiving any long-run tendency to nominate heavily ideological candidates. After all, only two such candidates, Goldwater and McGovern, have actually been nominated in recent times. Why shouldn't *they* be regarded as the exceptions? Both can be explained partly as throwaway nominations against impossible-to-beat incumbent presidents, or as fortuitous in other ways. Hence Goldwater and McGovern, like Bryan, may illustrate no more than the occasional capture of a party by ideological forces too narrowly focussed to win general elections. Or the McGovern and Goldwater nominations, along with a few others, may illustrate a trend toward a distinctive but not necessarily ideological type of candidate. Some such broader trend is stated in the next generalization.

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8. *Candidates previously unrecognized as established national party leaders, in or out of Washington, are increasingly able to win presidential nominations in the politics of the late twentieth century.* Based, like the ideological-candidate generalization, on apparently important changes in the character and rules of American politics, the idea here is that these changes provide opportunities for various candidate-centered campaigns, nonideological as well as ideological. Somewhat similar opportunities for achieving leadership, it can be admitted, always existed in American politics to a degree that they have not in the parliamentary parties of most Western democracies. It is hardly new for "outsiders" to win our presidential nominations and elections; one readily recalls our politically successful generals and Wendell Willkie. But the opportunities now seem greater, particularly for those nongenerals who have not just been without party leadership roles themselves but who also lack support from most of those in such roles. Outsiders can campaign effectively as new personalities against a supposed establishment—be it that of the bosses, Washington, eastern wealth, eastern intellectuals, or just old-timers. All such campaigns involve "protest" to some degree, but they are not always ideological in the usual sense of that term. Nonestablishment candidates may have established ideas. The strong issue-orientation implied by ideology is only one means of building an effective candidate-centered campaign. Personality, morality, or a vague appeal to "get the country moving again" may also attract intense participatory followings. Given the virtual disintegration of most party organizations, the significant common element of the successful outsiders, or insurgents, is a capacity to exploit the primaries, the mass media, and the generally more open or public political processes. John F. Kennedy's nomination in 1960 is as good an example as Carter's in 1976, and so, in a different way, is McGovern's. Even Goldwater's nomination, while more of an intraorganizational affair, owed

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a good deal to the public success of his candidate enthusiasts in California's primary.

Rather than being an entirely new generalization, however, this one is partly a restatement of a conception widely circulated in the wake of Kennedy's nomination in 1960. Only later, following the nominations of Goldwater and McGovern, plus McCarthy's showing in 1968, did the narrower ideological hypothesis become prominent. Typical of political science before the middle 1960s was the view of David, Goldman, and Bain: "Since the early 1940s presidential nominating campaigns have been subject to real and significant changes, for which the combined impacts of the primaries, the public opinion polls, and the mass media of communication seem to be mainly responsible."[37] And, it is fair to add, more recent authors have hardly forsaken the broader generalization, even while emphasizing ideological candidacies.

No one appears to have any doubt that party organizational influence over presidential nominations has declined, although it might be argued that it was never as great as a retrospective view suggests. Certainly American parties have always been so loose and relatively open as to make it difficult for any established national leadership regularly to exert control. Apart from the power of an incumbent president, party organizational influence existed mainly at state and local levels. Accordingly, a successful presidential candidate had to build a coalition of party leaders at those levels. The lessened need for such a coalition —or indeed the absence of enough effective leaders to make a useful coalition— apparently characterizes contemporary presidential nominating politics. Instead of relying mainly on such intermediaries, successful candidates build their own organizations and go directly to voters through the mass media, direct mailing, and primaries. Consequently, party organizations are further weakened, but they seem to have declined from other causes as well.[38] Primaries generally, not just presidential primaries, are sometimes blamed, and so are the advanced communications media through which the public has become accustomed to getting its messages, political and otherwise, without the benefit of organizational intermediaries.

Conclusions

Putting aside the last generalization, because of its post-1976 character, political scientists still appear to have known a good deal about presidential nominations, and occasionally in time for reasonably accurate projections. Of the seven earlier generalizations, four are confirmed by the 1976 experience: an incumbent president was nominated (though barely), both parties nominated on the first

[37] Paul T. David, Ralph M. Goldman, and Richard C. Bain, *The Politics of National Party Conventions* (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 1.

[38] Gerald M. Pomper, "The Decline of the Party in American Elections," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 92, pp. 21-41 (Spring 1977).

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ballot, an early and active campaign by a nonincumbent candidate was profitable, and contesting primaries was crucially important. Some of these generalizations, it must be admitted, remain uncertain despite their confirmation in 1976. We should hedge more than ever about the nomination of incumbent presidents, and we do not yet have enough experience to be confident about the profitability in all circumstances of early and active campaigns. Particular personalities and other time-bound circumstances may account for the evidently confirming nominations of 1976. Even the more firmly established generalization about first-ballot nominations may not be very meaningful if such nominations are, as suggested, of two rather different substantive types. And the loose statement about the crucial importance of primary contests has been confirmed in a degree that most pre-1976 scholarship did not lead us to expect. Although political scientists, including those previously most skeptical about the influence of primaries, had come to realize that primaries were being made increasingly important in the 1970s, they did not ordinarily suggest that they had become so important that virtually all of them should be entered by a prospective nominee. Nor can any of us yet read the generalization to mean that future successful candidates will enter as many primaries as did Carter.

The three specifically unfulfilled generalizations are not entirely demolished. Washington-based candidates may still be likelier than governors to win nominations in the next several presidential years, as they were in the several years preceding 1976. Political scientists had never flatly excluded occasional gubernatorial success. It's true, however, that they were thinking, as in the pre-1960 years, of big-state governors; thus the Carter nomination must be counted as moderately disconfirming. More certainly disconfirmed, it seems to me, is the generalization about the capacity of early front-runners to win nominations. Here the contrary Democratic experience of 1976 joins that of 1972 in refuting the belief created by the record of the several preceding nominations. The primaries have now been used successfully by two candidates seeking to become front-runners, rather than only by established front-runners seeking to reinforce their early status. Accordingly the belief in the nomination of early front-runners declines as the primaries become crucially important. In this sense, confirmation of the fifth generalization about primaries is a refutation of the third generalization about the capacity of early front-runners. Also substantially challenged if not so convincingly refuted is the generalization that ideological candidates are favored by the new nominating politics. They may again be advantaged, but Carter's success, like J.F. Kennedy's, suggests that it is a broader category of outsiders, not just ideological outsiders, who are currently favored.

Scholars specializing in presidential nominations are themselves ordinarily cautious about their predictive capacities. Polsby and Wildavsky, though among our bolder colleagues, offer the following disclaimer in the penultimate sentence of their book: "Because so many of the rules of presidential election politics are changing, it is impossible for us to say with a high degree of assurance how parties, candidates, and voters will adapt to the new incentives

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and disabilities that have been enacted into law."[39] And Austin Ranney stresses the unanticipated consequences of party reform and the opaque quality of our crystal ball.[40] We political scientists have good reason to be modest when we generalize about phenomena that are subject to as uncertain influences as are presidential nominating politics. We are only sure that the process changes. Accordingly, before the post-1968 Democratic rules, it was usual to observe new tendencies in the 1950s and 1960s: use of the media to secure preconvention attention, success for early front-runners (partly through *their* use of primaries), common first-ballot nominations, usefulness of high national poll standing at convention time, and a focus on national figures rather than on state leaders. Then in response to the Republican nomination in 1964 and the Democratic in 1972, plus perhaps the Democratic experience of 1968, we were led to believe that ideological extremists exerted a new and greater influence on non-incumbent nominations. The Democratic party reforms, first effective in 1972, and the related increase in presidential primaries, were thought to strengthen that influence. Finally, after 1972, further party reforms, still more primaries, and sharply innovative campaign finance legislation—as modified by the Supreme Court during the campaign itself—had to be considered.

Especially in 1976, political scientists risked being misled by the last campaign much as generals have been by the last war. Not only do we know that electoral behavior has become less stable, apparently in response to underlying social forces, but both legislative and party rules continued to shift and not always in the same direction, or with the same kind of impact, as the reforms of a few years earlier.[41] For various reasons, not readily foreseen, early front-runners, Washington-based candidates, and ideological Democratic campaigns were no longer advantaged. In other words, our difficulty is not in what we know so much as in when we know it. That difficulty, as suggested at the start of this review, could be avoided if we were content to write only in the past tense. We can readily describe what happened and why it happened, but we tend, even in such descriptions, to edge into the present perfect tense and to describe what *has* happened. We imply a continuity even when we do not use the present or future tenses (as we often actually do). We thus make at least short-run projections which, as observed in this review, are sometimes correct despite rapidly changing circumstances. Projections of this kind, while hardly in the form of rigorous, testable scientific propositions, remain decidedly our business. Their hazards, emerging from the present review, do not lead me to argue that we should limit ourselves to strictly historical reconstruction. Historians themselves are not always so limited. To be sure, we ought not only to

[39] *Presidential Elections*, p. 284.

[40] *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 191 and 208.

[41] William Cavala, "Changing the Rules Changes the Game: Party Reform and the 1972 California Delegation to the Democratic National Convention," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 68, pp. 27-42 (March 1974).

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be cautious about the way we generalize concerning future events. We should also avoid identifying probabilistic, predictive statements as scientific principles.

In studying presidential nominations, if not in some other aspects of political inquiry, we have a soft science.[42] Some of us nonetheless will want to pursue the subject. The policy implications are almost irresistible. Suppose that we are correct in thinking that primaries will continue to be crucially important—even overwhelmingly important—and that "outsiders" are increasingly likely to win these primaries and so also to be nominated. Would not such projections be relevant to the consideration of a national primary, or a nationally imposed set of regional primaries? If we are now to have at least as many state primaries as we had in 1976, what is there to lose by having a national primary? The Polsby-Wildavsky preference[43] for only a limited number of state primaries, accompanying a considerable influence for organizational leaders, seems unattainable. It's true that a national primary would eliminate the peculiar gamesmanship engendered by the present scheduling and other oddities of state primaries, notably New Hampshire's absurdly important role, and that little-known and little-financed candidates would thereby be deprived of one or more inexpensive early launching pads. Hence early front-runners might again be favored. But some observers, including critics (like Polsby and Wildavsky) of a heavy emphasis on primaries, might prefer that consequence to the results of the present process. So they might want to take another look at their objection to the expense and physical strain of a national primary if the probable alternative remains entry in thirty or more state primaries stretched over five months. Similarly, there may now be much less force in the objection to a national primary because it weakens the political party. Trends in presidential nominations, particularly the use of primaries and other open participatory methods, reflect the continued decline of party organizational strength long observed at various political levels. In that light, a national primary would only continue a deep-seated antiorganizational development that has already led the national convention simply to register a more-or-less popular choice made elsewhere.

[42] Gabriel A. Almond and Stephen J. Genco develop a general case for distinguishing much of political science from a study of physical regularities. "The regularities we discover are soft. They are soft because they are the outcomes of processes that exhibit plastic rather than cast-iron control." In "Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics," *World Politics*, Vol. 29, pp. 489–522 (July 1977), at p. 494.

[43] *Presidential Elections*, p. 224.

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American Foreign Policy and the Postwar Italian Left

ALAN A. PLATT
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United States policy toward Italy in the post-World War II period has been influenced and in many cases determined by the nature of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The superpower confrontation in Europe has had a profound effect on the establishment of the boundaries within which Italian domestic political choices have been (and are still being) made. The United States has not determined policies in Italy but it has exercised substantial influence on Italian domestic politics through its political, economic, and military linkages with Italy. Given Italy's strategic position in the Mediterranean, U.S. policy has been oriented toward three aspects of Italian politics: strengthening the control of centrist forces; maintaining a market-oriented socioeconomic system; and having Italy's foreign policy objectives and military posture shaped within the organizational framework of NATO. For much of the postwar period, the accomplishment of all three of these objectives has been consistent with keeping the Left—the Socialist (PSI) and Communist (PCI) parties—from playing a role in government.

The precise nature of U.S. policy toward the Italian Left can usefully be analyzed by focusing on the three most critical periods in postwar American-Italian relations, periods when basic choices were made in one or more of the sensitive areas cited. The first period covers the years between 1945 and 1948 when Italy's international position and postfascist socioeconomic model for reconstruction were shaped. The second period, from 1960 to 1963, was characterized by the attempt in Italy to create the international and domestic groundwork for permitting the entrance of the Socialist party into a government coalition. Finally, in the years from 1970 to 1976 the center-left experiment

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collapsed and Communist participation in government ceased to be an absurd hypothesis but became instead an ever closer reality.

U.S. Policy in the Era of Superpower Confrontation, 1945–1948

In the immediate postwar years, when U.S. policy makers turned their attention to Italian politics, they often did not think of Italian political developments solely on their own terms but consciously considered America's position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Indeed, several key American officials were explicitly concerned with halting what "they considered 'the Red flood' before it could trickle and flow into Italy (and) Western Europe."[1]

In terms of Italian domestic politics, this concern—reinforcing earlier leanings—manifested itself in early U.S. support for the anticommunist, postwar coalition of conservative and moderate political forces led by the Christian Democrats. In late 1945 and throughout 1946, such support was limited, though observable.

Moreover, by the beginning of 1947 U.S. policy reflected unreserved alarm at the strength of the Left in Italy and elsewhere. In Italy the Left (particularly the PCI) had made substantial gains in the municipal elections of November 1946, in comparison with their showings in the Constituent Assembly elections of June 1946. One of the major problems faced by the Christian Democrats (DC) was that the Communists and Socialists coordinated their actions and policies through a Unity of Action Pact. The DC had no similar understanding with the smaller parties to its right like the Liberals, or with the Republicans to its left. In essence it stood alone as the major representative of moderation in the system. Accordingly, in early January 1947 the United States invited the leader of the DC, Prime Minister DeGasperi, to Washington to receive first-hand information about economic progress in Italy and the seriousness of the Left. From the Italian point of view these talks promised to be of both real and symbolic value: real in that they would likely lead to increased U.S. economic assistance; symbolic in that the talks signified acceptance of postfascist Italy by the major Western power.

In the course of his meetings with President Truman and Secretary of State Byrnes, DeGasperi stressed two themes: Italy's desperate economic plight as a result of the war, and his determination to combat the increase of Communist influence in his government and in the country as a whole. DeGasperi emphasized that to thwart the Communists, Italy needed strong economic and financial support from the United States.

It has been argued that during the January trip no definite agreements were made between the Truman administration and the Italian prime minister.[2] Nevertheless, the ground was set for an attempt by DeGasperi to create a new

[1] John Lukacs, *A History of the Cold War* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966), p. 80. See also Roberto Faenza and Marco Fini, *Gli americani in Italia* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1976).

[2] Simon Serfaty, "An International Anomaly: The United States and the Communist Parties

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government coalition that would attempt to reduce Communist and Socialist influence in the policy-making process, especially in relation to economic affairs. In the new coalition of Communists, Socialists, and Christian Democrats that was put together on February 2, 1947, the Left was allocated fewer ministries than in the previous government. Of particular significance was the combination of the portfolios of Treasury and Finance (previously headed by a Communist) under Christian Democrat control. Notwithstanding, it was clear that in February 1947 DeGasperi was not yet looking for a full test of strength with the Left.

In subsequent months, U.S. policy toward Italy was explicitly designed to bolster the strength and legitimacy of the new DeGasperi government by extending to Italy substantial economic aid and food relief while at the same time suggesting that the United States would look even more favorably upon a government without the participation of Leftist parties. Thus a process of bargaining was set in motion between Washington and DeGasperi that was soon to bring an end to the tripartite coalition and heavily commit the United States to both the regeneration of the Italian economy and the shaping of domestic politics in Italy.

On May 7, 1947, U.S. Ambassador to Italy James Dunn sent Secretary of State Marshall an analysis of the current Italian situation. The ambassador advanced the thought that "if it is true that the economic position could be substantially improved through political measures, then aid to Italy perhaps should be based upon a *quid pro quo* of necessary changes in political orientation and policies."[3] Six days later DeGasperi dissolved his cabinet, initiating a political crisis that was finally to be resolved with the creation of a government coalition that excluded both the Communist and Socialist parties. However, before undertaking to create a center-right government composed of Christian Democrats, Liberals, and "technicians,"[4] DeGasperi made sure that the United States would back him up with new and substantial economic concessions. Soon thereafter the United States came forward with a number of economic programs in favor of Italy that foreshadowed the Marshall Plan.[5] While these initiatives of 1947 clearly reflected active U.S. concern for Italian domestic affairs and helped to effect change in the DeGasperi government, they were but a prelude to U.S. involvement and, indeed, intervention in the 1948 elections. These elections became the focal point for an almost apocalyptic struggle between "the forces of revolution" and "the forces of restoration."

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in France and Italy, 1945–1947," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Spring-Summer 1975): 123–146.

[3] "Current Economic and Financial Policies of the Italian Government," May 7, 1947, U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1947, III (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 901.

[4] Gianni Baget-Bozzo refers to the "technicians" as notabili (notables). See *Il partito cristiano al potere*, I (Florence: Vallecchi, 1974), p. 153–160.

[5] See "Cable from The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State," May 28, 1947, *Foreign Relations*, p. 911.

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In January 1947, while Prime Minister DeGasperi was in the United States, the Socialists split into two factions. At the Socialists' National Congress, revisionist members of the party—under the guidance of Giuseppe Saragat—broke with the dominant leadership in protest against the party's Unity of Action Pact with the Communists; and with the financial backing of the United States they created what eventually became known as the Social Democratic Party (PSDI).[6] The large majority of Socialist members, however, remained with the parent party and, led by Pietro Nenni and labor chief Oreste Lizzadri, these elements formed the Italian Socialist Party (PSI).

Following Saragat's secession, the Social Democrats, along with the moderately progressive Republican Party (PRI), moved toward the right and by December 1947 had joined the DeGasperi coalition. The PSI, on the other hand, came under the domination of its left wing and in January 1948 agreed to the formation of a national "Democratic Popular Front," "an electoral alliance between the Communist and Socialist parties who were to present themselves to the electorate as a single party with a single list of candidates."[7]

The creation of the "Front" further polarized Italian domestic politics and the ensuing campaign was an unequivocal struggle between the Left and the forces of anticommunism. Arrayed in opposition to the "Front" was an alignment of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Republicans, although no formal electoral or postelectoral alliance had been concluded among them. In light of the fervently pro-Western stance of the Christian Democrats and their allies, the outspokenly anti-American position of the Front, and the Communist coup in Prague in February 1948, the United States officially undertook a direct anti-Left role in the 1948 elections in Italy. Indeed, during the 1948 parliamentary campaign "America took the gloves off for the first time."[8]

Unlike the situation in 1947 when American involvement in Italian affairs was largely economic and diplomatic in nature, in the 1948 election campaign the United States massively intervened politically in Italian internal affairs. Viewing Italy as a crucial battleground between the United States and the Soviet Union, American officials—with virtual unanimity in both the executive and legislative branches—thought and acted as if the importance of these elections far transcended national boundaries, believing that it was essential to U.S. interests, not to say ultimate survival, for the Christian Democrats and their allies to emerge victorious in the electoral campaign. Testifying before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee in the spring of 1948, Secretary of State George Marshall summarized prevailing official views:

> In the world in which we live our national security can no longer be effectively weighed and dealt with in terms of the Western Hemisphere. . . . I wish to express . . .

[6] Confidential Interview; Faenza and Fini, pp. 208–222.

[7] Giuseppe Mammarella, *Italy After Fascism: A Political History, 1943–1963* (Montreal: Mario Casalini Ltd., 1964), p. 189. See Norman Kogan, *A Political History of Postwar Italy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), pp. 47–53.

[8] *The Economist* (London), April 24, 1948, p. 658.

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> concern over the accelerated trend in Europe. In the short years since the end of hostilities, this trend has grown from a trickle into a torrent. One by one, the Balkan States, except Greece, lost all semblance of national independence. Then two friendly nations—first Hungary and last week Czechoslovakia—have been forced into complete submission to Communist control. Within one month, the people of Italy, whose Government we had a large part in reconstituting, will hold a national election. . . . The outcome of that election has an importance far beyond local Italian affairs. It will decide not only whether Italy will continue with its restoration into a true democracy. It will foretell whether the disintegration to which I have referred may reach the shores of the Atlantic.[9]

For the U.S. government, the 1948 elections placed into question U.S. national security vis-à-vis communism in the Mediterranean and in all of Europe. In a recently declassified February 10, 1948 report on the U.S. position with respect to Italy, the National Security Council stated U.S. interests and objectives in Italy:

> The basic objective of the United States in Italy is to establish and maintain in that key country conditions favorable to our national security. Current U.S. policies toward Italy include measures intended to preserve Italy as an independent, democratic state, freiendly to the United States, and capable of effective participation in the resistance to Communist expansion.[10]

Consequently, before the election the United States utilized virtually every conceivable political and economic link that it had with Italy in an attempt to stop the Democratic Popular Front. First, and most important, the United States continued its large assistance program to Italy but made it clear that all economic aid, including Marshall Plan funds, would be terminated if the Left was successful in the upcoming election.[11] In addition, the United States instituted a number of political measures to aid the DeGasperi government which included intensified pro-DC propaganda activities and encouragement of Americans of Italian extraction to write to their relatives urging them to vote for the Christian Democratic party.[12]

Parallel to these moves designed to bolster the electoral strength of the anti-communist forces in Italy, U.S. policy makers also considered what the American response should be if the Leftist parties rose to power. Three different scenarios were considered: the Left would win only a plurality of the votes and thus enter a government coalition along with some of the moderate parties; the Front would win an absolute majority in the election; or the Left in defeat would stage an armed insurrection to gain control of the government. In the first eventuality,

[9] *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, XVIII (March 28, 1948), p. 428.

[10] "The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy (NSC 1/2)" March 5, 1948, *Foreign Relations*, 1948, III, p. 766.

[11] See C.L. Sulzberger, *A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries (1934-1953)* (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 381. *L'Unita*, March 6, 1948, p. 4.

[12] Kogan, p. 51. See Ernest Rossi, *The United States and the 1948 Italian Elections* (Ph.D. Diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1964), pp. 240–369.

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U.S. policy was to be oriented toward reinforcing moderate elements in Italy by minimizing the effects of Communist participation, continuing efforts to detach the Socialists from the Communists, and strengthening the military position of the United States in the Mediterranean.[13] Italy would still remain within the political, economic, and military boundaries of the Western camp, but it would be carefully supervised by U.S. forces.

If an absolute majority voted for the Leftist slate, U.S. policy foresaw the need for a much more severe stance. On March 9, 1948, the NSC noted that "in the event the Communists obtained domination of the Italian government by legal means, the United States should:

a. Immediately undertake a limited military mobilization and announce this action as a clear indication of determination to oppose Communist aggression in Italy and elsewhere.
b. Further strengthen its military position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean.
c. Initiate combined military staff planning with other European selected nations.
d. Provide the anti-Communist Italian underground with financial and military assistance.
e. Oppose Italian membership in the United Nations."[14]

The maneuvers suggested were designed to quarantine Italy from the rest of the countries in the Mediterranean area and Europe. Only if the Left were to attempt an armed insurrection was U.S. policy clearly oriented toward immediate military intervention by U.S. troops to secure the island of Sicily and Sardinia and to "stabilize" the Italian peninsula at the request of the government.[15]

When the 1948 electoral campaign was over and the returns were in, the Christian Democratic Party emerged as the dominant party in Italy with 48.5 percent of the vote and an absolute majority in Parliament. The Front fell almost one million votes short of its combined Communist-Socialist vote for the 1946 Constituent Assembly elections due in large part to the surprising show of strength on the part of the Saragat Socialists who polled 7.1 percent of the vote. The election results, moreover, represented a triumph for the United States which had played such an active role in the course of the election campaign. With a firmly pro-Western Christian Democratic party in power, the United States looked forward to an era of stability in Italian politics, and from 1948 into the '60s, U.S. policy was firmly oriented toward the encouragement

[13] "Position of the United States With Respect to Italy in the Light of the Possibility of Communist Participation in the Government by Legal Means (NSC 1/3)," March 8, 1948, *Foreign Relations*, p. 779.

[14] Ibid.

[15] "NSC 1/2," *Foreign Relations*, p. 769.

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and support of the DC centrist coalition which included the Republicans, Social Democrats, and Liberals.

Moreover, the U.S. experience during the 1948 Italian election led to the development of fixed principles that were to guide the formulation and conduct of U.S. policy in Italy till the early 1960s: The United States would not passively accept direct Leftist participation in an Italian government coalition as a subordinate or dominant partner because in either case this would be the prelude to a gradual shift of Italy out of the Western bloc and imposition of Soviet influence over a key Mediterranean country; the United States was ready to use a range of political, military, economic, and psychological measures to prevent such an eventuality; the United States would provide various kinds of support to anticommunist forces in Italy to enable them to keep free from Communist domination or influence; the DC was the central focus for the U.S. anticommunist strategy; the U.S. government encouraged anticommunist private individuals to establish contacts with their Italian counterparts; and the Socialists remained beyond the pale and were deemed unacceptable as coalition partners given their ties with the Communists, their pro-Soviet stance, and their opposition to NATO.

The Kennedy Administration and the Opening to the Left, 1960–1963

The need to find an alternative to this policy became an increasingly important political problem after the 1953 parliamentary elections. What followed between 1953 and 1960 was a period of relative government instability, fueled to a great extent by debate within the DC about which alternative (leftist or rightist) to follow. The Social Democrats, Republicans, and leftwing factions of the DC came out in support of a suggestion put forward by PSI leader Nenni in 1953 of an opening of the government to the Socialists, that is, a DC-PSI coalition. Earlier in 1953 the PSI had begun to withdraw from the Communist orbit. This process was accelerated by the events of 1956 in Hungary which altered the Socialists' views of the Soviet Union and the Western Alliance. Nevertheless, Nenni's initial suggestion that the DC-centrist coalition be replaced by an "opening to the left" (*apertura a sinistra*) was strongly opposed by a majority of the Christian Democratic party, the Liberals, business groups, the Church, and the U.S. government. These forces feared that the Socialists would serve as a Trojan horse within the government for the Communists and doubted very seriously the sincerity of the PSI's change of heart on international issues. Despite these misgivings, in the late 1950s and early '60s, momentum slowly built up inside Italy behind the *apertura*. Leaders like Fanfani and LaPira began to turn opinion around within the DC, the Liberals became increasingly estranged from the other centrist parties, the Church under the new leadership of Pope John XXIII gradually softened its anti-PSI stance, and some parts of the business community increased their dealings

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with the Socialists.[16] However, before 1961 there was no public sign of change in the anti-Socialist position of the United States.

The first impetus for a change in the U.S. government's total opposition to the Socialists came during the early months of the new Kennedy administration as part of a general re-evaluation of U.S. foreign policy. In early March 1961, President Kennedy sent the New Frontier's Ambassador-at-Large, W. Averell Harriman, to Rome on a goodwill and fact-finding mission. During his three days in Rome Harriman met with a number of Italian public and private figures who explained to him the need for a new kind of government coalition, namely, the *apertura a sinistra*, that could effectively meet the pressing problems of the country. For his part, Harriman continually stressed the Kennedy administration's willingness to rethink past policies and its strong commitment to economic and social change around the world. Harriman came away from his visit to Rome convinced that effective economic and social reforms in Italy were impossible without bringing the Socialists into the government coalition. He also concluded that U.S. support for the Socialists would likely take the PSI out of the PCI's orbit, hence weakening—and perhaps isolating—the Communists. Harriman has subsequently noted that "a change in American policy was not a liberal question (in 1961), it was the sensible thing to do."[17]

Upon his return to Washington, Harriman argued for an openly sympathetic U.S. policy toward the center-left prospect in Italy and on March 30, 1961 he briefed President Kennedy and his national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, on the need for a change in American policy. Harriman's suggestions were in line with the views of Kennedy's special assistant, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Both Harriman and Schlesinger advised the president in the spring of 1961 to offer a formal invitation to Premier Amintore Fanfani to visit Washington.

For Arthur Schlesinger and other members of the administration, the Fanfani visit (scheduled for June 12–14) provided an obvious opportunity to signal a new departure in American policy toward Italy. Schlesinger knew that in preparation for these talks various senior officials in Washington would have to review the whole gamut of issues of common concern to Fanfani and President Kennedy. Schlesinger envisaged this review—and the subsequent Fanfani-Kennedy talks themselves—as the vehicles for bringing about a change in U.S. policy.

Consequently, in late May 1961 Schlesinger actively mobilized allies who would help to allay possible opposition to a change in U.S. policy toward the Socialists. In contrast to the late 1940s, few congressmen or domestic interest groups in early 1961 were actively concerned about Italian domestic politics or the *apertura* issue.[18] Thus Schlesinger's lobbying in favor of the

[16] See Giuseppe Tamburrano, *Storia e cronaca del centro sinistra* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1971), pp. 27–113.

[17] Interview with W. Averell Harriman, March 4, 1971.

[18] Interview with Murray Frank, July 12, 1972. Interview with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., October 22, 1970.

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center-left was concentrated on the political and administrative organs involved in the formulation of U.S. policy toward Italy. Within the White House Schlesinger was successful in convincing Robert Komer, Mediterranean specialist of the National Security Council Staff, and his chief, McGeorge Bundy, of the wisdom of his efforts to change U.S. policy toward Italy.

At the various agencies Schlesinger got in touch with Under Secretary Chester Bowles at the State Department; William Bundy of the Office of International Security Affairs at the Defense Department; Deputy Director for Intelligence, Robert Amory, Jr., and European Analyst, Dana Durand, at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Secretary Arthur Goldberg at the Labor Department; and Edward R. Murrow, Director of the United States Information Agency.

In addition to consulting these potential supporters, Schlesinger got in touch with the known opponents of change in the U.S. position on the *apertura* question—the Bureau of European Affairs (EUR) at the State Department—in hopes of persuading EUR to change U.S. policy toward Italy. In late May he invited Foreign Service officer William Blue, Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, and William Knight, the Italian Desk Officer, to the White House for a meeting.

Both Blue and Knight had had some previous experience in Italian affairs. Blue had served in Naples during and immediately after the war and Knight had been posted to the U.S. Embassy in Rome from 1947 to 1951 and had then served as the Italian Desk Officer from 1951 to 1955. Both men argued that the formation of a center-left coalition in Italy in 1961 would be premature and dangerous. Echoing the views of Deputy Chief of Mission Outerbridge Horsey, and clearly reflecting the Embassy's reporting from Rome, Blue and Knight said that allowing the Socialists in the government would pose great risks for the United States, given that the Socialists might cause the Italian government to withdraw from NATO and the European Community and to nationalize a host of Italian industries, including perhaps some U.S. subsidiaries.[19] Both men felt that if the Socialists were to enter the governing majority, their entry should be gradual and should result solely from Italian political maneuvering and not from any U.S. encouragement.[20]

In response Schlesinger attempted to convince Blue and Knight that they were mistaken in their judgments about the positions the Socialists favored and the effect of Socialist participation in the government on Italian policy. Schlesinger argued that Socialist participation in the government would isolate the PCI on the extreme left of the political spectrum and would bring to the Italian government the progressive leadership it needed to meet long-neglected economic and social problems. Schlesinger observed that if the United States continued to pursue past policy, it would dangerously polarize Italian politics by driving the PSI into the PCI's orbit and would forestall any

[19] Interview with William Blue, April 12, 1971.

[20] Ibid. Interview with William Knight, October 22, 1971.

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meaningful reform in Italy. Finally, Schlesinger noted that the formation of a center-left government would not bring Italy to a neutralist position but, on the contrary, would likely make Italy a "more effective supporter of the foreign policy of the Kennedy Administration in Europe and elsewhere (e.g., in Latin America)."[21] In the end, neither side was able to convince the other. Blue and Knight left the White House certain that Schlesinger was naive, inexperienced, and badly informed about Italian politics. Schlesinger, on the other hand, was convinced that the Italian Desk in 1961 was manned by "typical" Foreign Service officers—bureaucrats who were inextricably committed to defending the status quo and for whom "risks always outweighed opportunities."[22]

On June 11, 1961 Prime Minister Fanfani arrived in Washington accompanied by Foreign Minister Antonio Segni and several of Segni's top aides. Among the officials they conferred with were: President Kennedy; Secretary Rusk, Under Secretary Ball, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Tyler of the State Department; Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul Nitze; and presidential aides McGeorge Bundy and Arthur Schlesinger. In these talks, many salient international issues were canvassed.

Although "the opening to the left" was not on the formal agenda, President Kennedy raised the issue in private with Prime Minister Fanfani and "formulated a position of sympathy toward the Italian Socialists."[23] In addition, he told Fanfani that "if the Italian Prime Minister thought it a good idea, we (the United States) would watch developments with sympathy."[24]

In light of President Kennedy's personal expression of sympathy for the *apertura* during the Fanfani visit, Arthur Schlesinger assumed that subsequent American policy—as formulated and implemented by the State Department—would be sympathetic to the formation of a center-left coalition in Italy. However, he was mistaken. When the Bureau of European Affairs at the State Department and the Embassy in Rome learned of President Kennedy's private comments to Fanfani, they were convinced that Kennedy's sympathy—if such sympathy had actually been expressed—represented the private talk of one politician to another and nothing more. They did not believe that "President Kennedy had any particular views on the question one way or the other" or that "he had made a decision to change U.S. policy toward Italy."[25] In the absence of a directive from Secretary Rusk, neither EUR nor the Embassy was inclined to act as if there had been an official change in U.S. policy.[26]

Unable to convince the "working levels" of the State Department of the

[21] Interview with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., October 22, 1970.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid. Interview with McGeorge Bundy, May 18, 1971.
[24] Arthur Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days* (Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 878.
[25] Confidential Interview.
[26] Interviews with Outerbridge Horsey, March 2, 1971 and Foy Kohler, February 2, 1971.

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importance of President Kennedy's private comments to Prime Minister Fanfani, Schlesinger then tried to persuade the President to communicate directly with Secretary Rusk. Fearing that there might be high political costs in a direct confrontation with the State Department, Kennedy was unwilling to take the risk over what he considered to be a relatively minor issue. Hence the president refused to take Schlesinger's advice to intervene with Secretary Rusk or, for that matter, to concern himself actively with the *apertura* issue.[27]

What Schlesinger wanted to do was to change the tone and substance of U.S. policy in such a way as to indicate to the top-ranking Italian leaders that the U.S. government was sympathetic to the formation of a center-left coalition, provided the Italians themselves decided upon such a development. For Schlesinger believed, rightly or wrongly, that:

> Italian officials were so deeply persuaded about U.S. opposition to the *apertura* by a dozen years of conditioning . . . that it was necessary to take steps to convey the impression that the United States would not interpose any obstacle or veto if the Italians wanted it ('the opening') . . .[28]

In an effort to change that policy, Schlesinger decided to go around, rather than through, EUR and the Embassy. With the tacit consent of President Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy, he tried to convey to Italian leaders in the fall of 1961 a changed U.S. policy toward the center-left. He began by traveling to Rome in September where, without the knowledge of the Embassy, he met with Pietro Nenni, head of the Socialists, Ugo LaMalfa, chief of the Republicans, and Giusseppe Saragat, leader of the Social Democrats. In subsequent talks with Italian leaders traveling in the United States, Schlesinger made the same points, frequently expressing fervent sympathy for the *apertura* movement. He also attempted to convey to Italian officials a changed American policy toward the "opening to the left" through correspondence on White House stationery.[29] Finally, Schlesinger used such personal friends as Senator Hubert Humphrey, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizational Affairs Richard Gardner (currently U.S. Ambassador to Italy), and CIA senior analyst Dana Durand to convey word of a new U.S. policy.

Neither the Italian Desk nor the Embassy was pleased by the efforts of Schlesinger and his allies to win acceptance for the *apertura* movement. Both the Desk and the Embassy felt that Italy was not Schlesinger's legitimate field of responsibility, particularly since he was unable to obtain a mandate from the president to encourage "the opening to the left." They also felt he and his friends were acting in "an unauthorized, unprincipled, and amateurish"

[27] Interview with McGeorge Bundy, May 18, 1971.

[28] Interview with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., November 17, 1971.

[29] See Mauro Lucentini, "Le carte di Kennedy," *Il Mondo*, September 6, 1970, pp. 4–5. It should be noted that Schlesinger has since denied writing letters to Italian politicians on White House stationery regarding the *apertura*. Interview October 22, 1970.

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manner in Italy and that their activities had a "disruptive" effect on the operations of the Embassy and on U.S. policy.[30]

In the State Department it was reasoned that it would be counter-productive in the long run and damaging to America's interest if "we became associated (with), or in fact, really pushed for the development of the center-left."[31] As former Ambassador Reinhardt has explained:

> It was anybody's guess as to whether a coalition of this character could hold together, and if the United States had become committed, in one way, and the subsequent developments had pulled this thing apart, it's quite apparent . . . that the U.S. would have lost considerably. Furthermore, there was another element in this development . . . And that was this: that a coalition of this kind would only be put together as a result of very intense bargaining on the part of the two parties. If we had actually pushed one way or the other we would have assumed a direct responsibility, (a) for the success or failure of the establishment of such a coalition, and (b) for the nature of the policies that would subsequently follow.[32]

In an attempt to stop Schlesinger's pro-*apertura* activities, several members of the State Department and the Embassy in Rome undertook a vigorous campaign to reach the top decision makers in the White House. For example, between September and December 1961, Deputy Chief of Mission Horsey personally went to Washington and tried to: convince senior State Department officials of the dangers in allowing the Socialists to enter the government coalition; get the 1961 National Intelligence Estimate for Italy rewritten; and "educate" Schlesinger in depth about Italy. All of these efforts failed to change Schlesinger's views.

In late November 1961, as change in the Italian governing coalition became increasingly likely, a meeting was held at the Embassy in Rome to discuss the *apertura* movement and its consequences for American foreign policy. At the meeting Military Attaché Vernon Walters forcefully advocated the use of U.S. troops to prevent the PSI from entering the government coalition. Walters's argument was supported by key members of the CIA station in Rome. However, it should be noted that the CIA was not unanimous in support of a hard line toward the PSI. The agency was, in fact, split on the issue as was much of the U.S. government. Though several CIA operatives in Rome advocated military action, the key European analysts in Washington were favorable to the center-left. Conflicting attitudes between Washington and Rome and within single agencies permitted moderates to prevail at the November meeting, and a consensus emerged according to which the Embassy would assume a "hands-off" policy if the PSI entered the govern-

[30] G. Frederick Reinhardt, Recorded Interview by Richard O'Connor, November 1966, John F. Kennedy Library, 6. Interviews with William Blue, April 12, 1971 and Outerbridge Horsey, March 2, 1971.

[31] Reinhardt, p. 7.

[32] Ibid., p. 4.

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ment.[33] Thereafter, the possibility of U.S. intervention just before or after the consummation of an "opening to the left" was excluded from serious consideration.

In short, by the end of 1961 the various bureaucratic elements within the U.S. government had acquiesced in the prospect of Socialists entering an Italian government coalition. Undeniably, it was the initiative taken by Italian political leaders which brought the center-left experiment to fruition, but it seems that the efforts of some U.S. officials helped to accelerate the entry of the Socialists into the government and, at a minimum, differences within the U.S. government over the Socialists dissuaded the United States from trying to exercise a veto power against the *apertura*. Although the U.S. government adopted a somewhat changed policy toward the PSI during the Kennedy administration, it did not alter its view of the Communists. On the contrary, the acceptance of the Socialists was seen by many U.S. officials as an integral part, and even a refinement, of an American anticommunist strategy in Italy. Thus the center-left experiment was to be subsequently judged by many in relation to its effectiveness in reducing the strength of the Communist party in Italian affairs.

U.S. Policy and the PCI, 1970–1976

With the creation of the first Aldo Moro government on December 4, 1963, the center-left alternative achieved full take-off and acceptance among a wide variety of political circles in the United States and Italy. A virtually unanimous consensus had been reached within the U.S. government on the positive nature of the center-left. The anti-PSI forces in the Embassy in Rome and in the State Department were neutralized or shifted to other areas of concern. Symptomatic of these changes was the official establishment of ties between the U.S. government and the PSI. In 1962–63 four top-ranking Socialists visited the United States as guests of the government; PSI leader Nenni was received by Ambassador Reinhardt; and John Kennedy, during his visit to Italy between June 30 and July 2, 1963, unequivocally conveyed U.S. backing for the *apertura* experiment in his conversations with leading government officials.

Though the tragic events of November 22, 1963 unexpectedly elevated Lyndon B. Johnson to the presidency, U.S. policy toward Italy remained unchanged. The position established by John Kennedy and his advisers on the "opening to the left" was carried forward through the Johnson years. Indeed, it could be argued that until 1968 U.S. policy toward Italy did not change as it did toward other countries, such as Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, and Greece where the main problem was the collapse of the moderate forces on which U.S. postwar policies had been based. Italy, by contrast,

[33] Confidential Interview.

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seemed rather reassuring. The DC had not collapsed in the 1963 parliamentary elections as a result of the *apertura*; the PSI maintained its acceptance of NATO and its relations with the PCI remained strained;[34] and by October 1966 moves toward the creation of a unified Socialist party (PSU) had been consummated.[35]

It was not until 1969 that enthusiasm for the center-left really began to wane in parts of the U.S. government. The reasons for disenchantment are easy to find. The Italian parliamentary elections in 1968 showed that the PSU was incapable of transforming itself into an alternative bloc for leftist votes. Running on separate tickets in 1963, the two components of the Italian Socialist movement gained 19.9 percent of the vote. Five years later, after unification, the PSU was able to maintain only 14.5 percent of its previous electoral base from which it was supposed to challenge the Communists. A good portion of that loss went to the PSIUP (Italian Socialist Party for Proletarian Unity) which broke off from the PSI in 1964 in opposition to the center-left. In contrast to the PSU, the PCI continued to make steady gains. In 1963 the PCI received 25.3 percent of the vote, and in 1968, 26.9 percent. Even more disconcerting was the amount of bickering that continued to lacerate the internal workings of the PSU. Not unexpectedly, the Unified Socialists split again into two parties in July 1969. Persistent divisions within the PSU had rendered it less effective than anticipated in its dealings with the DC and in pushing for socioeconomic reforms. The response to this failure took the form of a wave of student and worker protest strikes and demonstrations that culminated in the "hot autumn" of 1969.

In many ways 1969 represents a watershed in the evolution of Italian politics. It was in that year that possible Communist participation in the government began to assume an explicit form and name—Ciriaco De Mita's "constitutional pact" (working out common agreements on policy) with the PCI. It was also a year when events taking place abroad would soon have an effect on the development of Italian affairs and on the position taken by the United States in response to those developments. Most important, it was the year that Richard M. Nixon became president; Graham Martin was soon thereafter appointed Ambassador to Italy.

Before arriving in Italy, Martin had served as U.S. Ambassador to Thailand (from 1963 to 1967) during the militarization of the country as part of the Vietnam build-up. The Italian assignment came as the result of a shrewdly cultivated friendship with Richard Nixon who, during Martin's ambassadorship, made several trips to Thailand. Robert Anson writes that Martin treated private citizen Nixon with "a deference normally reserved for a Chief of State," and when Nixon became president he saw to it that the State Department did "something for Graham Martin."[36] Martin's tour in Italy lasted

[34] The PSI, however, maintained its working relationship with the PCI in many cities and provinces in the Red Belt regions.

[35] Tamburrano argues that the PSU was an example of a "unification at the top," p. 321.

[36] Robert S. Anson, "The Last of the American Caesars," *New Times*, July 10, 1975, p. 22.

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until April 1973 when President Nixon personally picked him to head the Embassy in Saigon. He was the last U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam.

During Martin's years in Italy, there was little in the Italian or American press that distinguished his tour from those of his predecessors. Little attention was given in the media to the role played by the ambassador or other officials in the formulation of U.S. policy toward Italy, and it was only hinted sporadically that the U.S. government had a continuing program of involvement in internal Italian affairs. For example, in 1971 rumors appeared in the American press that the U.S. government had undertaken to finance the Christian Democrats and other anticommunist parties in preparation for the parliamentary elections expected in 1973. However, the Italian government denied any such interference. The official position was that the United States was solely interested in the continuity of Italy's foreign policy as formulated by the center-left coalition.[37] And it was not until publication in 1976 of the report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, "The Pike Report," that the extent of U.S. efforts under Martin to aid the noncommunist parties became fully known. The Pike Report revealed that the U.S. government had allocated approximately $10 million to the 1972 parliamentary elections. The request cited the need to reduce interparty conflict and to demonstrate U.S. solidarity with the goals championed by the Italian anticommunist parties.[38]

This kind of aid program was not, in fact, an innovation instituted by Graham Martin. In the previous two decades, approximately $65 million had been allocated to various Italian political parties, organizations, and individuals by the U.S. government. However, what did change under Ambassador Martin was the choice of recipients and the way the money was allocated. In previous years the primary, if not exclusive, foci of U.S. financial assistance were the democratic centrist parties, especially the DC, and the financial arrangements between the Embassy and the recipients were handled by the CIA station in Rome. Martin undertook personally to control decisions of who was to receive money and how it was to be distributed. More important, Martin extended financial support to Italian political groups and individuals on the far right of the political spectrum (that is, to forces close to the neofascist Italian Social Movement, MSI).[39]

The basic motive for Martin's innovative dispersal program was an anticommunist fear. As one observer has noted, "he [Martin] went to Italy with a great anxiety, if not fear, of the worldwide Communist conspiracy."[40] This fear of communism inevitably colored Martin's evaluation of Italian political developments and specific policy recommendations. An example of his bias appears in the February 12, 1971 Annual Report of the Rome Embassy to the State Department, which was drafted by Deputy Chief of Mission Wells

[37] See *The New York Times*, February 27, 1971.

[38] See "The CIA Report the President Doesn't Want You to Read," *The Village Voice*, February 16, 1976, pp. 36–38.

[39] Ibid. Confidential Interview.

[40] Anson, p. 21.

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Stabler and approved and signed by the Ambassador. In the Report Martin declared that the United States had a crucial stake in the upcoming parliamentary elections. He asserted that the United States had a vast, and sometimes overlooked, reservoir of goodwill and influence at its command, and to use this influence to the fullest, it had to show its solidarity with "certain domestic political forces." One of the justifications offered for this policy was the fear of a broad leftist coalition that could win a resounding victory. Martin felt that "there was too much at stake in preparation for the election campaign for the U.S. to remain detached." He saw the priorities for U.S. intervention in aid of the anticommunist parties in the following order: provision of political encouragement, financial support, and then active help. The latter contingency policy was formulated in such a way that even a military intervention in Italian politics, including a coup d'état, would be conceivable if all other efforts to block the PCI from coming to power failed.[41]

Taken in this perspective, the revelation in the Pike Report of Martin's transfer of $800,000 to a rightist "local intelligence official" (namely, Vito Miceli, head of Italy's Defense Intelligence Service, SID) to conduct a "propaganda effort" fits with the ambassador's overall view of communism and Italian affairs. This new departure in funding, however, disturbed the CIA station chief in Rome and many bureaucrats in Washington concerned with U.S. policy toward Italy. For it constituted a deviation from normal American policy: the ambassador was personally in charge of the operation (which meant that covert funding, if discovered, could tarnish all other operations connected with the Embassy); the U.S. government was undertaking to finance a noted right-wing sympathizer with close ties to the neofascists, a development which would inevitably identify the United States with the far right of the Italian political spectrum; and the U.S. government might be drawn into domestic events in Italy from which there would be no easy exit.[42]

Not surprisingly, considerable tension arose between Martin and bureaucratic elements in both the State Department and CIA over the new U.S. covert funding policy. The following exchange of views reported in a cable from the Rome CIA chief of station to Washington illustrates that Martin had his own ideas about proper U.S. policy toward Italy and wanted to run his own show. Unlike many officials in Washington and Rome, he was more interested in the long run than in the short-term benefits of the project to finance Miceli:

> Chief of Station: Do you really care if his (Miceli's) efforts are successful or not?
>
> Graham Martin: Yes, I do, but not a helluva lot. The important thing is to demonstrate solidarity for the long pull.[43]

And Martin cared enough about demonstrating this "solidarity" that at one

[41] Confidential Interview.
[42] Confidential Interview.
[43] *The Village Voice*, p. 39.

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point he threatened to have the Embassy Marine guards carry off the CIA station chief over the disposition of the black money.[44]

To Martin and to his successor, John Volpe (1973–76), demonstrating "solidarity for the long pull" meant, in essence, the establishment of a series of contacts and policy measures that would serve as the building blocks for a closer relationship between the United States and staunchly anticommunist, rightist elements within Italy. Both Martin and Volpe believed that only these elements were vigorous enough to prevent the entry of the communists into a governing coalition. Accordingly, both ambassadors endeavored to test alternatives to U.S. policy in support of Christian Democracy in an effort to stem the increase of Communist electoral strength and to shore up the Right. Both failed, in part because bureaucratic elements in the State Department and CIA opposed their ideas and helped to ensure the futility of their efforts.[45]

Major causes of this failure were the ephemeral nature of right-wing support in Italy and the lack of qualified individuals and institutions upon which to build a rightist alternative. In addition, foreign multinational corporations, which had complemented U.S. support for the Christian Democrats in the past, were not inclined to engage in any substantial funding of the Right. In short, the Right in Italy, although the focus of much of Martin's and Volpe's anticommunist attention, lacked both political and economic clout from 1969 to 1976 and proved incapable of halting the gains of the Communists.[46]

Conclusion

The key question for U.S. policy makers in 1978 is not whether the Communists will enter the Italian government, for in March of this year they joined the governing parliamentary coalition. The issue is what should U.S. policy be toward a full consummation of the *compromesso storico* (historic compromise between the DC and PCI), through which the PCI would gain control of key cabinet posts and ministries. It is clear that the U.S. government, for both internal and external reasons, no longer has the margin of maneuver to prevent such a governing coalition in Italy, or elsewhere in Europe, by using force. As Victor Zorza perceptively noted in 1974, "The Soviet Union can afford to invade its allies. The U.S. cannot, and will not, and must therefore find other ways of dealing with the problem of the growth of Communist forces within the western democracies."[47] If Zorza's observation continues to pertain to the Italian situation—and we believe that

[44] See Roger Morris, *Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 277.

[45] Confidential Interview.

[46] For a discussion of the MSI's electoral fortunes in the 1970s, see Robert Leonardi, "The Smaller Parties in the 1976 Italian Elections" in Howard Penniman (ed.), *Italy at the Polls* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), forthcoming.

[47] *The New York Times*, November 5, 1974.

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it does—than the U.S. government must re-examine past policy toward Italy to see what lessons can be learned from U.S. attitudes toward the Italian Left during the postwar period.

The analysis presented in this paper leads to at least three major conclusions. U.S. policy toward the Left in Italy—in the current instance toward the PCI—will likely be framed in the overall context of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Many on the Right in both Italy and the United States argue that the recent gains of the PCI are a direct consequence of the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger and now Carter policy of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union. The influence of détente on Italian electoral politics is undoubtedly more complicated than the Right would suggest. But it is likely that future U.S.-Soviet relations will affect U.S. policies toward Italian politics. If, for example, the relationship between the two superpowers should cool, one can expect the United States to adopt a harder line toward the PCI. However, if détente with the Soviet Union continues, at a minimum pressures will build on American policy makers to treat the PCI much as it treats the other major parties in Italy.[48]

A few people within the U.S. government will play determinative roles in shaping future policy toward the Left in Italy, a policy which will most likely have considerable effect on the course of Italian domestic political developments. As we have shown in the preceding analysis, during certain critical periods in Italian postwar history political leaders in Italy have been highly sensitive to official U.S. views about Italian politics. Indeed, for most of the postwar period the United States has influenced the composition of the Italian governing coalition. Whether the United States will be able to exercise such a high degree of influence over the possible consummation of the *compromesso storico* is questionable. But it is likely, given the continuing dependence of the Italian economy on outside economic assistance,[49] that Italian officials will remain extremely sensitive to the attitudes, words, and actions of the U.S. president, the secretary of state, the ambassador in Rome, and the White House staff on the matter of direct Communist entry into the Italian government.

If the president of the United States decides to change U.S. policy toward the Left in Italy, he will likely encounter stubborn resistance from those parts of the government bureaucracy most concerned with Italy. Postwar policy toward Italian politics is a history of bureaucratic resistance to policy changes, particularly in the absence of overt presidential involvement. In the early 1960s presidential assistant Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. tried to shift U.S. policy to a more sympathetic stance toward the PSI only to be resisted by the State Department and the Embassy in Rome.

Again in the early 1970s Ambassador Graham Martin met with similar resistance when he attempted to institute innovative covert funding practices

[48] Confidential Interview.

[49] See Suzanne Berger, "Italy On the Threshold or the Brink?" in David Landes (ed.), *Western Europe: The Trials of Partnership* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977), pp. 209–236.

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in Rome. Only in 1947–48 when the Truman administration shifted to a policy of massive, overt opposition to the Communists did a new policy toward Italy have virtually unanimous support within the U.S. government. And it should be emphasized that in this instance President Truman personally played an active role in enunciating and carrying out the new policy, while neither Kennedy nor Nixon opted to involve himself directly in bureaucratic squabbling or to support new policy initiatives.

At present the Carter administration appears to favor a two-pronged policy toward the PCI: no encouragement whatsoever of the impression that the United States is indifferent to the growth of Italian Communist forces or favorably disposed to the prospect of Communist entry into the government;[50] no overt interference in Italy's internal affairs either through CIA payments to anticommunist elements or through threats to punish the Italian people should they choose to bring the Communists directly into the government.[51] The second part of this policy represents a noteworthy departure from past American practice in Italy. And if President Carter is seriously committed to renouncing U.S. interference in Italian politics, he would be well advised to explain this policy in the most unambiguous terms to the U.S. government bureaucracy and the American people. For only by doing so will he be able to avoid the kind of bureaucratic "drag" and intra-Executive sniping that have characterized U.S. policy initiatives toward Italian politics during earlier eras of the postwar period.*

[50] See "U.S. Statement on Italy, January 12, 1978," *The New York Times*, January 13, 1978.

[51] See "Interview with the President" by David Dimbly et. al., May 2, 1977 (The White House: Office of the White House Press Secretary), pp. 10–11. "Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski," *Congressional Record*, October 26, 1977, pp. E. 6592–6594; and Interview with U.S. Ambassador Richard Gardner, *Corriere della Sera*, November 15, 1977.

* The views expressed in this paper are the authors' and do not represent the views of any organization or institution.

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Ethnic Political Transition in Boston, 1884–1933: Some Lessons for Contemporary Cities

PETER K. EISINGER

Ethnic political transition occurs when the ethnic or racial group which has traditionally occupied the major roles in the formal political structure loses control of government over the long term to a newly emergent group. Such transition is a well-established pattern in American cities. Numerous examples of this process occurred in the cities and towns of New England and the Middle West in the decades around the turn of the century, as growing numbers of immigrant stock voters made possible the seizure of formal political power from men of Yankee stock. The process of transition is again under way in Detroit, Atlanta, Newark, and New Orleans where developing black majorities are literally changing the complexion of those who control city hall.

Though it is important to inquire just how the emergent group adjusts to its new power, it is equally critical to examine the responses of the newly displaced group to its unaccustomed status as a political minority. Scholars have been relatively uninterested in the modes of adjustment of politically displaced groups. Thus the basic dimensions of the experience of displacement—the underside of the ethnic political transition process in effect—have not been described.[1]

[1] Two exceptions to this statement are at least partially relevant. One is Donald Rothchild's *Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya* (N.Y.: Oxford, 1973), which looks at white adjustments to black rule in Kenya, among other things. The other is Kenneth Underwood's *Protestant and*

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The importance of examining this aspect of the transition process, however, goes beyond simple description, for the modes of adjustment to displacement are of considerable consequence to the new governors. Any group which has long held political power is likely to possess a variety of major resources. While members of that traditionally dominant group were in control of government, they could count on tapping those resources as they sought to govern. This is not to argue that when government and private sector elites belong to the same ethnic or racial group that intragroup conflict is eliminated. All it suggests is that significant resources controlled by actors outside of city hall are easily accessible to those who run the government.[2]

The loss by a particular ethnic or racial group of majority status in the local electorate does not, of course, imply that their resources vanish. And clearly, the disposition of these resources of money, expertise, prestige, and support bears heavily on the ability of the new group to govern. Will the displaced group make its resources available to the new occupants of city hall for such purposes as economic and urban development, political support, and public service? Or will those resources be withdrawn from the civic arena or even turned to opposition and obstruction? These questions, important in any circumstances, assume even greater significance when ethnic transition coincides with the accession to political power of a socioeconomically disadvantaged group—such as the Irish in the nineteenth century or the blacks today—who cannot command resources among their fellow-ethnics equivalent to those held by the displaced. Just as the effectiveness of Irish urban government was in part dependent upon the resources of Yankee businessmen,[3] so too is effective black government today dependent in some measure on urban white elites.

To understand the phenomenon of displacement in ethnic transition it is useful to begin by examining a situation in which the process has been fully played out. The Yankee response to the consolidation of Irish power in Boston from the 1880s to the 1930s provides an apt example. Though a historical case study does not promise to predict the character of an apparently similar chain of events currently in its early stages, such as the transitions in Detroit and Atlanta, it may nevertheless serve a useful heuristic purpose. Not only may we begin to gain some notion of the outlines and dynamics of the process of transition in

Catholic (Boston: Beacon, 1957), which deals with the question of what happens to a town (Holyoke, Massachusetts) when it "becomes Catholic."

[2] Numerous observers have predicted that this would not be the case when black mayors took control of city halls in cities where whites continued to control major resources. See, for example, the predictions by Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, "Black Control of Cities," *New Republic*, Sept. 30 and Oct. 7, 1967; and Paul Friesma, "Black Control of Central Cities: The Hollow Prize," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* 35 (March 1969): 77. See also the speculations in the *New York Times*, Oct. 18, 1973 and the findings of Charles Levine, *Racial Conflict and the American Mayor* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), p. 37.

[3] Martin Shefter, "The Emergence of the Political Machine: An Alternative View," in Michael Lipsky and Willis Hawley, eds. *Theoretical Perspectives on Urban Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), pp. 14–44.

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American cities from the point of view of the displaced, but we may also generate hypotheses relevant to the examination of the contemporary cases. These preliminary steps are the aims of this article.

The similarities between the Irish and blacks as the two groups rose to local political power in certain places are striking enough to validate such an inquiry. Both the Irish in the years before the Civil War and urban black Americans in the period after World War I occupied positions as least favored groups in ethnically stratified cities. Members of the two groups were overwhelmingly concentrated in the unskilled and marginal ranks of the labor force. Both gained urban political power through the exercise of bloc voting as they achieved majority status in particular cities, although their respective routes to electoral mobilization differed. In addition, neither group had achieved the formation of a substantial middle class when the political breakthrough to control of city hall occurred. Thus the disposition of important middle class resources controlled by members of the groups displaced became critically important to the new victors. Finally, the displaced in Boston viewed themselves—just as many whites in black majority cities do today[4]—as occupying a disadvantageous position in an ethnically (or racially) polarized society.

In this article I propose to outline briefly the political history of Boston from the critical year 1884 to the mid-1930s. I shall then focus on the psychological and strategic responses of Yankee Brahmins, the men who continued to control significant resources, as they struggled to adjust to their role as a political minority out of power.

Boston Politics from 1884: A Brief Survey

Boston Yankees[5] in the last decades of the nineteenth century anticipated the loss of political power to the Irish with apprehension and a good deal of bitterness. In Marquand's novel of the decline of the Brahmins, Thomas Apley sadly lectures his son: "It is not a pleasant thing for me to feel that the Irish are going to run the affairs of this city, and I do not see anyone in your generation who has the force and skill to guide them."[6]

The outlines of the process of ethnic transition in Boston are simple enough. The foundations of Irish electoral power were laid in the great immigration of the 1840s and in the ranks of cheap Irish labor attracted to Boston by the

[4] *New York Times*, Jan. 30, 1977.

[5] *Yankee* is a term used to refer to an ethnic group whose origins are predominantly Anglo-Saxon, whose religion is predominantly Protestant, and whose shared heritage lies generally in the colonial past. Such a definition draws on the notion of *ethnic group* proposed by R.A. Schermerhorn, *Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research* (N.Y.: Random House, 1970), p. 12. In this paper I shall use Yankee interchangeably with the term *Brahmin*, after Oliver Wendell Holmes's designation of the New England Yankee elite. See Barbara Solomon, *Ancestors and Immigrants* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 3.

[6] John P. Marquand, *The Late George Apley* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1937), p. 149.

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industrialization of New England in the 1850s. In 1883 Senator George Frisbie Hoar wrote grimly to Henry Cabot Lodge, "Unless we can break this compact foreign vote, we are gone, and the grand chapter of the old Massachusetts history is closed."[7] By 1884 the Irish of Boston were able to elect one of their own mayor. Symbols of the transition in process followed closely: in 1885 Patrick Maguire, the most prominent Boston ward boss, became the first Irish Catholic to deliver the city's Fourth of July oration,[8] and in 1892 the city closed the Public Library on St. Patrick's Day, enraging the Protestant community.[9] Through the first years of the new century each fresh Irish political triumph elicited Yankee eulogies to the "old Boston." By 1914, when James Michael Curley defeated Thomas J. Kenny in the first mayoral contest involving two Irish Democrats, Yankee political prospects were at a virtual end. Indeed, since the introduction of nonpartisan elections in the new city charter of 1909, only one Republican, Malcolm Nichols, has been able to finish among the top two contenders for the mayoralty. Of the sixteen men who sat in city hall between 1884 and 1977, nine have been of Irish descent. Since 1901, the Irish have controlled the mayor's office for all but six years, losing it only to George Hibbard for a two-year term in 1907 in the aftermath of fiscal scandal and to Nichols in 1925 when three Irish candidates split the Democratic vote. In 1930 a memorial volume marking the tercentenary of Boston's founding was able to observe with thorough dispassion that control of municipal government had passed out of the hands of the "Colonial Americans" and into those of the "newer races."[10] Essentially, transition has been complete, as Table 1 indicates.

Yankee Boston had been quick to perceive that the early Irish immigration was a challenge to its secure society. The problem that troubled the Brahmin elite in those antebellum years, however, was less the threat of displacement than, as Charles Eliot Norton put it, the difficulty of absorbing "a people so long misgoverned . . . a race foreign to our own."[11] Indeed the Irish were a very different people and, what was worse in Brahmin eyes, an uneducated and a reactionary people. They shared none of the Yankee reformist passions. Irish Catholicism in America provided no sustained impulse for the idea of liberal education, nor did it supply ideological grounds for supporting abolition, women's rights, or public education. In addition, Irish mores precluded sympathy for the temperance movement.[12] As Boston's Irish population continued to increase (by 1840, 46 percent of the city's population was foreign born, nearly

[7] Quoted in Alec Barbrook, *God Save the Commonwealth: An Electoral History of Massachusetts* (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1973), p. 16.

[8] Geoffrey Blodgett, *The Gentle Reformers: Massachusetts Democrats in the Cleveland Era* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 145.

[9] Solomon, *Ancestors*, p. 88.

[10] "Editorial Note: The Census of 1930," in Elizabeth Herlihy, ed., *Fifty Years of Boston* (Boston: Boston Tercentenary Committee, 1932), p. 83.

[11] Solomon, *Ancestors*, p. 12.

[12] Martin Burgess Green, *The Problem of Boston* (N.Y.: Norton, 1966), p. 46.

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TABLE 1

Boston Mayors and Runners-Up, 1884–1975

	Winner		*Runner-up*	
1884	Hugh O'Brien	(Irish, Democrat)	Augustus P. Martin	(Yankee, Republican)
1885	Hugh O'Brien	(I, D)	John M. Clark	(Y, R)
1886	Hugh O'Brien	(I, D)	Thomas Hart	(Y, R)
1887	Hugh O'Brien	(I, D)	Thomas Hart	(Y, R)
1888	Thomas Hart	(Y, R)	Hugh O'Brien	(I, D)
1889	Thomas Hart	(Y, R)	Owen Galvin	(I, D)
1890	Nathan Matthews	(Y, D)	Moody Merrill	(Y, R)
1891	Nathan Matthews	(Y, D)	Horace Allen	(Y, R)
1892	Nathan Matthews	(Y, D)	Homer Rogers	(Y, R)
1893	Nathan Matthews	(Y, D)	Thomas Hart	(Y, R)
1894	Edwin Curtis	(Y, R)	Francis Peabody	(Y, D)
1895	Josiah Quincy	(Y, D)	Edwin Curtis	(Y, R)
1897	Josiah Quincy	(Y, D)	Edwin Curtis	(Y, R)
1899	Thomas Hart	(Y, R)	Patrick Collins	(I, D)
1901	Patrick Collins	(I, D)	Thomas Hart	(Y, R)
1903	Patrick Collins	(I, D)	George Swallow	(Y, R)
1905	John F. Fitzgerald	(I, D)	Louis Frothingham	(Y, R)
1907	George Hibbard	(Y, R)	John F. Fitzgerald	(I, D)
1910	John F. Fitzgerald	(I, D)	James Storrow	(Y, D)
1914	James M. Curley	(I, D)	Thomas Kenney[a]	(I, D)
1917	Andrew Peters	(Y, D)	James M. Curley	(I, D)
1921	James M. Curley	(I, D)	John R. Murphy[a]	(I, D)
1925	Malcolm Nichols	(Y, R)	Theodore Glynn	(I, D)
1929	James M. Curley	(I, D)	Frederick Mansfield[a]	(I, D)
1933	Frederick Mansfield[a]	(I, D)	Malcolm Nichols	(Y, R)
1937	Maurice Tobin	(I, D)	James M. Curley	(I, D)
1941[b]	Maurice Tobin	(I, D)	James M. Curley	(I, D)
1945	James M. Curley	(I, D)	John Kerrigan	(I, D)
1949	John B. Hynes	(I, D)	James M. Curley	(I, D)
1951	John B. Hynes	(I, D)	James M. Curley	(I, D)
1955	John B. Hynes	(I, D)	John Powers	(I, D)
1959	John Collins	(I, D)	John Powers	(I, D)
1963	John Collins	(I, D)	Gabriel Piemonte	(Ital., D)
1967	Kevin White	(I, D)	Louise Day Hicks	(I, D)
1971	Kevin White	(I, D)	Louise Day Hicks	(I, D)
1975	Kevin White	(I, D)	Joseph Timilty	(I, D)

[a]GGA-endorsed Irish Democrats. GGA dissolved Dec. 4, 1933. Malcolm Nichols ran third in this election.

[b]First time since 1909 charter that a mayor can succeed himself.

NOTE: 1895 Two year terms instituted.
1910 First nonpartisan election; four-year terms instituted; only Democrats run.
1951 Runoff system instituted. No Republicans contested for runoff position.

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all of it Irish),[13] the carefully wrought culture of New England's hub seemed genuinely threatened.

With only a few exceptions, however, Boston's Brahmins refused to endorse the Know-Nothing movement which developed in the decade between 1845 and 1855. The brief domination of Massachusetts politics by this virulently anti-Catholic party shocked Brahmin democratic sensibilities and led them to reaffirm their faith in the essential correctness of an open immigration policy.

Meanwhile, Irish Catholics began to make political inroads throughout Massachusetts. Boston elected its first Irish Catholic common councilman in 1857; in 1870 it had its first Irish alderman. City voters sent the state's first Irishman to Congress in 1882, and then in 1884 the Irish captured the mayoralty. As early as 1895, and probably for several years before that, people of Irish descent constituted a substantial majority in Boston, a position they maintained at least into the 1960s.[14] Brahmin ideals seemed suddenly self-defeating.

As the campaign for mayor began in 1884 it was clear to many that the end of uninterrupted Yankee rule was near. Mayor Augustus P. Martin, a Yankee Republican Mugwump, had beaten Hugh O'Brien, an Irishman and five-term alderman, in the 1883 race by only 1,500 votes. The Brahmins anticipated the end with foreboding. "The day has gone by," remarked a prominent Boston Republican, "when a Republican can be elected on party principles in Boston"[15] And the principal mouthpiece of Brahmin sentiment, the *Boston Evening Transcript*, intoned: "The cause of good government in Boston, not only for this year but for an indefinite time to come, is bound up with the success of General Martin and the non-partisan movement."[16]

It is important to understand at the outset that even though Boston's Yankee elite was in no sense monolithic in the way its members adjusted to Irish power, the broad concern they felt over displacement and the subsequent measures some of them took to regain power must be regarded as indications of the general importance of political control in the nexus of Brahmin values. The Yankee response also suggests that there were no immediate alternative means of exercising power in the society as satisfactory as those furnished by the political system. The Brahmins were men who nourished a vision of the public

[13] David Ward, "Nineteenth Century Boston: A Study in the Role of Antecedent and Adjacent Conditions in the Spatial Aspects of Urban Growth" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1963), p. 339.

[14] Determining the ethnic composition of the city's population is a difficult task. Census data report only the first and second generation ethnics. Blodgett, *Gentle Reformers*, estimates the total Irish population at more than 60 percent in 1895 (p. 149). Others estimate that the Irish maintained their majority status at least through the 1960s. See William Shannon, *The American Irish* (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1966), p. 186; Barbrook, *God Save the Commonwealth*, p. 22; and Edward Banfield, *Big City Politics* (N.Y.: Random House, 1965), p. 38

[15] *Boston Evening Transcript* (hereinafter *BET*), Nov. 20, 1884.

[16] Ibid., Dec. 5, 1884. On Yankee apprehensions over the impending loss of political power, see also Shannon, *American Irish*, pp. 208–9; and Gerald McFarland, *Mugwumps, Morals and Politics*, 1884–1920 (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1975), p. 135.

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good to be realized not principally through the good works of the economically well-off individual in the market place but through the vehicle of the polity and the duty of public service.[17]

The O'Brien-Martin race of 1884 solidified the terms in which much ethnic conflict was to be understood in Boston. In Brahmin public discourse the issue of ethnic struggle came generally to be sublimated to the broader contest between reform and machine. Local Republicanism, pictured as the domain of the "good people" of Boston,[18] was equated with nonpartisanship, while the Democratic "ring" came to stand for the vehicle of Irish power. What is significant is not so much the sense of nonpartisan virtue with which Yankee Republicans invested themselves, as the fact that public exploitation of the ethnic dimensions of the struggle in progress became almost from the start virtually unacceptable to the Brahmins. "It has been supposed," wrote the *Transcript* in a double-edged rebuke in 1885 during O'Brien's campaign for a second term in city hall, "that the party dominant in this city was American, not Irish-American. . . . The effort made in some quarters to discredit [O'Brien] because of his race and religious belief is despicable. It shows a very superficial knowledge of true republicanism for any race in our community to boast that it governs Boston as such."[19] Brahmin animosity toward the Irish did not, of course, disappear, but it soon was very largely masked.

O'Brien won his first term, beating General Martin by more than 3,400 votes out of nearly 52,000 cast. The Boston *Post* called the result regrettable but necessary.[20] The *Herald*, noting O'Brien's Irish Catholic background, proudly claimed that the election result demonstrated Boston's lack of prejudice.[21] O'Brien promptly disclaimed any association with the "ring"[22] and embarked upon a year in office that had all the trappings of a reform administration. The *Nation* soon compared him to Grover Cleveland.[23] Even the *Transcript*, which had called O'Brien the candidate of the bosses, eventually praised him for his attentiveness to voters who wanted only "an efficient, economical and upright city government."[24]

O'Brien went on to win three more one-year terms. While Yankee tolerance of O'Brien began to run short by the end of his second term, his achievement in the end was to set a standard of conciliation that dominated Boston politics until the end of the century, easing the city toward Irish domination in a most gentle way.[25]

[17] See, for example, the essays by the Mugwump leader Moorfield Storey, *Politics as a Duty and as a Career* (N.Y.: Putnam's, 1889).
[18] *BET*, Nov. 25, 1884.
[19] Ibid., Dec. 4, 1885.
[20] *Boston Post*, Dec. 10, 1884.
[21] *Boston Herald*, Dec. 10, 1884.
[22] *BET*, Dec. 10, 1884.
[23] *Nation*, Aug. 13, 1885, p. 124.
[24] *BET*, Dec. 2, 1885.
[25] Blodgett, *Gentle Reformers*, p. 61.

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There were, to be sure, early periods of difficulty for the Irish on the road to transition. A combination of factional fighting within Democratic ranks, a chronic problem, and the crystallization of anti-Catholic feeling in Boston led to O'Brien's defeat in 1888. It is notable, however, that Boston's established Yankee aristocracy neither raised nor sought to exploit with vigor the issue of Irish Catholicism. Anti-Catholic sentiment was most forcefully articulated by an organization of working class Canadian immigrants formed in 1887 which called itself the British-American Society. Expressing concern over the survival of the public school system in an increasingly Catholic city, the British-American Society became a minor factor for a brief time in Boston's mayoral contests. The society enjoyed the tacit support of another newly formed group, the loosely organized Citizen's Committee, which drew its small membership from disaffected Yankee Democrats and some Republicans. The Citizen's Committee, which O'Brien believed was the source of a widely distributed anti-Catholic tract during the 1887 campaign,[26] sought unsuccessfully to run a third-party candidate in 1887. In 1888 and 1889 it joined in the successful Republican efforts to win with Thomas Hart as the standard bearer.[27]

Hart's consecutive victories over O'Brien and a young Irishman named Owen Galvin led the city's Irish Democratic leaders to reassess their strategy. Although Yankee Democrats had essentially conceded control of Boston to the Irish in order to hold the urban wing of the party in state contests, Patrick Maguire persuaded his fellow Irish party leaders to relinquish the plum of the mayoralty in order to dampen rising anti-Catholicism.[28] Accordingly, he set out to find a Yankee Democrat to run, eventually selecting Nathan Matthews, the organizer of Boston's Young Men's Democratic clubs and a personal friend.

The *Transcript* was not impressed by the choice, charging that Matthews was a partisan Democrat and a candidate of the bosses.[29] But Maguire's strategy was aided by the Republican nomination of a colorless former state legislator named Moody Merrill, whose defeat of Thomas Hart in the GOP nominating convention divided the party. Independent Democrats, primarily Yankees who had supported Hart, were drawn back to the fold and helped to

[26] *BET*, Oct. 14, 1887.

[27] In his autobiography James M. Curley calls Hart a "renegade Irishman," referring to his Republicanism; *I'd Do it Again* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1957), p. 44. There is no evidence I could find, however, that suggests that Hart was indeed an Irishman or that he was perceived as such. Hart took tacit advantage of anti-Catholic sentiment in the mayoral campaign of 1887. His speeches were filled in each of his many campaigns with appeals to Yankee business and reform instincts, and he shared Yankee fears of a Catholic "threat" to the public school system. He sounded always like the banker he was. In any event Patrick Collins, elected first in 1901, is widely regarded as the second Irish mayor of Boston. See, for example, Andrew J. Peters, "Boston–The Municipality," in Alfred Bushnell Hart, ed., *Commonwealth History of Massachusetts*, vol. 5 (N.Y.: States History Company, 1930), p. 77. If Hart was indeed of Irish descent, he concealed it very well. In this study I shall consider him a Yankee.

[28] Blodgett's interpretation, *Gentle Reformers*, pp. 158ff.

[29] *BET*, Nov. 22 and Dec. 1, 1890.

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produce a landslide victory for Matthews in 1890, vindicating Maguire's calculations.[30] In later mayoral races Matthews added to his coalition by gaining the support of the normally Republican businessmen of the Citizens' Association.[31]

Matthews was one of a number of young Boston Yankees who came of political age with the Mugwump movement after 1884. Unlike the Republican defectors who spurred the Mugwump break, Matthews entered politics as a Democrat. Realizing the party's dependence on Irish voting strength in statewide contests, Matthews and other young Democratic Mugwumps embarked on a period of cooperation with the Boston Irish.[32]

The coalition Matthews and Maguire forged to hold the mayoralty in Democratic hands began to come apart, however, in the economic depression of 1893 over differences of opinion about the municipal government's obligation to the large pool of predominantly Irish jobless men in the city. Maguire finally broke with Matthews in 1894. In seeking a replacement in keeping with his strategy of reserving the head of the local ticket for a Protestant, Maguire hit upon Francis Peabody, a Yankee lawyer of impeccable connections but a man with no experience in public or party service.[33] It proved a ludicrous choice. Unbelieving Irish ward bosses sat out the election of 1894, enabling Edwin Curtis, a Republican, to win a year in city hall.

Although Maguire faced growing discontent among an impatient corps of ward bosses, which included the young Martin Lomasney and John F. Fitzgerald, Irish Democracy nevertheless sought one more time to follow a Protestant strategy in the mayoral race of 1894. They chose to support Josiah Quincy, two of whose forebears of the same name had served as mayors of Boston. Quincy had earned his credentials as a party official and campaign manager in state and national politics, but what interested the Irish in particular was his reputation in the state for a generous patronage policy.[34] Once elected to the first of what were now two-year terms, Quincy established a backroom "Board of Strategy," composed mainly of Irish party politicians in the city, to allocate patronage and to plan electoral strategy.

In 1896 Pat Maguire died. By force of will he had imposed a thin veneer of unity on the Boston Democratic party. With his departure the fragmented structure of the party became visibly pronounced. Warring factions were unable to agree on a candidate to succeed Quincy in 1899, throwing the election to Thomas Hart.[35]

Hart's election marked the last time that a candidate backed by the dominant part of the Yankee community won more than 50 percent of the vote, as

[30] Ibid., Dec. 4 and Dec. 10, 1890.
[31] Ibid., Dec. 11, 1893.
[32] Blodgett, *Gentle Reformers*, p. 85.
[33] *BET*, Nov. 20, 1894.
[34] Ibid., Nov. 14, 1895.
[35] Ibid., Nov. 21 and Dec. 6, 1899.

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FIGURE 1

Fluctuation of the Vote for Yankee-Backed Mayoral Candidates, Boston, 1884–1933



Figure 1 demonstrates. From the turn of the century on, Yankee fortunes depended very heavily on the extent to which the Irish Democrats failed to hold their warring factions together. Yankee political power in these years was aggregated and exercised mainly through the Good Government Association, a reform group put together, ironically, by Louis Brandeis, a Mugwump, in 1903.[36] From that year until 1933, when the GGA was dissolved, three men endorsed by the reform organization won the mayoralty: Andrew Peters, a Yankee Democrat who enjoyed yachting, in 1917; Malcolm Nichols, a Yankee Republican in 1925; and Frederick Mansfield, an Irish Democrat and enemy of James Curley, in 1933. Each of these three men won substantially less than half the vote, as numerous Irish contenders, divided largely by the nearly twenty-year feud between Curley and John F. Fitzgerald, fragmented the Irish vote. In 1929 "Honey Fitz" and Curley united the party, and from that year on the mayoralty has belonged exclusively to one or another Irishman.

[36] The GGA was once described by Curley with some accuracy as "that select and exclusive body of social bounders in the Back Bay." *New York Times*, Nov. 5, 1929.

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Psychological Adjustment to Irish Power

The psychology of displacement in Boston may be reconstructed by reference to the writings of people who, as best we can tell, reflected the concerns of their class and age. Perhaps more than anywhere else in America, cultural standards and social behavior in nineteenth century Boston were shaped and dominated by a distinct literary tradition. This was in part a product of the high degree of overlap between doers and writers in Boston civic affairs. Academic men in particular were singularly prominent among the city's influential forces.

These journal keepers, letter writers, and pamphleteers set the standards, especially after the pre-Civil War heyday of the Brahmin merchant class, by which the "proper Bostonian" thought, lived, and died. Thus what they wrote can, I believe, generally be taken as "emblematic" of the larger culture, that is, as relatively accurate mirrors of the elite psychology of the times as well as powerful attempts to shape it.[37]

America, as most Yankee New Englanders understood it, was clearly under assault in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Henry Adams sought a spiritual retreat in the Mariolatry of gothic France, but a number of more practical members of the Brahmin class simply moved to rural Brookline. Immigration trends, combined with the ugliness of industrialization, produced a mood of despair and depression.[38] This was translated easily into fear of the Irish challenge, which "in race conscious America," Abrams observes, "meant only barely less than a challenge to civilization itself."[39]

Fear of the Irish produced in a number of Brahmin writers an almost wistful sense of loss. The Harvard art historian, Charles Eliot Norton, wrote in a letter in 1897 "I fancy that there has never been a community on a higher and pleasanter level than that of New England during the first thirty years of this century, before the coming in of Jacksonian Democracy, and the invasion of the Irish . . ."[40] And Gamaliel Bradford, a descendant of the governor of Plymouth Colony and a prominent Mugwump, wrote in his journal in the same year: "This afternoon, town meeting. Always entertains me. . . . In its origin, for hard-headed, sober deliberate New England farmers it was an excellent institution; but now that the pyrotechnic Celt has got hold of it, it is in a rapid state of decline, I imagine."[41]

[37] Green uses the term "emblems" of the culture and makes a similar argument in *The Problem of Boston*, pp. 10, 12, 26, 35. See also Solomon, *Ancestors*, p. 3.

[38] Oscar Handlin, *Boston's Immigrants* (N.Y.: Atheneum, 1974, originally published by Harvard University Press, 1941), p. 133.

[39] Richard Abrams, *Conservatism in a Progressive Era: Massachusetts Politics*, 1900–1912 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 133.

[40] Sara Norton and M.A. De Wolfe Howe, eds., *Letters of Charles Eliot Norton* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913), p. 254.

[41] Van Wyck Brooks, ed., *The Journal of Gamaliel Bradford, 1883–1932* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1933), p. 85.

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Bradford went so far as to confess to a feeling of "terror" when he was brought into contact with the "low-browed, dirty, hard-handed animal sons of toil" from Ireland.[42] Others, however, regarded the Irish less in terms of their threat to personal sensibilities or to New England culture than as a challenge to what they saw as more generalized American values. Moorfield Storey, a Mugwump leader and prominent Boston attorney, worried about the survival of "free government." In an essay entitled *Politics as a Duty and as a Career*, published in 1889, he wrote:

> A republic cannot succeed if it becomes an oligarchy of 'bosses' . . . The immigration of every year adds to the mass of poverty and ignorance in our country. . . . [The immigrants are unfit] to take part in our political contests, yet in a few years they become citizens and their votes in the ballot box count as much as our own.[43]

Henry Cabot Lodge, a prime mover in the U.S. Senate to restrict the flow and origins of immigration, blamed the immigrants (by whom he chiefly meant the Irish) for the rise of professional politicians, municipal corruption, city debts, and inefficient urban administration, particularly in Boston.[44]

Brahmin fears of the Irish in these years, however, while apparent, were remarkably tempered; ultimately they were contained by a larger and continuing commitment to some democratic ideal. Norton affirmed his faith in democracy in a letter to James Russell Lowell in 1884, although he worried that "it may work ignobly, ignorantly, and brutally."[45] Years later Gamaliel Bradford reports on the continuation of his "old controversy" with George Frisbie Hoar, U.S. Senator from Massachusetts:

> He is sceptical about the future of democracy. So am I. Then . . . he exclaims, 'After all, it would be better if we had a monarchy.' And against this I protest . . . with all the energy of my being. Democracy is a great experiment, an enormously difficult experiment. . ."[46]

Hoar himself, who may on occasion have doubted the wisdom of democracy, nevertheless vociferously attacked the anti-Irish prejudice of the American Protective Association in the 1890s. In a speech of 1895 he declared, "I have no patience or tolerance with the spirit which would excite religious strife. . . . This nation is a composite."[47] In light of such beliefs it is no surprise that the sense of loss experienced by New England's Yankee elite never found expression in reactionary antidemocracy.[48] Bitterness and doubt were instead mostly

[42] Ibid.

[43] Storey, *Politics as a Duty and as a Career*, pp. 4–5.

[44] Henry Cabot Lodge, *Boston* (N.Y.: Longmans, Green, 1902), pp. 198–9.

[45] Quoted in Blodgett, *Gentle Reformers*, p. 33.

[46] Brooks, ed., *Bradford*, p. 112.

[47] George Frisbie Hoar, *Autobiography of Seventy Years* (N.Y.: Scribners, 1903), p. 283.

[48] To be sure, a number of Brahmins participated as leading figures in the movement to restrict immigration. Yet these efforts, which were justified in part as necessary to *save* American democracy, never sought to call into question the principles of popular government, majoritarianism, or civil liberties. Nor did they seek to subvert existing bases of immigrant power through antidemocratic means.

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kept private,[49] giving rise to interior personal struggles between values and impulses that laid the basis for eventual acceptance of the new political reality.

The path to acceptance of Irish majority power was opened early in the contest between the two ethnic groups by a small number of Brahmin reformers committed to the principle of cultural pluralism. Along with men like George F. Hoar, C.W. Eliot, and the Reverend Edward Everett Hale, Thomas Wentworth Higginson emerged as an early and articulate Yankee defender of the Irish. Higginson, who had distinguished himself as an abolitionist, stood for election in 1880 to the state legislature as a Republican and won. It was here that his position on the Irish began to develop. In the mid-1880s he wrote that "a due proportion of Irish admixture will help, not hinder American society." In 1888 he led the effort in the legislature to defeat the School Inspection Bill, a thinly veiled assault on the newly established parochial school system in the state. In 1891 at a memorial service for the Irish-American writer, John Boyle O'Reilly, Higginson argued that America had failed "if it was only large enough to furnish a safe and convenient place for the descendants of Puritans and Anglo-Saxons, leaving Irishmen and Catholics outside."[50]

Such sympathetic views were not, of course, broadly characteristic of Brahmin sentiment, but at the turn of the century there occurred a more general re-evaluation of the Irish stimulated by the contrast posed by the new immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe. Boston social workers, struck by the apparent intractability of the more exotic non-English speaking newcomers to the city, suddenly began to speak of the "race trait adaptability" of the Irish.[51] Even prominent immigration restrictionists such as Francis Amasa Walker and Henry Cabot Lodge began to soften their views of the Irish. On the basis of his recurrent census analyses beginning in 1870, Walker, an economist and president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, had argued that Irish, German, and Scandinavian fecundity was slowly overwhelming the less fertile but superior Anglo-Saxon "race." Immigration restriction, in this context, became a matter of racial preservation. In the early 1890s, however, the shifting composition of immigrant newcomers in favor of Italians, Poles, and Russians cast the Irish in a new light. Walker decided that the Irish had worked hard, raising their standard of living. More important, the republic seemed to have survived the Irish, but it was not at all clear that it could do so in the face of the newer arrivals.[52]

Admiration for Irish socioeconomic mobility was reflected in the writings of others in this period. John D. Long, a former governor of Massachusetts (1880–82) and a prominent national Republican, wrote in his journal in 1906:

> In the evening, I went to a local Hibernian meeting [in Hingham], held in our Loring Hall, in honor of St. Patrick. . . . My talk was on the Irishmen of Hingham.

[49] Solomon, *Ancestors*, p. 153.

[50] Tilden G. Edelstein, *Strange Enthusiasm: A Life of Thomas Wentworth Higginson* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 370–372.

[51] Solomon, *Ancestors*, p. 154.

[52] Ibid., pp. 70–79.

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> The generation of Irishmen who came here, 60–70 years ago, were a good stock—just as good as our Pilgrim ancestry, and very much like them, in some ways. They brought nothing but their hands. The children of these first-comers, the present generation . . . turn to professional or business life. They run to politics. The severe manual, rough toil, which their fathers did, is now done by Italians, Poles, or other later arrivals.[53]

The Brahmin re-evaluation of the Irish is most strikingly illustrated in the transformation of Henry Cabot Lodge. In 1881 Lodge had written in his *A Short History of the English Colonies in America* that the Irish were "a very undesirable addition at that period. . . . They were a hard-drinking, idle, quarrelsome and disorderly class . . . and did much to give to government and to politics the character for weakness and turbulence . . ."[54] Yet as the Irish became an increasingly large component of Lodge's Senate constituency, he began to temper his views of them (a race "closely associated with the English-speaking people") as he pressed for immigration restriction. In contrast to the Southern and Eastern Europeans, he argued before the Boston City Club in 1909, the Irish "presented no difficulties of assimilation, and they adopted and sustained our system as easily as the people of earlier settlement."[55]

The change in Lodge's views was not merely a product of political calculation. In 1890 he had begun research on an article entitled "The Distribution of Ability in the United States" in which he sought to classify the "race" backgrounds of the 15,000 people listed in *Appleton's Encyclopedia of American Biography*. His analysis showed that the Irish were disproportionately represented among the notable Americans included in the *Encyclopedia*. A Lodge biographer, John Garraty, reports that he was unable to find a single instance after the publication of this research in which Lodge disparaged the Irish.[56]

By the beginning of the second decade of the twentieth century the Irish politician was an unremarkable feature on the Boston scene. Few among the Brahmin class any longer regarded the Irish as interlopers or threats to Yankee "racial" survival. Few chose to raise the question about the viability of democracy in a city of immigrants. Many among them indeed were ready at last to place their resources of prestige and wealth at the disposal of Irish Catholic politicians.

Yankee acceptance is best illustrated by the pattern of Yankee endorsements in Boston mayoral elections. In four instances after the turn of the century the Good Government Association endorsed Irish Catholics (Thomas Kenny in 1914, John Murphy in 1921, and Frederick Mansfield in 1929 and 1933). In the first three of these elections the main opponent and eventual winner was James Curley. In 1933, however, Mansfield's unsuccessful opponent was

[53] Margaret Long, ed. *The Journal of John D. Long* (Rindge, New Hampshire: Richard R. Smith, 1956), p. 291.

[54] Edward N. Saveth, *American Historians and European Immigrants, 1875–1925* (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1948), pp. 56–57.

[55] Ibid., p. 58.

[56] John A. Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge* (N.Y.: Knopf, 1953), p. 144.

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Malcolm Nichols, a protégé of the Republican boss Charles Innes, whom the GGA had backed most reluctantly in his race in 1925.[57] In 1937 Boston's Yankee elite—Lowells, Storrows, Parkmans, and Shattucks—once again came to the aid of an Irish Catholic, this time Maurice Tobin, an old ally of James Curley now bent on challenging him.[58] If some few in the Brahmin community still regarded the Irish with bitterness,[59] it was nevertheless attended with resignation. On the whole Yankee Boston had accepted the rule of the new majority.

Strategic Adjustments to Irish Power

For Yankee Republicans the ultimate futility of attempting to wrest the mayoralty from Irish Democratic hands was apparent early in the transition period. While head to head contestation across the party divide was not abandoned, chances for success were clearly dependent on the periodic tendency of the factionalized Democratic party to disintegrate. As early as 1886 the Republicans were driven to the desperate strategy of surreptitiously funding a third party labor candidate in the mayoral contest in the vain hope of splitting the Democratic vote.[60] Reflecting on the decade before 1909, the year the new Boston city charter introduced nonpartisan ballots in local elections, Andrew Peters, a Democratic reform mayor of Boston from 1918 to 1921, wrote: "For some years prior to the adoption of the new charter, the Republican party had been growing weaker in numbers; and it had become obvious that only a Democrat had any chance of being elected to a major office."[61] Given this diminished possibility for a productive strategy of partisan contestation after the election of Hugh O'Brien, Yankee Republican energies were turned more and more toward multifaceted strategies of subversion and withdrawal.

In contrast in the decade before the turn of the century, Yankee Democrats associated with the Mugwump movement pursued a vigorous strategy of cooperation with the Irish. These efforts, as we have seen, produced the mayoralties of Nathan Matthews and Josiah Quincy. Bryan's nomination for the presidency in 1896 and the restiveness of Boston's younger Irish ward leaders, which found expression after the death of Maguire, combined to close off the opportunities for what the Yankees called "Independent" Democracy.

[57] *New York Times*, Oct. 29, 1925.

[58] Vincent Lapomarda, "Maurice Joseph Tobin: The Decline of Bossism in Boston," *New England Quarterly*, 43 (Sept. 1970): 365–366.

[59] In 1920 Moorfield Storey complained in the Godkin lectures at Harvard about the dishonesty and inefficiency of "men of Irish descent . . . devoted to Irish interests and working to secure place and power for Irishmen." *Problems of Today* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1920), pp. 132–133. And Gamaliel Bradford wrote in a letter in 1931 that "the Irish and Jews . . . seem to be the real Boston at present . . . The Boston that we loved . . . seems forever departed." Van Wyck Brooks, ed. *The Letters of Gamaliel Bradford, 1918–1931* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934), p. 358.

[60] *Nation*, Dec. 9, 1886, p. 464.

[61] Peters, "Boston—The Municipality," p. 83.

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Although both Matthews and Quincy played elder party statesmen roles in the city Democratic caucus which nominated the Irishman, Patrick Collins, for the mayoralty in 1901,[62] Yankee Mugwumps increasingly joined in or actually came to lead efforts broadly opposed to immigrant power in which Republican Yankees had already established a solid record of action. The formation of the Good Government Association in Boston in 1903 and the simultaneous rise of the Immigration Restriction League, among other developments, marked the consolidation of Yankee energies across party lines after 1900.[63]

Subversive strategies—in this case, efforts to change the formal structures and constraints within which politics occurred to the disadvantage of the newly powerful group—were promoted through reform. Routinely enlisting the aid of the Massachusetts General Court (the state legislature), still thoroughly dominated by Yankee Republicans, reformers pressed for state assumption of municipal powers and other forms of intervention, charter reform, and metropolitan government in an effort to limit Irish Democracy. In 1884 and 1887 the Boston Reform Association sought and won the imposition of debt and tax limits on the city. The state legislature in 1885 also placed the Boston police force under the control of a board appointed by the governor. Temperance advocates in the reform movement had urged such action on the grounds that the police were not enforcing the liquor license laws with sufficient vigor.[64] The anti-Irish implications of these activities were clear. As Andrew Peters put it delicately, "whether the rapid influx of a new racial element into the Boston electorate, with the consequent increase in Democratic voters, has influenced the actions of Massachusetts Legislatures, which are normally Republican, is a matter of pure conjecture."[65] However, for Michael Hennessy, a Boston newspaper reporter and popular historian, there could be no doubt about the motives of the General Court. The Boston charter reform passed in 1909, Hennessy wrote, "was opposed by substantially a unanimous vote of the Democratic party. It was designed to clip the wings of the then Democratic mayor of Boston, John F. Fitzgerald."[66]

The new charter, written by a commission dominated by GGA members and ratified by Boston voters, introduced nonpartisanship and at-large aldermanic elections, solid planks in the reform platform. Although the mayor's veto power was strengthened by the new charter and his term lengthened to four years, his appointments henceforth had to be approved by the state Civil Service Commission. Finally, the new charter created a city finance commission appointed by the governor to oversee the city's money matters. None of these reforms, as

[62] *BET*, Nov. 12, 1901.

[63] McFarland, *Mugwumps*, pp. 84–85, 135, 175.

[64] A. Chester Hanford, "The Government of the City of Boston, 1880–1930," in Herlihy, *Fifty Years of Boston*, p. 91.

[65] Peters, "Boston—The Municipality," p. 74.

[66] Michael E. Hennessy, *Four Decades of Massachusetts Politics, 1890–1935* (Norwood, Mass.: Norwood Press, 1935), p. 124.

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it turned out, forestalled the return of Fitzgerald to city hall in 1910 or the subsequent successes of James Curley, a consummate party politician.[67]

The municipal reformers not only sought to undercut Irish rule through an attack on structural elements of the political system which they believed facilitated the maintenance of machine power, such as partisan elections, ward-based representation, and mayoral patronage powers, but also to dilute Boston's Democratic electorate with suburban voters through metropolitanization. Middle class flight from the city, which coincided with the growth of the immigrant population, was already evident by the 1850s.[68] As the prospect for Irish rule in Boston began to take shape, interest in the extension of the city's boundaries to encompass the Yankee suburbs grew accordingly. A report by a committee in the Massachusetts legislature stated in 1863:

> It is necessary to adopt the metropolitan principle in order to prevent the elements which are destructive of property and laws from keeping practical control of the city.[69]

Between 1867 and 1874 the city carried out five significant annexations, but growing suburban resistance brought the city's territorial growth to a virtual end. During the period of transition (1884–1933) only one annexation, Hyde Park in 1911, succeeded.[70]

In 1905, badly frightened by the prospect of Fitzgerald as mayor, the *Transcript* issued a plea for metropolitan government that sounded much like that in the 1863 legislative report.[71] Yet it would be incorrect to interpret the interest in metropolitan government solely in terms of the desire to diminish the strength of the growing Irish electorate. Toward the end of the century motives for metropolitanization were as much a product of the belief in the desirability of growth and metropolitan tax equity as they were of a fear of Irish power.[72] In 1895 a plan for a Greater Boston was referred to the next General Court session but no action was taken. Twenty years later Andrew Peters took up the cause of metropolitan government, mixing a subtle nativism with the themes of boosterism and efficiency in his argument. Not only would size attract business and services be rationalized, he argued, but the inclusion of the suburbs in a federated city would give the city a "better balanced citizenship." The commuters to Boston are people of character and intelligence, he wrote, and it "should be their duty . . . to take part in the general government [of the city]."[73]

[67] See David Stoffer's similar assessment in "Parties in Non-Partisan Boston," *National Municipal Review* (Feb. 1923): 83–89.

[68] Sam Bass Warner, *Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870–1900* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press and the MIT Press, 1962), p. 14.

[69] Blodgett, *Gentle Reformers*, p. 120.

[70] Ward, *Nineteenth Century Boston*, pp. 139–140, 267.

[71] *BET*, Nov. 18, 1905.

[72] See, for example, Joseph H. Beale, "The Metropolitan District," in Herlihy, *Fifty Years of Boston*, pp. 120–121.

[73] Ibid. See also Stoffer, "Parties in Non-Partisan Boston," p. 85, for a similar argument.

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Once again nothing came of this proposal. By 1924, however, the issue had clearly lost its overtones of ethnic and party conflict. In that year James Curley introduced a Greater Boston Bill in the General Court (it failed), and in 1930, as mayor, he pushed yet another proposal for metropolitan federation. The metropolitan strategy as a device to undercut Irish power was thoroughly dead.

While the strategies of reform, electoral contestation, and metropolitan reorganization brought Yankee activists into direct or implicit confrontation with the Irish Democrats of Boston, other paths of adjustment to the loss of political dominance were more oblique. Some members of Boston's oldest families withdrew spiritually to the gratifications of a new Anglophilism.[74] The period from 1875 to 1895 was also a frenetic time of club-founding, as certain elements in Brahmin society sought to insulate themselves from the unpleasantness of the new order.[75] Still others turned their energies to the cultural realm. "More and more," wrote Barrett Wendell in 1902, "it seems to me that the future of our New England must depend on the standards of culture which we maintain and preserve here. The College, the Institute, the Library, the Orchestra . . . are the real bases of our strength and our dignity in the years to come."[76]

More significant strategic withdrawals occurred through the charities movement and the effort to restrict immigration. The former diverted energies from politics to philanthropy as a means of social control: uplift, as Huggins has observed, was an attempt at management.[77] The restrictionist movement represented a withdrawal from the battle with the Irish in order to open a new front against a different foe. A number of streams of Brahmin resistance were symbolically united by the endorsement in 1901 of the Immigration Restriction League by the Boston Associated Charities. The latter was headed by mainstay Yankee Mugwumps, Charles Codman and Robert Treat Paine, although many of the central figures in the social work movement, like Robert Woods, were not themselves Boston-bred Yankees. The Immigration Restriction League had been founded by young men of the generation following the Mugwump glory. After the turn of the century, however, the League drew increasingly upon the strength of the Democratic Mugwumps, until at its peak the membership reflected the full political heterogeneity of Boston's Brahmin class.

The effects of withdrawal were, as the term suggests, to create for a good many Yankee activists a life apart from the maelstrom of local politics. With the onset of World War I and the subsequent passage of immigration quotas during the 1920s, immigration diminished sharply. The League's work was done, although a small core of members continued to guard the gates through the

[74] Arthur Mann, *Yankee Reformers in the Urban Age* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 7; and Solomon, *Ancestors*, pp. 56–57.

[75] Alexander W. Williams, *A Social History of the Greater Boston Clubs* (Barre, Mass.: Barre Publishers, 1970), p. 4.

[76] Green, *The Problem of Boston*, p. 23.

[77] Nathan Irvin Huggins, *Protestants Against Poverty: Boston's Charities, 1870–1900* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1971), p. 191.

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period between the wars. By the end of the 1920s the public energies of the Yankees in Boston were nearly dissipated. Nothing the Brahmins had tried had restored their place in the political life of the city or stemmed the Irish advance.

Toward an Explanation of Yankee Adjustment

American history has surely witnessed few ethnic divisions so filled with animosity, distrust, and disdain as the one between Yankee New Englanders and the Irish. For the better part of the nineteenth century these two groups regarded one another across a divide of class, political, and religious differences so broad that genuine accommodation seemed impossible. It is remarkable, then, particularly in light of the deep sense of fear that Yankees felt for the survival of their culture, "racial" stock, and position, that ethnic political transition in Boston was accomplished so peacefully. The explanation for the character of this transition, I would suggest, lies in a combination of factors which served gradually to diminish Yankee anxieties and resign them to their situation. Though it is difficult to determine the relative significance of these factors, I would argue nevertheless that their decisiveness may probably be laid to the tempering effects of the generalized context of democratic commitments acknowledged by the Brahmins as well as to the inescapable fact that Yankee voters constituted a minority.

One factor which reassured a number of Yankee observers, like Francis A. Walker and John D. Long, was evidence by the turn of the century of Irish social mobility. Hard work and ambition were values the Brahmins understood and respected. Census data from 1900 do indeed show clearly a declining concentration in menial occupations between first and second generation Irish workers with corresponding increases in skilled occupations.[78] Upward social mobility among the Irish, however, was indicative for Brahmin writers of more than ambition. It suggested finally an assimilatory capacity on the part of the Irish, evidence of the ability to participate in what the Yankees were convinced was the true American experience. From Ralph Waldo Emerson's belief in the "smelting pot" to John D. Long's conviction that the American citizen of the twentieth century would emerge from an "amalgam of all nationalities," one strand in the Brahmin belief system was the expectation that the diverse immigration would eventually produce an American blend.

A second, though perhaps less important, factor that helps to explain the character of the response to the loss of political dominance in Boston was the maintenance of Yankee hegemony in Massachusetts state politics. While it is not clear that frustrated Boston Brahmins actually found outlets for their ambition in state government, the statehouse was nevertheless a Yankee preserve during virtually the entire period of transition. It is not unreasonable to suppose that

[78] See Stephan Thernstrom, *The Other Bostonians: Poverty and Progress in the American Metropolis* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 132–133; and E.P. Hutchinson, *Immigrants and their Children, 1850–1950* (N.Y.: Wiley, 1956), p. 174.

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such dominance provided a certain measure at least of psychological reassurance that some aspects of the Yankee world remained stable in a world of flux. Between 1884 and 1930 only one Irishman—David Walsh—succeeded in winning the governorship and that for only two years. In that forty-six year span the Republicans elected thirteen governors, who controlled the statehouse for a total of thirty-seven years. Four Democratic governors accounted for only nine years, of which three years could be attributed to the Bullmoose split in the ranks of the GOP. Three of the Democrats were themselves of Yankee stock, and a number of state Democratic leaders were avowedly anti-Catholic.[79] The Republican party organization at the state level, reputedly among the strongest in the nation, managed to control both houses of the Massachusetts General Court in the entire period between the Civil War and 1948. Under these circumstances, relinquishing the city was perhaps less crippling to Brahmin activists than it might have been.

Yet Boston was important to the old stock New Englanders, not only as the seat of their business enterprises but as the symbol—the hub—of their civilization. It was the genius of the Irish that they understood this. Thus Irish sensitivity to the implications for the Yankees of transition constitutes a third factor which influenced the nature of Yankee adjustment. O'Brien's "reform" mayoralty and the choice of Patrick Collins, with his Harvard law degree and diplomatic experience in England, did much to assuage Yankee fears. Irish politicians were also consistently solicitous toward business: Fitzgerald, for example, coined the slogan, "A Bigger, Better, and Busier Boston," as he promoted port development.[80] In addition they were not unwilling to share patronage tidbits with selected Yankees. Robert Grant, a Mugwump lawyer, described himself as "a grateful but astonished office-holder" upon his appointment by O'Brien as a Water Commissioner in 1888. "I was at a loss," he wrote in his autobiography, perhaps naively, "to know why the Mayor should have consented to nominate one who . . . could be of no assistance politically."[81] Patrick Maguire played a crucial role in this and other efforts to distribute patronage spoils to others besides claimants of Irish ancestry.[82]

Other factors also undoubtedly help to account for the relative ease with which Boston Yankees came to accept Irish power. The transfer of anxieties from the Irish to the newer immigrants clearly served to diminish the fearsomeness of the Irish threat. Another factor leading to Yankee resignation to the loss of hegemony was the fragmented character of their response to Irish power. This fragmentation arose from the pluralism of the Yankee community with its

[79] Duane Lockard, *New England State Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 45, 119. See also Hennessy, *Four Decades*, and J. Joseph Huthmacher, *Massachusetts People and Politics, 1919–1933* (N.Y.: Atheneum, 1969), pp. 14–18.

[80] Shannon, *American Irish*, p. 209. In 1890 the Irish Congressmen from Boston, Joseph O'Neil, announced, "This is a business age, and we are essentially a business community." Quoted in Blodgett, *Gentle Reformers*, p. 145.

[81] Robert Grant, *Fourscore* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934), p. 172.

[82] Blodgett, *Gentle Reformers*, p. 60.

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Mugwumps and Republicans, its different generations, its social workers and merchants, its restrictionists and cultural pluralists. Some cooperated with the Irish; others left the city. Some pursued reform; others philanthropy. None of these strategies stemmed the Irish advance. It seems probable that the relative ineffectiveness of a fragmented response sapped the spirit and energy of those who sought to resist. A united response might in contrast have given hope, prolonging and intensifying the struggle.

By the 1930s Yankee observers saw that fifty years of Irish dominance had not produced radical changes in the conduct of municipal affairs. If the style and sympathies of the Irish differed from those of the Brahmins, a low tax rate had nevertheless become a universally important symbol. For Yankee Boston there were no longer any powerful reasons not to accept the well-established fact of Irish rule.

Some Lessons: Benchmarks in the Process of Ethno-racial Transition

From the vantage point of contemporary times, from which many of the nasty details of daily politics in turn-of-the-century Boston cannot be seen and do not obscure the issue, the process of ethnic political transition taken as a whole reveals a political system with many adaptive and comparatively benign characteristics. This is not to say that the political system of the city was open to all comers, nor necessarily that it was responsive or honest. But it did manage to accommodate intense ethnic conflict, interwoven with elements of class and religious struggle, in a peaceful and nondestructive way.

Was Boston unique? Was the contest between the Yankees and the Irish *sui generis*? We may certainly draw some tentative lessons from this case which serve not only to summarize matters but to provide benchmarks to watch for as the contemporary transition process unfolds in cities like Atlanta and Detroit.[83]

—The process of transition is not likely to occur overnight. In Boston it surely could not be regarded as complete for several decades after 1884, for Yankee opportunities for political victory were not entirely closed off until the 1930s. Ethnic transition in Boston, as well as in other cities, cannot be likened to a coup: the new pattern of political power is slow to take form not only because the new group is still consolidating its power, but because the displaced group is in no sense subject to a purge or harassment. While the fortunes of the latter decline, it still controls significant resources which permit the establishment of political opposition. The new group not only allows the displaced group to use its considerable resources for the purposes of opposition, but it also seeks

[83] All comments about transition in Atlanta and Detroit are based on my field research there in 1975 and 1976 and will be elaborated in a book. No particular white ethnic group has been displaced in those cities, but white economic and political elites—the focus of my study—have had to adjust to a situation in which they could no longer assume ready access to local government.

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to tap those resources—money, experience, expertise, and prestige in particular—for its own purposes. The latter point is amply demonstrated by the emerging, if cautious, alliance between the black mayors of Atlanta and Detroit and the white business communities in those cities.

—During the process of transition, the newly emergent group is likely to suffer temporary electoral reverses, but the weight of its voting bloc will reestablish its dominance. When factional splits within a newly powerful group coincide with or stimulate the consolidation of opposition resources, the displaced group is likely to win a temporary period in office, as the Yankees managed to do several times. The new group, realizing the costs of division, will smooth over its differences in order to regain political dominance. Eventually, factions within the new group will come entirely to structure electoral competition. Mayoral contests in Detroit and Atlanta in 1977 were already fought out by competing black candidates, even though black mayors had first been elected only in 1973.

—By the time transition begins, competition between the two ethnic or racial groups is likely to be pursued through peaceful means. The moment from which we may date the beginning of transition is the capture of the mayoralty by a candidate from an ethnic or racial group which heretofore occupied a subordinate place in the city's social and political structure. Such a victory marks the onset of transition only when the newly emergent group constitutes a majority or near majority of the city's population, thus making continued control of the mayoralty by candidates from the new group highly likely.

While violent conflict between politically established and emerging ethnic groups has been common in American history, it seems to occur principally in the earliest stages of the new group's mobilization and long before it is ready to challenge for top political office. There is evidence which suggests indeed that such violence may be more a response to the new group's efforts to break into the labor market than a reaction to its political stirrings.[84] By the time the new group has achieved an electoral majority, however, the group's claims to power are evaluated in light of its voting strength. Commitments on the part of the previously established (now displaced) group to the principles of majority rule and to the sanctity of elections preclude the resort to violent means to change the turnabout in the patterns of formal power. The point is borne out in both the Boston and the modern cases of transition.

—A major factor contributing to the peaceful character of transition is the tendency of the newly victorious group to make overtures and concessions to the displaced group. To the extent that a winner is concerned with the sensibilities of the losers, it is out of a mix of motives. On the one hand the winner knows that today's victor may be tomorrow's loser. In addition, the desire of the new victors to draw on the resources controlled by the displaced group dictates a strategy of making transition palatable to the displaced. Thus the

[84] Peter K. Eisinger, "Ethnic Conflict, Community-Building, and the Emergence of Ethnic Political Traditions in the United States," in Jeffrey Obler and Susan Glass, eds. *Urban Ethnic Conflict: A Comparative Perspective* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Institute for Social Research, 1977).

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newly victorious group is likely to appoint members of the displaced group to office (the black mayors have assiduously appointed whites to city government) and to offer a variety of other, often symbolic, assurances (a firm commitment to business development was promised by the Irish and the black mayors).

—Strategies pursued by members of the displaced group designed to deal with the loss of formal political power are likely to be diverse and uncoordinated. While the natural pluralism of the displaced ethnic or racial community may be set aside in a highly visible electoral contest with a candidate of the newly emergent group, those divisions tend to reassert themselves and influence strategic adjustments between elections. Different elements in the community, whose only common attribute may be race or ethnicity, tend to estimate differently the degree of threat to them posed by the new order. People divided by ideology, age, and class find that they cannot agree on appropriate strategic responses. As we saw in Boston, the diversity of responses lessens the chances of re-establishing political dominance; we may watch for a similar pattern in contemporary transitions.

—Elites among the displaced group are neither likely to abandon the city in wholesale numbers nor entirely to withdraw their resources from the city and the new governors. In Boston, Irish politicians sought successfully to use Yankee resources. Many among the Yankee elite remained in the city as the transition progressed. Some stayed to cooperate with the new governors, others to fight them. Many stayed to foster business enterprises and the business climate of the city, and others to maintain its cultural and philanthropic institutions. All preliminary evidence suggests that economic elites in Atlanta and Detroit are following a similar pattern.

Summary

In Boston the process of ethno-racial political transition resulted in the full transfer of political power from the hands of one ethnic group, favored by virtue of class status and heritage, to another, situated initially at the bottom of the white status hierarchy. There is no evidence to suggest that the Irish were the pawns, unwitting or otherwise, of covert Brahmin wirepullers. Society was transformed in a way that could not perhaps have been predicted from the nature of Irish-Yankee relations before 1880. A combination of commitment to democratic norms and a pragmatic electoral calculus formed the groove along which Yankee adjustment proceeded. A preliminary inspection of transition to black rule in Atlanta and Detroit tempts me to suggest that the character of transition in Boston was less a product of New England genius than of a more general trait of adaptability in the American political system.*

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A Political Context for Legislative Vetoes

LOUIS FISHER

After debating for the past decade the merits of the war power, executive privilege, impoundment, and other struggles between Congress and the president, along comes another topic of constitutional interest: the "legislative veto." Several hundred statutory provisions currently require the president and executive officials to report administration proposals to Congress, on the understanding that Congress (within a specified number of days) may disapprove the intended action. Another variation is to place upon the administration the burden of obtaining congressional *approval* within the time allowed by statute. Depending on the statute, congressional action may be taken by one or both houses. But whatever the procedure, these legislative actions are not presented to the president for his signature or veto.

The great danger at the present time is the temptation to join one of two rival camps. One choice: the legislative veto is an essential means of controlling the bureaucracy and maintaining representative government. Alternatively: the legislative veto violates the separation of powers doctrine and evades the president's veto power. My contention is that the issue, presented in this manner, is wrongly framed. The legislative veto is not a simple substance, to be disposed of one way or the other. No single constitutional theory can either exonerate it or invalidate it. We confront not an element but many different compounds, some easier to justify legally and politically than others.

Although proponents and opponents of the legislative veto are urging the courts to settle the issue, we cannot expect a neat resolution in this area any more than we could with the war power, executive privilege, or

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impoundment. With good reason, the courts are approaching the controversy over the legislative veto with great circumspection. The U.S. Court of Claims, in upholding a one-house veto incorporated in a federal salary act, remarked:

> We are not to consider, and do not consider, the general question of whether a one-House veto is valid as an abstract proposition, in all instances, across-the-board, or even in most cases. . . . Our consideration must center, then, on this specific mechanism in this specific statute—how it works, what it involves, what values and interests are implicated—not on an overarching attempt to cover the entire problem of the so-called legislative veto, or even a large segment of it.[1]

The same cautious attitude appears in a ruling by an appellate court, after deciding that a one-house veto in a federal elections act was not ripe for judicial consideration:

> Clearly, the question of legislative review of Executive and administrative agency actions is a sweeping subject to be treated in a gingerly fashion by the courts. Review of various legislative review mechanisms ought at an absolute minimum be informed by experience and not depend solely on abstract analysis or speculation.[2]

This essay divides into four sections. The first section discusses legislative vetoes that are attached to delegated authority. Congress consents to the delegation only on the condition that it retains control by a legislative veto. The second section covers the use of legislative vetoes in contested areas, where a power is not exclusively legislative in nature and therefore not subject to delegation. Instead, the legislative veto becomes a procedural device for accommodating the interests of Congress and the president. The last two sections concern legislative vetoes that reach deeply into administrative and adjudicative details, raising serious questions about congressional participation.

Quid Pro Quo for Delegated Authority

The constitutional challenge to the legislative veto draws much of its force from textual interpretations of the Constitution, especially the Presentation Clause. As provided by Article I, Section 7, every order, resolution, or vote "to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment)" must be presented to the president for his signature or veto. A second exception to the Presentation Clause is allowed by Article V, covering amendments to the Constitution. Congress can adopt amendments in the form of resolutions and refer them directly to the states for ratification, without submitting them first to the president for his signature.[3]

[1] *Atkins* v. *United States*, 556 F.2d 1028, 1059 (Ct. C1. 1977). The Supreme Court denied certiorari on January 9, 1978; 46 U.S.L.W. 3431.

[2] *Clark* v. *Valeo*, 559 F.2d 642, 650 (n. 10) (D.C. Cir. 1977), affirmed by the Supreme Court on June 6, 1977, *sub. nom. Clark* v. *Kimmitt*, 45 U.S.L.W. 3785.

[3] *Hollingsworth* v. *Virginia*, 3 Dall. 378 (1798).

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Throughout the nineteenth century, Congress deviated from a strict reading of the Presentation Clause by passing simple resolutions (adopted by either house) and concurrent resolutions (adopted by both houses). Those legislative measures were not presented to the president for his signature or veto. Congress withheld them because they were housekeeping in nature, pertaining to internal congressional operations, and not "legislative in effect." As a Senate report in 1897 observed, if a resolution contained matter "legislative in its character and effect," it had to be presented to the president.[4]

But the legislative effect of such resolutions could be profoundly altered if a public law sanctioned their use. Enabling legislation, signed by the president, elevated the status of these resolutions. Attorney General Cushing stated in 1854 that a simple resolution could not coerce a department head "unless in some particular in which a law, duly enacted, has subjected him to the direct action of each; and in such case it is to be intended, that, by approving the law, the President has consented to the exercise of such coerciveness on the part of either House."[5] This logic applied even to vetoes exercised by individual committees. In 1867, for example, Congress included the following restriction in an appropriation for public buildings and grounds: "To pay for completing the repairs and furnishing the executive mansion, thirty-five thousand dollars: *Provided*, That no further payments shall be made on any accounts for repairs and furnishing the executive mansion until such accounts shall have been submitted to a joint committee of Congress, and approved by such committee."[6]

The committee veto has been the target of repeated criticism by presidents. Yet it is instructive to recall that when constitutional misgivings were first expressed, they were directed not so much to the committee veto but to a particular dollar amount. In 1933 Attorney General Mitchell singled out as unconstitutional a bill that authorized the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation to make the final decision on any tax refund that exceeded $20,000.[7] Previous legislation, however, had allowed the Joint Committee to decide tax refunds in excess of $75,000. Apparently executive officials had lived with that procedure without objection. It took a dollar threshold to transform an acceptable procedure into unconstitutional "meddling" with executive detail.[8] At what point on the continuum between $75,000 and $20,000 did the constitutional objection emerge? Clearly there is room for judgment here on what Congress can add, in the form of conditional restrictions, to delegated authority.

This mix of constitutional theory and practical judgment is seen most clearly in the dispute over reorganization authority. Franklin D. Roosevelt initially asked for authority to reorganize the executive branch, allowing Congress to

[4] S. Rept. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897).

[5] 6 Ops. Att'y Gen. 680, 683 (1854).

[6] 14 Stat. 569 (1867).

[7] 37 Ops. Att'y Gen. 56 (1933).

[8] See 76 Cong. Rec. 2448 (1933). The Joint Committee now reviews all refunds in excess of $200,000.

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disapprove by *joint* resolution (which must be presented to the president for his signature). If Roosevelt had decided to exercise his veto power, members of Congress would have had to find a two-thirds majority in each house to override him. In effect they would have delegated authority by majority vote but could recapture it only with a two-thirds majority. Partly because of that concern, Congress did not enact a reorganization bill in 1938.[9]

The impasse was broken the following year when members of Congress decided to make reorganization plans subject to disapproval by concurrent resolution. They believed that the procedure could be justified by placing the understanding in a public law. To Congressman Edward Cox the concurrent resolution was merely a condition attached to authority delegated to the president. If he objected he could invoke his veto power. Otherwise, by signing the bill, he would express a willingness to abide by the condition.

This reasoning found support in *Currin* v. *Wallace* (1939), which upheld a delegation of authority to the secretary of agriculture to designate tobacco markets. No market could be designated unless two-thirds of the growers, voting in a referendum, favored it.[10] To the House Select Committee on Government Organization it seemed absurd to argue that "the effectiveness of action legislative in character may be conditioned upon a vote of farmers but may not be conditioned on a vote of the two legislative bodies of the Congress."[11] Critics of the legislative veto point out that participation by farmers does not pose the same threat to the separation of powers doctrine as involvement by Congress, but the Reorganization Act of 1939 adopted the concurrent resolution approach, and by 1949 Congress had settled on simple resolutions as the preferred means of disapproving reorganization plans.

Attorney General Bell regards the legislative veto in the Reorganization Act as a permissible exception, and the only exception, to the regular procedure of having Congress pass legislation and present it to the president. All other legislative vetoes, according to his analysis, unconstitutionally trench upon the president's own veto power. Bell justified this single exception because the decision to initiate a reorganization plan remains with the president. The freedom to present a plan is treated as an equivalent to the presidential veto; in each case the decision to exercise power is one for the president alone.[12] The argument seems a bit strained, suggesting that the Justice Department is capable of marshaling whatever evidence is needed to obtain for the president the desired reorganization authority. Congress delegates the authority only on certain conditions; the executive branch accedes to the arrangement. Harvey C.

[9] 83 Cong. Rec. 4487 (1938). See Doyle W. Buckwalter, "The Congressional Concurrent Resolution: A Search for Foreign Policy Influence," 14 *Midwest J. Pol. Sci.* 434, 438-440 (1970), and Donald G. Morgan, *Congress and the Constitution* 189 (1966).

[10] 306 U.S. 1.

[11] H. Rept. No. 120, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1939). See 84 Cong. Rec. 2477 (1939).

[12] H. Rept. No. 105, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1977).

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Mansfield cut through the constitutional bramble by making this astute observation: 'There the question has rested, 'no tickee, no washee.' "[13]

The same compromise appears in FDR's willingness to accept a legislative veto in the Lend Lease Act of 1941, despite serious constitutional objections. The political situation, however, did not permit him to voice his criticism. Long-standing enemies in Congress had already opposed the concurrent resolution feature as unconstitutional. To announce his position would associate the president with the wrong group. His Attorney General, Robert H. Jackson, later explained: "To make public his views at that time would confirm and delight his opposition and let down his friends. It might seriously alienate some of his congressional support at a time when he would need to call on it frequently."[14]

The Nixon administration readily accepted a one-house veto as part of the price of obtaining new impoundment authority in 1974. Presidents may now report to Congress on "deferrals" (delays in the spending of funds), subject to disapproval by either house. No constitutional complaint has emerged from the White House. Presidents who want authority delegated to them have to take the conditions that are attached.

A Compromise for Powers in Dispute

Reorganization authority is recognized as essentially a legislative power, to be delegated or withheld as Congress decides. Also, as the U.S. Court of Claims said in *Atkins*, the pay-setting function is basically legislative in character and does not invade administrative responsibilities.[15] The use of the legislative veto in other areas can intrude impermissibly into the president's constitutional responsibilities. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee conceded in 1976 that the legislative veto could not be used to invade areas of "plenary presidential prerogative, such as the pardon power (article II, section 2, clause 1) or the recognition power (article II, section 3). It could not be employed to oversee the finest details of the day-to-day administration of the Federal Government."[16]

In many situations the power in question does not belong exclusively to Congress or the president. Here the legislative veto may serve as an acceptable bridge between different claims of constitutional power advanced by the two branches. The use of a legislative veto is not a condition attached to delegated authority, since the executive branch denies that anything had been delegated, but a legislative veto can provide a procedural link between two rival interpretations.

The difficulty of distinguishing between executive and legislative was painfully

[13] "Reorganizing the Federal Executive Branch: The Limits of Institutionalization," 35 *Law & Contemp. Prob.* 461, 464 (1970).

[14] "A Presidential Legal Opinion," 66 *Harv. L. Rev.* 1353, 1356–1357 (1953).

[15] 556 F.2d 1028, 1068 (Ct. C1. 1977).

[16] S. Rept. No. 605, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1976).

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evident to the framers. In Federalist 37 James Madison observed that just as naturalists had difficulty in defining the exact line between vegetable life and the animal world, so was it an even greater task to draw the boundary between the departments of government, or "even the privileges and powers of the different legislative branches. Questions daily occur in the course of practice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science." After the constitutional convention, Madison confided to Jefferson that the boundaries between the executive, legislative, and judicial powers, "though in general so strongly marked in themselves, consist in many instances of mere shades of difference."[17]

Place these doubts in a more contemporary setting. Consider, for example, whether the impoundment power is "administrative" or "legislative." If routine in nature, Congress need not intervene. On the other hand, when programs are being curtailed or abolished, as they were during the Nixon administration, congressional prerogatives are vitally affected. The Senate gave serious consideration to distinguishing between routine and policy types of impoundment, but the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 contains no such distinction. The two types of impoundment are lumped together in the reports submitted by the president. Some impoundments are disposed of by the rescision process (requiring affirmative action by both houses within 45 days), while others follow the deferral process (allowing either house to disapprove).[18]

In the area of the war power, Congress tried to spell out by statute the constitutionally permissible actions of a president. The Senate believed that a distinction could be made between executive and legislative prerogatives; the House felt that any effort to codify the commander in chief powers would be futile and impracticable. Section 2(c) of the War Powers Resolution of 1973 appears to limit the president's exercise of his powers to three situations, but upon closer examination it is evident that the statute does not define his emergency powers. The two houses could not agree on the president's responsibilities under Article II of the Constitution. As a result, Congress fell back on procedural controls, placing great reliance on the passage of a concurrent resolution to force a president to disengage from military operations.

Nixon vetoed the War Powers Resolution, in part because he believed that the concurrent resolution violated the powers granted him under the Constitution. He also concluded that a concurrent resolution, since it evades the president's veto power, does not have the force of law. Depending upon circumstances, the exercise of the legislative veto may indeed encroach upon the president's constitutional powers. The Legal Adviser to the State Department told a House committee in 1975 that if the president has the power to put men into combat "that power could not be taken away by concurrent resolution because the

[17] *Writings of Madison* (Hunt ed.), V, 26.

[18] For one effort to categorize impoundments, see Louis Fisher, *Presidential Spending Power* 147-174 (1975).

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power is constitutional in nature."[19] Surely it is too broad a proposition to claim that the president has an unrestricted power to put men into combat, but a strong case can be made for the president's responsibility to defend his armed forces and to protect American lives abroad.

On balance, the legislative veto in the War Powers Resolution is justified. Without it, Congress's own constitutional powers could be gravely impaired. Recall that in 1973 a majority in both houses wanted to bring the war in Southeast Asia to a halt. Each legislative action was countered by a veto. A federal court argued that the failure of Congress to override the vetoes should not be taken as legislative authority to continue the war. Said Judge Judd: "It cannot be the rule that the President needs a vote of only one-third plus one of either House in order to conduct a war, but this would be the consequence of holding that Congress must override a Presidential veto in order to terminate hostilities which it has not authorized."[20] To insist that every legislative action must be presented to the president, and made subject to his veto power, would allow a president to conduct a war with minority backing. No such intention should be read into the Constitution.

Closely related is the use of legislative vetoes for arms sales, such as President Carter's proposal this year to supply military weapons to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The president is required to notify Congress in the case of a "letter of offer" to sell any defense articles or services for $25 million or more. If within 30 days Congress passes a concurrent resolution, objecting to the proposed sale, the letter of offer cannot be issued unless the president certifies the existence of an emergency which would require the sale for U.S. national security interests.[21]

President Ford objected to this type of feature on the ground that it would "seriously obstruct the exercise of the President's constitutional responsibilities for the conduct of foreign affairs."[22] But Congress also has a legitimate role in arms sales. With sales above $10 billion a year, the power of the purse is profoundly affected. Moreover, the drawdown of military supplies has a direct impact on combat readiness and effectiveness, while the infusion of arms into a particular region, such as the Middle East, can tilt the balance of power to the point of war and American involvement. Apparently the Carter administration recognizes that the interest of Congress in arms sales is so intense and fundamental that it is best to work cooperatively with legislators rather than contest the constitutionality of the legislative veto procedure.

Regarding executive agreements, it is difficult to reach a consensus on what a

[19] *War Powers: A Test of Compliance*, hearings before the House Committee on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1975).

[20] *Holtzman* v. *Schlesinger*, 361 F.Supp. 555, 565 (E.D. N.Y. 1973), reversed by *Holtzman* v. *Schlesinger*, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), after stays by the Supreme Court, 414 U.S. 1304, 1321 (1973).

[21] P.L. 94-329, 90 Stat. 740-743.

[22] *Wkly Comp. Pres. Doc.*, XII, 828 (May 7, 1976). See also his statement of July 1, 1976, while signing H.R. 13680; *id.* at XII, 1104.

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president may do pursuant to constitutional powers. Even the settlement of claims, endorsed by the *Belmont* and *Pink* cases, is subject to disagreement today among scholars.[23] A bill introduced in the House of Representatives in 1975 did not try to codify presidential powers to enter into executive agreements. Instead, the bill focused generally on national commitments regarding the introduction, basing, or deployment of armed forces on foreign territory, as well as any military training, equipment, or financial or material resources provided to a foreign country. Such commitments would be subject to a 60-day waiting period, during which time Congress could disapprove the commitments by passing a concurrent resolution.[24]

The approach in these areas has been to leave the arena for presidential operation somewhat nebulous, because of conceptual and philosophical disagreements, while subjecting executive actions to congressional disapproval. This solution narrows, but does not eliminate, the opportunity for conflict between the two branches. Even though a legislative veto has the backing of public law, an administration may conclude, in a particular instance, that Congress has reached too far into the executive domain. In such confrontations it may not be possible for Congress to curb the president simply by passing a one-house or two-house veto. A lengthy and acrimonious political battle may result, in some cases requiring judicial intervention. An outcome of this magnitude would not discredit the legislative veto. It would merely clarify, or at least highlight, the parts of the terrain that remain in sharp dispute. In the majority of cases the legislative veto can serve as an acceptable compromise for both branches.

Integrity of the Administrative Process

Bills are currently under consideration to make all departmental regulations subject to legislative veto. While it could be argued that the authority to issue rules is delegated by Congress (and therefore vulnerable to whatever conditions Congress attaches), and that rule-making is a mix of legislative and executive qualities, the use of this type of legislative veto involves members too deeply in administrative matters. The problems are of both a constitutional and policy nature.

The framers established a separate executive branch in large part for reasons of administrative efficiency. For a decade the framers had watched the Continental Congress struggle fitfully with its legislative duties while at the same time tending to administrative and adjudicatory matters. Several years prior to the Philadelphia Convention, before the creation of three separate branches, the national government had already begun to establish separate executive and judicial bodies. The

[23] *United States* v. *Belmont*, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) and *United States* v. *Pink*, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). See Louis Fisher, *The Constitution Between Friends: Congress, the President, and the Law* 204–213 (1978).

[24] H.R. 4438; 121 Cong. Rec. H1451–1452 (daily ed. March 6, 1975).

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experiment with single executives in 1781 laid the foundation for the executive departments established in 1789.

This quest for administrative efficiency need not lead to the strict partitioning of functions advocated by Woodrow Wilson. In one of his veto messages he counseled: "The Congress and the Executive should function within their respective spheres. Otherwise, efficient and responsible management will be impossible and progress impeded by wasteful forces of disorganization and obstruction." While he admitted that Congress had the power to grant or deny an appropriation, or to enact or refuse to enact a law, "once an appropriation is made or a law is passed the appropriation should be administered or the law executed by the executive branch of the Government."[25] This remark came from the days when students of government tried, unsuccessfully, to separate administration from politics.

Congress has the right to oversee the laws that are passed and the regulations that are promulgated. The rapid growth of administrative legislation prompted Congress, in the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, to make its celebrated plea that each standing committee exercise "continuous watchfulness" over the execution of laws. We may forget some of the concern that gave rise to that phrase. Senator Robert LaFollette told his colleagues that when Congress "yields up that rulemaking power and delegates it to an executive agency, it is part of the responsibility of Congress to keep informed as to whether the power is being exercised as it intended it should be."[26]

In the same year that Congress rededicated itself to legislative oversight, it passed the Administrative Procedure Act. The purpose was to create an administrative process that would best guarantee, to the degree possible in a political world, the availability of full information and facts needed for fair and intelligent rule-making. Major requirements include adequate notice to the parties concerned, an opportunity for interested persons to participate in rule-making by submitting material, publication of the rule not less than 30 days prior to its effective date, and a right to review by the courts. Because of the complexity of modern legislation, it may take agencies years to develop a suitable hearing record before issuing a regulation. The Federal Trade Commission estimated that one of its rules was the subject of four years of study and produced a public record of some 30,000 pages.[27] Some records run 100,000 pages and more.[28]

How will this process be affected by subjecting the thousands of regulations promulgated each year to legislative veto? Congress does not have the staff, expertise, time, or interest to review all of the rules and regulations. More is involved than simply reading a regulation, in itself a demanding assignment.

[25] James D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, XVII, 8846 (1925).

[26] 92 Cong. Rec. 6446 (1946).

[27] *Congressional Review of Administrative Rulemaking*, hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 465 (1975).

[28] *Oversight—Rulemaking Activities of the Federal Trade Commission*, hearings before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1977).

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To judge the fairness and reasonableness of a regulation, members and their staffs would have to study the entire hearing record that supports the regulation. There is no evidence that Congress is prepared to do that. Congressman Walter Flowers has told his colleagues that there would not be a "rerun or a rehash of all of the intricate rule-making hearings and consideration that we have in the agencies. Congress is clearly not set up to do that; have no fear of that."[29] But if Congress does not examine the hearing record, and does not intend to conduct an independent study, on what would it base a decision to disapprove a regulation—on hunches and political pressures? The door would be wide open for lobbying by special interests. Information is already available to suggest the pattern: agency-subcommittee negotiation in private, with heavy influence by staffs.[30]

By disapproving a regulation Congress might add substantively to the legislative history of an act. Statements on the floor or in committee reports, as part of the process of overturning a regulation, would supplement everything that had preceded the public law. In this way Congress could selectively "amend" an act without allowing the president to participate. The temptation to express new intent, in light of public responses to agency regulations, will be strong.

Part of the criticism directed at the rules promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency reflects a shift in public and congressional attitudes. While EPA has been trying to carry out legislation enacted at the height of the environmental movement, the commitment to environmental protection has lost ground to competing social and economic concerns (yet to be incorporated into law). Members of Congress will be hard-pressed to isolate a rule from the political values operating at the moment. Antonin Scalia, former Assistant Attorney General, has stated the case vividly: "What is likely, I fear, is that we will be forced to cross the ever-shifting sands of a congressional intent defined by separate and successive Houses of Congress as they see fit. It will be a confusing and never ending process of retouching legislative history."[31]

The use of legislative vetoes to second-guess regulations will most likely encourage Congress to legislate with even fewer guidelines. Defenders of vague delegations can always argue that Congress will be in a position at some later date to review regulations and see that they square with congressional intent. Yet if a statute is vague, and if the legislative history supplies inadequate or conflicting directives, who can say when an agency departs from the legislative purpose? The climate would be ripe for arbitrary, piecemeal, covert, and uninformed implementation of a statute. If Congress believes that agencies are violating legislative intent, it ought to draft statutes in more explicit language or adopt clarifying amendments.

[29] 122 Cong. Rec. H10673 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 1976).

[30] Harold H. Bruff and Ernest Gellhorn, "Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes," 90 *Harv. L. Rev.* 1369 (1977).

[31] *Congressional Review of Administrative Rulemaking*, hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 375 (1975).

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There are situations in which the legislative veto can be applied selectively to agencies that cry out for special attention. The General Services Administration provides an instructive case. In 1974, when it appeared that GSA might improperly dispose of President Nixon's tape recordings and other materials, Congress passed legislation to subject regulations issued by the Administrator of General Services to a one-house veto. In 1977 the Supreme Court offered this judgment on the legality of the statute: "Whatever are the future possibilities for constitutional conflict in the promulgation of regulations respecting public access to particular documents, nothing in the Act renders it unduly disruptive of the Executive Branch and, therefore, unconstitutional on its face."[32] The Court concluded that Nixon, who complained of being singled out for special treatment, constituted "a legitimate class of one" in view of his resignation, his acceptance of a pardon for offenses committed while in office, and the judgment of Congress that he was an unreliable custodian of his papers.[33] The extraordinary circumstances justified the use of a legislative veto to monitor GSA regulations.

In other situations, Congress can resort to the regular legislative process. Members of Congress have demonstrated that they can act rapidly to disapprove an agency regulation. On May 9, 1977 the Department of Housing and Urban Development released a regulation that created an uproar in Congress. The purpose of the regulation was to define the family groups eligible for public housing. HUD defined "stable family relationships" broadly to include unmarried couples, but because of ambiguities the definition could also cover homosexual couples—a result HUD did not intend. On June 15, 1977, the House voted to nullify the regulation. Shortly thereafter the House amendment became law.[34] Also, through an informal process, agencies will withdraw and revise regulations that have been criticized by review committees.

Congress as Adjudicator: Deportation Cases

When the Court of Claims upheld the use of a legislative veto for federal salaries, it noted that the pay-setting function "embodies no substantial element of, or incursion into, the administration, enforcement, or execution of the laws."[35] Quite different is the role that Congress has carved out for itself in the handling of deportation cases.

Section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 authorizes the attorney general to suspend deportation of aliens and to adjust their status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. Congress may disapprove a suspension by a one-house veto. During the session of the Congress

[32] *Nixon* v. *Administrator of General Services*, 45 U.S.L.W. 4917, 4922 (June 28, 1977).

[33] *Id.* at 4930.

[34] 123 Cong. Rec. H5931-5932 (daily ed. June 15, 1977); P.L. 95-119, 91 Stat. 1089, sec. 408 (1977).

[35] 556 F.2d 1028, 1068 (Ct. C1. 1977).

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at which a case is reported, or prior to the close of the following session, either house may pass a resolution stating that it does not favor the suspension of a deportation. The attorney general shall then deport the alien or authorize the alien's voluntary departure at the alien's expense. Since 1952 Congress has exercised this one-house veto on at least thirteen occasions. Sometimes a resolution of disapproval includes one or two names; the number has been as large as seventy.

The constitutionality of this procedure is now in the courts. The specific issue involves Jagdish Rai Chadha, born and raised in Kenya but of East Indian race. Admitted to the United States as a student in 1966, he received a B.S. in business administration in 1970 and a master's degree in political science and economics a year later. At that point he discovered that neither Kenya nor the United Kingdom would admit him as a permanent resident because of immigration restrictions in those countries on persons of his race.[36]

When Chadha's visa expired in 1972, he requested a suspension of deportation. On the basis of documents and affidavits he supplied to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and findings of fact that indicated "extreme hardship" for him were he deported, an immigration judge in 1974 granted the application for suspension. The attorney general transmitted to Congress the name of Chadha, along with others, complete with a detailed explanation justifying suspension.

The contrast between executive and legislative procedures, in this matter, could hardly be more pronounced. The INS established an adversary hearing procedure, with an opportunity for cross-examination. The attorney general is required by statute to report to Congress a complete and detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provision of law in suspension cases, giving the reasons for each suspension. Executive officials are expected to satisfy the requirements of due process.

Not so with Congress. On December 16, 1975 the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapproving six suspensions, including that of Jagdish Rai Chadha. Since the Judiciary Committee had been discharged from further consideration of the resolution, no report accompanied the resolution to explain the need for legislative action. The House agreed to the resolution without a recorded vote. The sole justification in support of the resolution was a statement that the Judiciary Committee, after a review of 340 deportation cases, decided that six individuals did not meet the statutory requirements, "particularly as it relates to hardship."[37] The record for other House and Senate actions on suspension cases is the same. Reasons are provided neither in the committee report nor during floor consideration.

The one-house veto for deportation cases bears a superficial resemblance to

[36] Details of this case appear in briefs filed in *Chadha* v. *Immigration and Naturalization Service*, No. 77-1702, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

[37] 121 Cong. Rec. H12609 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1975).

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private immigration bills. Certainly Congress has, over the years, reserved for itself a special right of "dispensation" in these matters, but there the similarity ends. Private bills follow the regular legislative course. The initial burden is on Congress to build a record to justify the legislation. Members of Congress call upon the INS and the State Department to review private immigration bills. If the committee report accompanying a bill shows that an executive agency advises against it, that may be enough cause for any two representatives (including the "official objectors" appointed to review these bills) to send the bill back to committee. More important, private bills are presented to the president for a possible veto.

Conclusions

In adopting political reforms, Jefferson advised that the patch should be commensurate with the hole. The use of legislative vetoes to control all departmental regulations is not a good fit. Members of Congress, testifying in support of this legislation, emphasize how strongly their constituents resent government involvement in their daily lives. Constituents object to "redtape" and "overregulation." If that is the complaint, if such sentiments lie behind the drive for rule-making reform, relief will not come from legislative vetoes. The appropriate response would be smaller government, fewer statutes, and less regulation, but there is little indication that members of Congress (or their constituents) want to move in that direction.

For other objects, however, the legislative veto can serve a useful purpose. There are some who fear that Congress cannot use this oversight tool selectively, that in time the legislative veto will be used indiscriminately across the entire range of government activity. But legislators, like the rest of us, are limited by a 24-hour day and will circumscribe their activities. We did not think it responsible a few years ago to argue that the president's power to impound funds, withhold information, enter into executive agreements, and engage in other activities should be totally abolished, for otherwise he would use those prerogatives in unlimited fashion. Both Congress and the president have tried to reconcile the needs of administrative flexibility with legislative control. The legislative veto, kept within bounds, is one of a number of instruments available for that purpose.

Looking back on our handling of some central executive-legislative conflicts of the past decade, we can see how fashionable it was to stake out a position on the periphery. By occupying ground on the fringe area, and polarizing each issue, protagonists ignored a vast tract of fertile land in the middle. The questions were extravagant and impractical. Does the war power belong to Congress or to the president? Is executive privilege an inherent power, absolute in its application, or a "myth"? Can presidents impound funds at will or may Congress dictate how funds are to be spent? What factors ushered in "presidential government"? What augurs now for "Congressional government"?

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Rarely does an issue between Congress and the president present itself in such stark fashion. After much compromise and accommodation, the political process gives ground to deliver novel solutions for sharing power and responsibility. We can expect the same kind of pragmatic approach to the legislative veto.*

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Presidential Power and White House Lobbying

JOHN F. MANLEY

It seems almost a law that severe political crises more often overcome than revive political institutions. So when Gerald Ford, replacing Richard Nixon, declared that he wanted a good marriage rather than a honeymoon with Congress, cynics doubted and realists wondered whether he could restore some semblance of order amid the political wreckage of Watergate. The Watergate affair was essentially a crisis of power and the abuse of power. As such, it pointed up once again the wisdom of the bedrock assumption of American government: too much power in one place is dangerous. But the long-term question from the point of view of political institutions was how Congress and the presidency would renegotiate the balance of power between them, and how long this renegotiated settlement would last when confronted by new political realities, such as the election of a Democrat to the presidency.

In a decentralized system of checks and balances any theory of presidential power must perforce be dynamic. A large part of American political history could be written from the perspective of how national leaders and institutions have sought, largely without permanent success, to concentrate power in one pair of hands. Thus it is hardly surprising that students of the American presidency have developed two contrasting models of presidential power. The first, which we may call the problematic model, reflects periods of presidential weakness. The second, which we may call the supremacy model, applies in times of presidential ascendancy.

The problematic model, best developed in the work of Richard E. Neustadt, holds that presidential power is essentially the power to persuade, and persuasion is essentially a bargaining process between the president and other power-

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ful figures.[1] Presidential power is problematic because the effectiveness of formal powers depends heavily on the president's skill at bargaining, his public standing, and his reputation among political elites. When Neustadt's book appeared in 1960 it was greeted as a refreshing look at how the power of the presidency appeared to those within the White House and as a useful corrective to the general tendency to exaggerate the extent to which presidents get their way. His observations about presidential power were so felicitous and so well argued that they passed into political science more as copybook maxims than as hypotheses to be tested.[2]

The supremacy model of presidential power, as developed by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., argues that the "constitutional Presidency—as events so apparently disparate as the Indochina War and the Watergate affair showed—has become the imperial Presidency and threatens to be the revolutionary Presidency."[3] During the 1960s and early '70s those whom Neustadt saw as independent checks on presidential power became enfeebled as the presidency successfully claimed more and more power. Now, Schlesinger argues, the pendulum must be brought back closer to the constitutional plan of the Founding Fathers: not so much that the presidency is enfeebled—for a powerful presidency is needed to overcome the inertia inherent in a system of separated powers—but as much as is needed to protect the fundamental values of the American political system.[4]

The problematic and supremacy models of presidential power reflect the fact that presidential power is highly variable from president to president. Truman and Eisenhower, on whom Neustadt focused, present one picture; Johnson and Nixon, the prime subjects of Schlesinger, present another. The power of the presidency and Congress has seesawed back and forth throughout American history. Although it is possible to draw generalizations that describe the fluctuations in the power of one over the other, we are still a long way from identifying and measuring the factors that explain why some presidents are powerful and others weak.

For all the difficulties of concentrating research on the presidency at the level of power, Neustadt's work was a major step forward. Before Neustadt, the richest theoretical works on the presidency were George F. Milton's and Clinton Rossiter's, which analyzed the various roles that presidents play in American politics.[5] Neustadt's model holds that multiple roles and formal powers do not

[1] Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: Wiley, 1976), Ch. 3. Neustadt has revised his views in the wake of the Johnson and Nixon presidencies, but his basic theory remains the same. See his introduction to the 1976 edition.

[2] Nelson W. Polsby, *Congress and the Presidency*, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), pp. 199–200. For a good exposition and critique of Neustadt see Peter W. Sperlich, "Bargaining and Overload: An Essay on *Presidential Power*," in Aaron Wildavsky (ed.), *Perspectives on the Presidency* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), pp. 406–30.

[3] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (New York: Popular Library, 1974), p. 10.

[4] Ibid., pp. 9–12.

[5] George F. Milton, *The Use of Presidential Power, 1789–1943* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1944). Clinton Rossiter, *The American Presidency* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956).

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ensure that a president will be powerful. In fact, the diverse expectations placed on presidents may be, for certain kinds of incumbents, a source of weakness, not strength. This is most certainly true and important.

Yet in many ways the presidential literature resembles that on Congress around 1961 when Ralph K. Huitt, commenting on the reform-oriented congressional literature, said that the "preoccupation with reform has obscured the fact that we have no really adequate model of party leadership as it exists in Congress, and that none can be constructed because we lack simple descriptions of many of the basic working parts of the present system."[6] There are, of course, important exceptions to this charge in the presidential literature, just as there were in the congressional literature when Huitt wrote.[7] But the general charge is, on balance, correct. The concern with presidential power and generalizations about it far outstrip our understanding of the institutions comprised in the presidency, and how these institutions add to or detract from the ability of presidents to get their way.

The purpose of this article is to describe some of the major features of a part of the institutionalized presidency that is centrally involved in guiding the president's program through Congress, the Office of Congressional Relations (OCR). Our treatment of the OCR is restricted to two Democratic presidents, Kennedy and Johnson, who actively sought congressional approval of a broad range of legislative proposals. The primary sources of information are the files of leading White House lobbyists contained in the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, and personal interaction with some of those lobbyists while I served as a staff assistant in the office of the House Democratic whip, Hale Boggs (D., La.), during the last half of 1967.

Because this article is a case study of the OCR from 1961 to 1968, no generalizations are possible beyond the evidence collected on Kennedy and Johnson. But it is hoped that the importance of the OCR to the president, and the relative dearth of studies of the White House that are based on the rich primary data of the presidential libraries, may help compensate for some of the limitations of the case study approach. In time, students of the presidency may have sufficient understanding of the inner workings of the White House to attempt generalizations about the office that are not as tightly restricted as the ones offered here. Meanwhile, intensive studies of various parts of the presidency extend our knowledge about an institution that still needs to be better described before it can be better understood.

A study of the OCR is inextricably related to the study of presidential power

[6] Ralph K. Huitt, "Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate," in Ralph K. Huitt and Robert L. Peabody (eds.), *Congress: Two Decades of Analysis* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 138.

[7] Among the most significant exceptions on the presidency are Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *The President's Cabinet* (New York: Vintage Books, 1959); Patrick Anderson, *President's Men* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968); John H. Kessell, *The Domestic Presidency* (North Scituate, Mass.: Duxbury, 1975); Thomas E. Cronin and Sanford D. Greenberg (eds.) *The Presidential Advisory System* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); and Edward Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers* (New York: New York University Press, 1957).

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because the OCR, beginning with Kennedy, has emerged as one of the major tools used by presidents to influence and direct Congress. Who heads the OCR, and how well he performs, are as important to academic and journalistic students of the presidency as most if not all cabinet appointments. Thus after taking a look at how the OCR functioned under Kennedy and Johnson we will conclude with some observations about the capacity of the OCR to enhance the president's power, and with some suggestions about how current and future presidents may use this office to help overcome the problematic nature of power in a system of separated powers.

Presidential Objectives and the OCR

Part of the reason why generalizations about presidential power come hard is that the power of any particular president depends in the first instance on the interplay between his objectives and his general political circumstances. Dwight D. Eisenhower and Richard Nixon defined their objectives vis-à-vis Congress very differently than did John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, which makes comparisons among these presidents difficult in the extreme. The two Republican presidents faced Democratic Congresses, a structural reality that would have made it hard for them to follow the activist programmatic course of the two Democrats, even if they had been so inclined. And Kennedy and Johnson faced Democratic Congresses that were so different in composition that comparisons between them are no easy matter.

Looking first at Kennedy, it will be remembered that he helped to establish the political context in which he operated with his vague campaign promise to "get this country moving again." This promise cut two ways after his election. It gave him considerable flexibility in deciding which demands to make on Congress, and when to make them. But it also bound him to some kind of comprehensive program. His campaign slogan, when translated into specific programs, constituted a risky strategy for a Democratic president whose party actually lost congressional seats in 1960. Kennedy could do little without congressional cooperation. The problem was how to get it.

One of Kennedy's first steps in solving this problem was to keep the Office of Congressional Relations, an office first established by Eisenhower in 1953. Then he decided to upgrade it. To this end he appointed his campaign manager, Lawrence F. O'Brien, to head the office and he made it clear to congressmen that O'Brien was to be one of the major links between the White House and Capitol Hill.[8]

[8] Background material on the OCR may be found in the following sources: Lawrence F. O'Brien, *No Final Victories* (New York: Ballantine, 1975), chs. 6–9. Maura E. Heaphy, "Executive Legislative Liaison," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 5 (Fall 1975): 42–46; and Lawrence F. O'Brien, Jr., "The Invisible Bridge," Senior Thesis, Harvard University, 1967. Other parts of the executive branch had, of course, dealt with Congress for many years, and most had special offices for congressional relations. The OCR was not intended to monopolize the congressional relations function. Its purposes were to help the departments out when they faltered, and to act as a liaison unit that was particu-

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The political obstacles confronting the New Frontier program, as seen by the White House, were far worse in the House than in the Senate.[9] The Democratic margin in the Senate of 64 to 36 promised to make the Senators more hospitable to liberal programs than the more conservative House. In the House Democrats outnumbered Republicans 263 to 174, but the margin was uncomfortably close given the tendency of conservative Democrats, mostly from the South, to vote with Republicans on a wide range of issues.

The OCR learned a great deal about political context during the opening battle of the 87th Congress, the 1961 fight to liberalize the House Rules Committee. It was clear to O'Brien and Kennedy that if liberal bills were to have a chance in the House, something had to be done about the Rules Committee. This committee had been a major source of conservative power in the House for many years, and Kennedy concluded that the fate of much if not all of his program depended on packing Rules with liberals. Fortunately for the White House, Speaker Sam Rayburn agreed to lead the battle.

For our purposes, there are two important points about the Rules fight.[10] First, Speaker Rayburn and the White House, after an extremely intense effort, barely won by a vote of 217 to 212. Second, the OCR assumed a major role in the effort. O'Brien and Kennedy were aghast to learn that Rayburn expected to lose the roll call by a handful of votes, and that he had made no systematic head count of how individual members planned to vote.[11] The OCR organized a head count and orchestrated diverse efforts to induce "wrong" or wavering members to support the president. From then on the central legislative task of the OCR was the head count; and on this task depended much of Kennedy's success or failure.

The lesson in political arithmetic of the Rules fight was reinforced in February 1961 when O'Brien and his assistants met with three experienced House vote counters at the Mayflower Hotel.[12] On the surface, the House was solidly controlled by Democrats. But as Representative Richard Bolling, a liberal from the border state of Missouri, Frank Thompson, a liberal from New Jersey representing the northern Democrats, and Carl Elliott, a friendly southerner from Alabama, diagnosed the House for O'Brien, the New Frontier had little chance of success. Going down the list of House members one-by-one showed that only about 180 members were safely counted as liberal supporters. This meant that to achieve a majority in the House, the administration needed votes from the largely conservative southern Democratic and Republican blocs.

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larly close to the president. O'Brien's initial staff consisted of only four men. For a good account see Abraham Holtzman, *Legislative Liaison* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970), ch. 9. See also Ralph K. Huitt, "White House Channels to the Hill," in *Congress Against the President* (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1975), pp. 71–84.

[9] O'Brien, *Victories*, p. 134.

[10] A good account may be found in Neil MacNeil, *Forge of Democracy* (New York: David McKay, 1963), ch. 15.

[11] O'Brien, *Victories*, pp. 107–8.

[12] MacNeil, *Forge*, p. 258.

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Of the 99 southern Democrats, only a dozen or so had reasonably liberal records. The same was true of the Republicans. Adding these to the 180 sure votes showed that the administration's supporters fell 15 votes short of a majority. The fate of the New Frontier rested in the hands of pivotal southern Democrats and Republicans, members who, it was hoped, could be persuaded bill by bill to support the Kennedy program.

In essence, the OCR and its allies inside and outside Congress faced three tasks: hold the votes of liberal Democrats; attract a number of votes from the southern Democrats; and compensate for Democratic losses with Republican votes whenever possible. The second task, as seen from the White House, was especially important—and difficult. In July 1962, after eighteen months of experience, Henry Hall Wilson, an OCR lobbyist with special responsibility for southern Democrats, sent O'Brien a memorandum on southern Democratic voting. He noted that the southern Democrats, with few exceptions:

> —Can look for little or no help in their districts either financially or organizationally either to organized labor or to the party structure;
>
> —Must encounter their critical tests not in the general election, but in the primaries, where they get no help from having the president at the head of the ticket;
>
> —Have established through the years entrenched habits of voting with the Republicans;
>
> —Must look for their financial and community support to local business leaders who are totally responsive to the national pressure groups which oppose all our programs, and
>
> —Can gain little from us but a kind smile and a pat on the head.

"For these reasons," Wilson continued, "these districts constitute the battleground on all major bills. And the pressures applied by our opponents on these members are almost unbelievable."[13] In Wilson's view, even if the administration carried every northern, western, and border state Democrat, which had never happened, it still needed 55 southerners for a bare majority of 219. This assumed little or no Republican support, but with Charles Halleck (R., Ind.) as minority leader, and as key votes on the 1962 tax and farm bills showed, the assumption was realistic.

Except for the 89th Congress (1965-66), in which a lopsided Democratic majority of 295 to 140 tipped the balance in favor of the administration, the political arithmetic of the House boded ill for the New Frontier and Great Society programs. Democratic majorities throughout the 1960s did not allow much margin for error. The political context in the House gave weight to one of Kennedy's favorite Jeffersonian aphorisms: "Great innovations should not be forced on slender majorities." How, then, did Kennedy and his successor go about the task of influencing Congress?

[13] Henry Hall Wilson to Lawrence O'Brien, July 18, 1962, Wilson Box 4. Much of the material for this article is drawn from the Wilson papers. Additional material may be found in the general legislation file of the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, classified as LE by the library.

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Favors. Students of the presidency knew long before Watergate that behind the pomp and circumstance of the presidency, and the gleaming facade of the White House, lies politics. The president is perforce the leading politician in the country. He is at the center of much of the politics that makes and breaks careers and programs in Washington. And he has at his disposal numerous favors that he can use to induce and reward cooperation with the White House.

Given the inherently political nature of the White House it may seem surprising that one of O'Brien's first acts was to insulate the OCR from responsibility for allocating patronage to loyal administration supporters. This task was assigned to the Democratic National Committee, then headed by John Bailey. O'Brien assumed the role of friendly supporter but not decision maker in his dealings with congressional requests. On closer inspection, however, O'Brien's effort to insulate his office from patronage requests was an effort to enjoy the benefits of patronage without paying all of the costs. By channeling patronage requests to the DNC O'Brien protected the OCR from being overwhelmed by hundreds of specific demands, and placed the bargaining position of the OCR on a somewhat higher level than the ratio of requests met to requests received. His pose to congressmen as a mere friend in the DNC court probably fooled no one, but it did remove him somewhat from direct, day-by-day patronage politics, with all the headaches, complaining, and frustration involved in that.

O'Brien's objective was not unlike that of many successful bargainers in politics: to establish and maintain a bargaining relationship in which the flow of mutual support continued without the need for specific accounting or explicit trading. Tacit exchanges between the administration and congressmen were the best exchanges; they testified to a high quality working relationship. Explicit exchanges—support for this in exchange for that—frequently mark a bargaining relationship in decline. Many politicians seem to feel more comfortable exchanging benefits if the relationship is a solid one based on mutual need and commitment, rather than a shaky one in which a failure to deliver threatens the relationship itself. Thus the OCR tried to get congressmen indebted to the White House by performing favors, and also made an effort to provide a sympathetic hearing even if a sympathetic response proved impossible.[14]

Congressmen, of course, are well aware that the White House response to their requests depends in part on their support of the administration's program. And the record contains numerous examples of congressional efforts to affect White House perceptions:

> Even such a powerful Representative as George Mahon, Chairman of Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and of the House Appropriations Committee, was not above calling attention to some facts. On March 27, 1964 he sent a letter to Walter Jenkins, Special Assistant to the President, complete with two articles from the Lub-

[14] O'Brien, *Victories*, pp. 46–47.

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bock Avalance Journal. One contained a story on Mahon's support for LBJ's Viet Nam policy. The other reported Congressional Quarterly's analysis that in 1963 Mahon supported President Kennedy 75 percent of the time. Mahon wrote in pen: "I had hardly realized that I was doing such a good job supporting the Administration—75% in 1963! He also wrote Jenkins that he expected no reply from the President, but, of course, he got one. "I shared your letter and the clippings with the President," Jenkins wrote Mahon on March 28, "and he was mighty pleased."[15]

A less powerful, but more liberal Texas Democrat, Henry Gonzalez, also saw fit to herald his record of Administration support. On April 6, 1964 he sent Jenkins a zerox of CQ's 1963 study with his name and batting average (98 percent) underlined.[16]

Douglass Cater informed the President on April 1, 1965, that "Senator Randolph just phoned to say, 'This vote may be very close. Tell the President I will be voting with him.' " Unknown to Randolph, Cater informed the President that Senator Javits was also voting against the unwanted amendment, giving the Administration enough votes even without Randolph.[17]

Favor, although a rather diffuse concept, accurately describes the nature of the relationship between the White House and a large number of congressmen during the Kennedy and Johnson years. A congressman who is in the favor of the White House can expect a sympathetic response to his requests and positive action on at least some of them. If the president is in the favor of a congressman, the White House can feel comfortable approaching the member on a bill or some other matter. Being in the favor of someone, although based on the exchange of favors, is different from simple bargaining or logrolling. It captures the qualitative side of the relationship, the side that governs the response to specific requests. Favor is, in a sense, the strategic background that allows repeated calls for assistance without embarrassment or worry that too much is being asked. Of course if the bargaining relationship is too one-sided it may endanger and ultimately erode favor. But once favor is established it tends to be self-perpetuating and mutually reinforcing. Congressmen and presidents who enjoy each other's favor are more like long-term partners than temporary allies. As partners they may sometimes disagree. But until the partnership is dissolved each knows that he can rely on the other for some if not all of his important political needs.

Three examples of favor illustrate this point. On April 30, 1964 Lawrence O'Brien wrote President Johnson asking him to meet with an important constituent of Representative James Trimble. "Judge" Trimble was an Arkansas Democrat on the Rules Committee. According to O'Brien, it was vitally important to Trimble politically to have Johnson meet with the constituent, and O'Brien made it clear to Johnson why he should grant the request: "As you know, practically without argument and without absences Trimble supports us both in the Rules Committee and on the floor of the House."[18]

[15] LE5, 170.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Douglass Cater to the president, April 1, 1965, LE5, 169.
[18] Lawrence F. O'Brien to the president, April 30, 1964, Wilson Box 5.

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A second dimension of favor is seen in a letter from Lyndon Johnson to Mayor Richard Daley of Chicago. Johnson wrote Daley on November 14, 1964 that one of his associates with a penchant for research found that three Chicago congressmen were at the top of the list of LBJ supporters in the 88th Congress. This, according to Johnson, was "mighty comforting" and he just wanted to thank "you for all your help, Dick."[19] As this letter illustrates, the Johnson White House had a good working relationship with the Chicago Democrats in Congress, and recognized that part of the relationship was due to Daley. Johnson's letter is a case of recognizing favor and, by so doing, extending it.

The third case involves Frank Horton, a Republican from Rochester, N.Y. In November 1966 Horton called Henry Hall Wilson's attention to an editorial in the Rochester *Democrat and Chronicle* in which he was attacked for voting with the administration. Wilson sent the clippings to Marvin Watson together with a note describing Horton as a "very helpful Republican." Wilson explained that Horton's "purpose in sending the editorial is to point out one or more of these editors, at the top of the page, are in here frequently and should be talked to."[20] Thus, Horton felt free to use the Democratic White House to exert influence on opinion leaders in his district, at least partly as a return for past favors.

One of the most important favors at the disposal of the White House is, of course, federal judgeships. Congressmen, as everyone knows, lobby the White House on behalf of their friends and supporters. A good illustration of the kinds of arguments used by administration supporters—ranging from patience to *Congressional Quarterly* voting scores—is contained in a letter from Senator Daniel K. Inouye of Hawaii to the chief Senate lobbyist for the White House, Mike Manatos. Inouye wanted a Hawaiian considered for the Court of Claims:

> Please note that I am very serious in this matter and I am very hopeful that the White House will give Hawaii a break. Since Statehood we have not received any appointment of any significance. We have sat by silently hoping that someday the President would favor us. However, the people of Hawaii are beginning to rumble a bit. After all, I don't blame them too much. Hawaii's Congressional delegation, especially the Democratic members, have been extremely loyal to the Administration. We have led all of our colleagues in our voting records. As you know, the *Congressional Quarterly* ranks me Number One in the Senate as far as Administration support is concerned. In addition, in the past two Presidential Elections, with relatively little help from the National Committee, the people of Hawaii have responded very favorably to the Democratic cause.[21]

Implicit in Inouye's reference to himself as the "Number One" loyalist in the Senate is the threat that unless some help is forthcoming from the White House, this could change. Having established a record of "favor," Inouye felt free to press for a particular favor in return.

[19] Lyndon B. Johnson to Hon. Richard Daley, November 14, 1964, LE5, 169.
[20] Henry Hall Wilson to Marvin Watson, November 7, 1966, LE5, 170.
[21] Senator Daniel K. Inouye to Mike Manatos, January 26, 1965, LE5, 169.

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Establishing and maintaining favor constitutes a large part of the OCR's job. One of the best known methods involves federal projects in congessional constituencies. Although the files consulted at the LBJ Library do not overflow with examples of this sort, a few were uncovered. In 1965 White House lobbyists called six congressmen on behalf of the St. John's River Project in Maine. President Johnson was informed that four of the six would have opposed the project were it not for the White House intervention. And, since the project passed by an 18-15 vote, the White House calls seem to have made a difference. At the bottom of the memo to LBJ is a hand-written notation: "send to Senator Muskie."[22] Another revealing example occurred a year earlier. Henry Hall Wilson wrote a memo to O'Brien about a meeting over the refusal of the Corps of Engineers to build dams. Wilson attended the meeting along with Congressmen Carl Perkins, James Kee, Senator Cooper, and about 80 Kentuckians, West Virginians, and Virginians. Evidently the problem was that the western side of Pike County got Fishtrap Dam, and now the eastern side wanted to know why it was left out. As Wilson sardonically noted: "Presumably we have yet to hear from northern and southern Pike. And Sweet Betsy."[23] The Democratic National Committee, to cite a third example, also got involved in this kind of activity. In August 1965 a memo was sent to O'Brien listing the record of federal activities in several congressional districts. O'Brien was informed that the DNC was holding meetings with congressmen in which the legislators discussed problems they were having with governmental agencies. O'Brien hardly needed to be told that if the agencies followed through these meetings could be worthwhile.[24]

Patronage and projects are important components of favor, and O'Brien took pains to ensure that the OCR received credit for good news. Explicit trading—a vote for a project or a job—is, however, probably less common than generally believed. Being in favor is a slightly amorphous condition befitting a somewhat amorphous process. It is a matter of batting average more than a particular hit. So many factors affect the distribution of particular projects that it is risky for a congressman to bargain a vote for something in particular. D.S. Saund, a former congressman from California, once tried to hold the White House up on long-term financing for foreign aid, and the effort backfired. Saund, as a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, was strategically placed to advance or retard presidential borrowing authority. He let it be known that his amendment to kill the borrowing authority could be deflected if an economically questionable naval hospital were kept in his district. The OCR refused, Saund's amendment passed, and President Kennedy pointedly snubbed Saund during a 1962 visit to his district.[25] Saund had gone too far.

Superintending the legislative process. Regardless of the number of favors at the disposal of the White House, it was never sufficient to overcome the basic

[22] Jake Jacobsen to the president, September 1, 1965, LE5, 169.
[23] Henry Hall Wilson to Larry O'Brien, November 7, 1965, Wilson Box 5.
[24] Dave Bunn to Larry O'Brien, August 13, 1965, Wilson Box 8.
[25] MacNeil, *Forge*, pp. 251-52.

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fact of executive-legislative relations during the Kennedy-Johnson years: Congress and the presidency were inherently at odds with each other on many, if not all, of the fundamental issues of national policy. No amount of favors could ensure easy victories for the White House because the political arithmetic of the Democratic majorities in Congress, save for the 89th Congress, gave the Republicans and their Democratic allies the potential balance of power. Favors were useful in retaining the support of proadministration Democrats, and luring individual supporters issue by issue. But the political obstacles facing many New Frontier and Great Society programs far exceeded the capacity of the White House simply to buy success. Favors helped buy a chance of success; for the rest, intensive efforts at controlling the legislative process were essential.

No one understood this better than Lyndon Johnson. "There is but one way for a President to deal with Congress," Johnson recalled, "and that is continuously, incessantly, and without interruption. If it's really going to work, the relationship between the President and the Congress has got to be almost incestuous. He's got to know them even better than they know themselves."[26]

In line with Johnson's view that the system of legislative liaison had to stretch from the cradle to the grave—from the moment a bill is introduced to the moment it is enrolled as law—the OCR was deeply involved in every phase of the legislative process. The process of passing legislation was so incestuous that many functions that one might expect to be performed by congressmen were performed by executive branch lobbyists instead.

The nature of OCR involvement depends heavily on the quality of leadership in Congress. When dealing with a competent committee chairman like Oren Harris (D., Ark.), for example, the White House role was quite different than with less competent chairmen. Harris was seen as a man who was totally on top of the situation in his committee (Interstate and Foreign Commerce), had good cooperation from Judge Smith's Rules Committee, knew the bargains he had to make to get the necessary number of votes, and hollered for the White House when he needed help.[27]

When dealing with other committees, however, the OCR knew it was in trouble. Adam Clayton Powell, the flamboyant chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee, was very different from Oren Harris. Education and Labor handled many key Great Society programs, but its generally low reputation in the House led the OCR to consider ways to circumvent the committee. O'Brien even contemplated the unusual step of establishing a select committee to handle one of the top Great Society programs, the war on poverty. As O'Brien wrote LBJ: "The subject matter points toward Education and Labor, but the standing of Powell and of the Committee generally would not be a plus for the bill on the floor of the House."[28] O'Brien went on to warn LBJ not to say

[26] Doris Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), p. 226.

[27] Henry Hall Wilson to Larry O'Brien, March 16, 1964. Wilson Box 4.

[28] Lawrence O'Brien to the president, January 31, 1964, Wilson Box 5.

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anything that would lead Powell to assume that the poverty bill would go to his committee. In the end the White House abandoned the select committee notion, but it was intimately involved in getting Powell to establish a special subcommittee to handle OEO. The OCR induced Phil Landrum, a moderately conservative and highly regarded Georgia Democrat, to chair the subcommittee. Landrum agreed but given his variable relationship with Powell told the White House to act as an intermediary with the Chairman.[29] Landrum subsequently played the central role in overcoming conservative opposition to OEO in the House.

Working with the party leadership. On most issues the OCR's job was simplified by the fact that a large number of Democrats routinely supported the White House. The task of majority coalition building did not start from scratch; it was, rather, a question of picking up the requisite number of marginal votes to win. The typical situation was summed up by O'Brien in 1965 in a memo to the president: "Normally we enter into a tough count with a mimimum of 175 votes, about which we need not worry, and we move from there with the active help of the leadership, the committee chairman, and the committee Democrats."[30]

The party leadership—Speakers Rayburn and McCormack, Majority Leader Carl Albert and the Majority Whip, Hale Boggs—worked so closely with the White House during the 1960s that the system more resembled the parliamentary form of executive-legislative relations than the presidential.[31] There were some difficulties in the early 1960s before White House lobbyists learned that they could not push the leadership too far, but in time the legislative role of the leadership was dominantly that of passing the administration program.

No better illustration of the close working relationship between the leadership and the White House can be found than the head count. On important bills where the outcome was uncertain the Majority Whip's Office frequently surveyed the House Democrats, asking them how they planned to vote on the issue at hand.[32] The information gathered by the whip poll was, however, only one body of intelligence. In many cases the executive departments or the OCR or interested private lobbyists also ran head counts. Information on how the members planned to vote was pooled, and doubtful or negatively inclined congressmen were contacted by the leadership or whoever else seemed appropriate. The importance of the leadership's whip poll to the White House was

[29] Henry Hall Wilson to Lawrence O'Brien, February 5, 1964, Box 5. Another good example of the administration program being in weak hands involved the rent supplement program. This was a very controversial proposal. As O'Brien wrote LBJ, it would be difficult enough to pass with a Wilbur Mills, Phil Landrum, or Oren Harris in charge. "Bill Barrett is not remotely in that category," in O'Brien's view. Lawrence O'Brien to the president, June 25, 1965, Box 10.

[30] Lawrence F. O'Brien to the president, August 13, 1965, Wilson Box 10.

[31] See O'Brien's recollections, *Victories*, p. 117ff.

[32] See Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review*, 58 (September 1964): 561-76. Also see Ripley's monograph, "Kennedy and Congress," General Learning Co., 1972.

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that it narrowed the number of targets to be contacted, and it sometimes revealed members who gave different answers to different polls. As a source of intelligence, however, the leadership poll was secondary to the executive branch poll. The most important work on the legislative head count was done by executive branch lobbyists.

The leadership did not like to appear indecisive or to be awaiting word from LBJ before making decisions,[33] but the fact is many of their functions were performed for them by the executive. From the very start in 1961 O'Brien preferred detailed head counts even to as finely honed an intuition as Sam Rayburn's. The executive branch assumed primary responsibility for the count, as the following examples document:

> In a foreign aid bill in 1964 the State Department not only conducted the count but gave the leadership a list of 53 southern and western Democrats who would help the Administration on some votes, if not all.[34]
>
> In the 1965 farm bill O'Brien worried to LBJ that the OCR was not within 50 votes of reporting to the leadership a majority against a key amendment. On Monday, O'Brien observed, "we face the question of accepting the Quie amendment or taking the responsibility of overriding the leadership's judgment."[35]
>
> In 1967, when OEO was under severe attack by Republicans and conservative southern Democrats, OEO prepared the basic count and gave the leadership a list of members who would walk the teller lines for the Administration position.[36]

As these examples show, the working relationship between the leadership and the executive branch was so close during the Kennedy-Johnson years that the leadership came to rely on the executive for much of the basic information it needed to pass the president's bills. The line between the leadership and the executive was virtually erased because they were united in a common cause. Leadership meetings with executive branch lobbyists were held regularly as bills neared the floor stage of the process, and wavering members would sometimes be called by McCormack, Albert, or Boggs during these meetings. Yet the chief importance of these meetings, according to one OCR lobbyist, was not vote gathering.[37] That was done elsewhere. The chief importance was, strange to say, getting the leadership involved in the legislative process.[38]

[33] Barefoot Sanders to the president, May 14, 1968, Califano Box 8.

[34] Craig Ruppe to Claude Desautels, June 29, 1964, Wilson Box 1. Desautels had major responsibility for coordinating the OCR with departmental lobbyists.

[35] Lawrence O'Brien to the president, August 13, 1965, Wilson Box 10.

[36] Private document in possession of the author.

[37] Personal interview, August 31, 1967. One reason why the executive made its own count was that some members of the House would not respond to Bogg's whip poll, and one or two whip zones would only give out numbers, not how individual congressmen planned to vote.

[38] A good example of the closeness between the leadership and the White House occurred in 1967. When the Whip Office wanted to know which members would be in town for an important vote it would sometimes call those who failed to answer a quorum call in the House. One day Irvine Sprague, an OCR lobbyist, and Boggs's chief staff assistant were calling the absentees. Sprague identified himself as calling from the Whip Office until Boggs's assistant suggested that

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Getting the leadership involved in a collegial process of passing White House bills had many advantages to both parties. It saved the leadership a lot of work, and protected them from some risks. It was easier to have White House lobbyists keep a close check on the whereabouts and voting intentions of large numbers of Democrats, a job that often required hundreds of telephone calls and long hours of tedious work. The leadership was the beneficiary of this labor; all it had to do was supplement the executive branch intelligence. Moreover, if the White House insisted that some members return for a close vote, and the vote proved not to be close, the complaints went to the White House. In 1967, for example, the head count showed a close vote for a District of Columbia bill. The bill carried easily due to unexpected Republican support. And it was the White House that was primarily responsible for getting members back for the vote, including one of the Hawaii Democrats.

For the White House the cooperation of the leadership had many advantages. Not only did the leadership contribute valuable information to the head count, but it sometimes helped change votes as well. In addition, coordination between the two branches was necessary to prevent the kind of trouble caused in 1967 when the leadership suddenly called off a vote on a transportation bill conference report. The OCR had worked all weekend calling members to return for a vote on Monday. There was no vote, but there was a lot of complaining from members who returned early.

Muscle. The support of the leadership, the ability to perform favors for members, and superintending the legislative process were not all the OCR had going for it in the 1960s. It also had, and used, what was known as *muscle*. The term referred to a wide variety of things, but in general it meant the application of extraordinary pressure to get members of Congress to aid the White House cause. No less an authority than Larry O'Brien has commented on this phase of the legislative process: "We got the vote, but not just by an appeal on the basis of merit or substantive discussion with members."[39]

The application of muscle took many forms. In its most diffuse form, it meant merely being insistent and firm: the pending vote is going to be close and the president needs your vote. "You insist, as much as you can insist with these people," one OCR lobbyist said. Then he added: "And you can be pretty insistent."[40]

If asking members to take the political heat failed, there was always the possibility of generating cross pressures on them. When a Catholic congressman proved difficult on the question of aiding parochial schools, for example, O'Brien got the local party leader to call the congressman. The local leader drew the issue clearly: "Who sent you there, me or the Bishop? And who's going to keep you, me or the Bishop?"[41] In other cases, calls to southern party leaders

some offices might think that a bit strange. Thereupon Sprague identified himself as another staffer in the office. Personal observation.

[39] Holtzman, *Legislative Liaison*, p. 251.

[40] Personal interview.

[41] *Time*, September 1, 1961, p. 14. Quoted in Holtzman, *Legislative Liaison*, p. 253.

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were made in 1963 to generate pressure for packing the Rules Committee; the same issue saw the White House trace financial contributors to Republican congressmen and induce the contributors to call the representatives; and defense contractors were sometimes called upon to pressure uncooperative members.[42]

If all else failed, the OCR resorted to pressure from interested private lobbyists. The AFL-CIO worked closely with the OCR throughout the 1960s,[43] and private companies would sometimes be called on to help. In 1964, for example, Henry Hall Wilson called Claude Hobbs of Westinghouse to the White House to discuss the mass transit bill. This bill meant a lot of money to Westinghouse. It was suggested that Hobbs establish an informal group of lobbyists representing similar companies who could then put pressure on "wrong Southern Democrats" through back home manufacturing plants, bank contacts, and the like.[44]

Republican members of the House, although often written off by the OCR, were not completely free of White House pressure. The Wilson papers contain a list of 22 Republicans who might be influenced by the Machinist Union on the 1964 poverty bill.[45] (Of these 22, ten voted for OEO.) In the area of civil rights O'Brien advised LBJ in 1963 to stress to Roy Wilkins the need for two or three Republican votes in the Rules Committee, plus 60 to 70 on the floor, to pass civil rights legislation.[46] And on foreign aid the OCR orchestrated the efforts of Sol Linowitz and John J. McCloy in lobbying Republicans (with the aid of a telegram from Dwight D. Eisenhower).[47]

The OCR was also able to use friendly Republicans like Frank Horton to intercede and gather information on Republican plans,[48] and they even elicited the cooperation of the ranking Republican on Education and Labor, William Ayres, on the repeal of 14b in 1965.[49] On balance, however, the OCR operation was a partisan one. They did not feel that there was much use spending time seeking Republican votes, and, with some exceptions, they were correct.[50]

Presidential involvement. In the final analysis the ability of the OCR to line up votes for the president's program depended mostly on the president. Late in 1967, when LBJ was fighting a losing battle on behalf of a 10 percent surtax and the war in Vietnam was going badly, a reporter asked a normally loyal big city Democrat what he thought of the President's recent attack on Congress. The reply was, "f . . . him," said with more indifference than rancor. The incident recalls to mind the response on Capitol Hill when an Eisenhower official, in the

[42] Ibid.

[43] O'Brien, *Victories*, pp. 108, 128.

[44] Henry Hall Wilson to Lawrence O'Brien, June 1, 1964, Wilson Box 3. The Wilson file also contains an interesting list of targets on the 1967 teacher corps bill. Wilson was advised that these members should be contacted by HEW and that they should get pressure mail from back home. Charles Roche to Henry Hall Wilson, April 3, 1967, Wilson Box 1.

[45] Henry Hall Wilson to Lawrence O'Brien, August 1, 1964, Wilson Box 5.

[46] Lawrence O'Brien to the president, November 29, 1963, Wilson Box 2.

[47] Lawrence O'Brien to the president, June 30, 1964. LE5.

[48] Henry Hall Wilson to the president, May 3, 1967, Wilson Box 1.

[49] Henry Hall Wilson to Lawrence O'Brien, May 5, 1965, Wilson Box 5.

[50] O'Brien, *Victories*, p. 138. The leading exception was civil rights.

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midst of great confusion over Eisenhower's position, referred to the administration "program."[51] The laughter spoke volumes.

The president's standing on Capitol Hill sets the limits and conditions within which the OCR works. A presidential appeal to the people over the head of Congress, such as the one made by John Kennedy on Medicare in 1962, obviously affects (in incalculable and largely unpredictable ways) Congress's response to presidential programs.[52] But at the more specific level, Kennedy and Johnson participated in the legislative process in two ways: they actively sought to affect the working relationship between the executive and legislative branches by nurturing the support of congressmen; and, second, they sometimes intervened in specific cases and asked individual congressmen for their help.

Presidents Kennedy and Johnson spent a great deal of time nurturing congressional support. In Kennedy's first year alone he held 32 Tuesday morning breakfasts with the leadership, 90 private conversations with congressional leaders that lasted an hour or two, coffee hours with 500 legislators, bill-signing ceremonies with a like number, and, in all, had about 2,500 separate contacts with congressmen, exclusive of correspondence.[53]

Johnson was if anything a more ardent suitor of Congress. He persuaded selected senators and representatives to serve on many of the task forces that generated ideas for Great Society legislation; he involved them in drafting the presidential messages that accompanied legislative requests; he briefed congressmen on the messages before they were sent to the Hill; he selected and sought out the congressmen he wanted to introduce bills; and he followed up all this by closely watching and frequently directing the process of enacting legislation.[54] Johnson, in short, sought to copy the British Cabinet system which, in Bagehot's famous line, was "a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens the legislative part of the state to the executive part."[55] And he did it quite deliberately:

> No one knows about the hundreds or more briefing sessions we conducted for Congressmen and Senators. That's what did it. It's all in my diary. I'd do it like the British system. It was my version of the question period—an opportunity for the members of Congress to get an advance look at my documents and then to confront my Cabinet members with all sorts of questions. Allowing some to receive an advance look the night before may seem like nothing, but, in fact, it was everything.[56]

Despite the high level of presidential involvement, the White House was reluctant to overuse the president in the direct search for votes. If the president made too many calls then congressmen would begin to expect and hold out for

[51] Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, pp. 132-33.

[52] Larry O'Brien opposed Kennedy's 1962 Madison Square Garden Speech, and notes that the speech did little good in moving Wilbur Mills. O'Brien, *Victories*, p. 136.

[53] Ibid., p. 113.

[54] Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson*, pp. 221–27.

[55] Ibid., p. 221.

[56] Ibid., p. 224.

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a presidential call, thereby making OCR head counts impossible.[57] Moreover, a call from the president to a congressman may be flattering to the congressman but it may also create a presidential debt, and too many debts outstanding could erode the president's future bargaining position.

Nevertheless, after the head counts were made and the swing votes identified, the president did call. Specific quid pro quos were avoided. If it got around that the president was trading patronage for votes, patronage demands would soar to an impossible level.[58] But in many cases the fate of bills depended on presidential influence; nothing else would do the trick.[59] Kennedy evidently asked members for votes on specific pieces of legislation less often than Johnson did, but both sometimes found it necessary to do so. And both sometimes found that doing so was futile.[60]

Conclusion

Close inspection of the Office of Congressional Relations under presidents Kennedy and Johnson generally supports the problematic view of presidential power. This office emerged as an important part of the institutionalized presidency precisely because presidential power is constrained. Among other things, the OCR and the president seek to influence Congress through favors, superintending the legislative process, working with the party leadership, muscle, and direct presidential involvement. But the legislative record shows that presidential programs during the 1960s were very hard to enact, and most of the major successes came in the 89th Congress. When the party balance returned to normal proportions in the 90th Congress, Lyndon Johnson's program was in trouble. In 1967, by the count of the White House itself, it lost 19 of 50 important roll calls in the House. The record, though positive, does not reveal an omnipotent presidency. On many votes, for all the resources and skill

[57] Holtzman, *Legislative Liaison*, p. 247.

[58] Kearns, *Lyndon Johnson*, p. 236.

[59] The following examples may be cited: Kennedy called Harold Cooley (D., N.D.) in 1961 to get the votes of the North Carolina delegation for packing the Rules Committee (O'Brien, *Victories*, p. 109); O'Brien gave LBJ a list of 13 Democrats to call on rent supplements in 1965 (Wilson Box 10, June 29, 1965; Mike Manatos suggested in 1966 that LBJ see senators Bible, Cannon, Gore, and Symington, all of whom were wrong on rent supplements in 1965 (LE5 169, April 1, 1966); and in 1964 LBJ spent two hours on the phone calling representatives to get them to sign a discharge petition on behalf of home rule for the District of Columbia (O'Brien, *Victories*, p. 175.)

[60] Kennedy, for example, had at least two long, private meetings with Representative James Delaney (D., N.Y.) in a futile effort to get Delaney to withdraw his demand for aid to parochial schools. Delaney's vote in the Rules Committee helped kill aid to education. "Had he been bargaining," O'Brien writes, "holding out for some patronage plum, we might have done business, but the only thing he wanted was the one thing Kennedy could not give—federal aid to all Catholic schools." O'Brien, *Victories*, pp. 129-30. LBJ's major failure came on the 1967 tax surcharge proposal. Relations between Johnson and Wilbur Mills became so strained over this issue that Johnson leaked to the press the number of times he and Mills discussed taxes. See Lee M. Cohn, "President Striving to Keep Record Clear on Tax Issue," *Washington Star*, October 15, 1967, p. A1.

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of the OCR, the president lost. And on some issues, most notably the 1967 10 percent tax surcharge, the president could not even get the matter to the floor for a vote.

Kennedy and Johnson, as heirs to the New Deal and Fair Deal programs of FDR and Harry Truman, faced the problem of holding together an antagonistic coalition of southern conservatives and northern liberals.[61] And there is abundant evidence in the OCR files and elsewhere that conservative southern Democrats were a constant source of trouble throughout the 1960s. Shortly after the Kennedy administration took office, as noted earlier, O'Brien met with a group of experienced House Democrats to discuss the problems confronting New Frontier legislation. They concluded that much of the program would be defeated in the House unless they could split the southern bloc by inducing such southern leaders as Carl Vinson (D., Ga.) to vote with the administration.[62] Vinson, the highly respected chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, was a swing vote for southern Democrats, as was Wilbur Mills. The OCR often needed a Vinson or Mills to act as a wedge to split the southern Democrats.

The OCR files are full of references to the pivotal position of southern Democrats, as well as to repeated efforts to line up southern support. On an education bill in 1967, for example, Henry Hall Wilson wrote LBJ rather ruefully: "The difficult factor is the fact that the application of integration guidelines frighten southerners far more than Administration pressure."[63] All the Republicans had to do (and they knew it) was raise the spectre of federal control in the education field and many southern Democrats began to waver.[64]

If the administration wanted to pass a youth employment bill it ran into trouble in the Rules Committee because the program had racial overtones in the South. The normally loyal member of Rules from Alabama, Carl Elliott, refused to vote for the bill until after his second primary was over.[65] If the Republicans tried to cut foreign aid funds the OCR had to seek southern Democratic votes on at least some of the crucial roll calls.[66] When the House in 1967 went on a budget-cutting campaign LBJ was advised: "As has been true on so many other occasions, it looks like our chief trouble with the Bow Amendment will be in the South."[67] As if southern defections were not bad enough, the administration sometimes had to worry about frustrated liberal Democrats retaliating on bills important to the South, as happened in 1963 on a cotton bill.[68]

How well did the OCR do against the House conservative coalition during the 1960s? A complete answer to this question would have to take into account the

[61] For a general treatment of the Conservative Coalition see John F. Manley, "The Conservative Coalition in Congress," *American Behavioral Scientist* 17 (November-December 1973): 223–47.

[62] O'Brien, *Victories*, p. 119.

[63] Henry Hall Wilson to the president, May 3, 1967, Wilson Box 1.

[64] John Barriere to Hon. John W. McCormack, April 17, 1967, Sprague Box 1.

[65] Lawrence O'Brien to the president, February 7, 1964, Wilson Box 5.

[66] Craig Raupe to Claude Desautels, June 29, 1964, Wilson Box 1.

[67] Barefoot Sanders to the president, December 7, 1967, LE5.

[68] Lawrence O'Brien to the president, December 2, 1963, Wilson Box 5.

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various conflicts that occurred within the committees of the House, as well as on roll call votes on the floor, but an examination of roll calls gives an important part of the answer.

Table 1 presents a test of presidential success by examining those votes on which the position of Kennedy and Johnson differed from that of the coalition. This table shows that Kennedy and Johnson did not always take a public stance on coalition roll calls. They remained publicly neutral on more than 40 percent of the votes that split the northern and southern wings of the Democratic party in the House. On these 118 votes the northern wing of the party operated without the benefit of the president's public support.

On 159 roll calls, however, Kennedy and Johnson did publicly oppose the coalition, and it is reasonably certain that the OCR was active on all or nearly all of these votes.

President Kennedy won 12 of 32 contests during his three years in office, for a winning average of 38 percent. President Johnson did considerably better, winning 86 of 127 votes, for an average of 68 percent. Yet Johnson's average is inflated by the 89th Congress in which he won 54 of 63 votes. Johnson's last two years in office were comparable to Kennedy's first two years. In these years, Johnson, like Kennedy, won less than half the coalition votes he contested.

The figures in Table 1 show that in the aggregate the House conservative coalition was a formidable obstacle to Kennedy and Johnson. Johnson did very well in 1964, winning 7 of 10 coalition votes, and the power of the coalition was broken during the 89th Congress. But in most years the presidency, for all its imperiousness, was regularly humbled by conservative southern Democrats and Republicans in the House.

TABLE 1

House Coalition Roll Calls on Which the President Opposed the Coalition, 1961-1968[a]

Year	*Total Coalition Votes*	*Votes Contested by President Contra the Coalition*[c]	*Contested Votes Won by President*	*% of Coalition Votes Contested by President*	*% of Contested Votes Won by President*
1961	22	13	5	59	38
1962	17	12	6	71	50
1963	11	7	1	64	14
1964	18[b]	10	7	56	70
1965	61	32	29	52	91
1966	41	31	25	76	81
1967	57	31	14	54	45
1968	50	23	11	46	48
	277	159	98		

[a]President's position determined from appropriate volumes of *CQ Almanac*.

[b]Includes four votes in 1963 taken after Kennedy's assassination.

[c]The president's position agreed with the coalition's on only five votes from 1961 to 1968.

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This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the conservative coalition appeared on a significantly larger number of votes in the last four Johnson years than it had from 1961 to 1964. Kennedy's efforts to limit southern defections seem relatively successful from 1961 to 1963, and in 1964 the coalition appeared only 18 times. In 1965, however, the coalition appeared on 61 votes. From 1961 to 1964 the coalition appeared 68 times; from 1965 to 1968 it showed up on 209 roll calls. This means that although the coalition winning average in the late 1960s was comparable to that of the early '60s, it won on a substantially larger number of issues than before. The sharp rise in the incidence of coalition voting after 1965 (19 percent of all contested roll calls before 1965, 36 percent after 1965) suggests that after the 89th Congress Johnson, if anything, suffered more at the hands of the coalition than did Kennedy.

Table 1 suggests that for all the resources and skill of the OCR, Congress frequently reserved the right to reject presidential proposals. This conclusion is reinforced by the reports of the OCR itself. Table 2 shows that the OCR claimed victory on 33 of 53 major bills (62 percent) in 1961, and in 1967 the OCR counted 31 victories out of 50 roll call votes in the House (62 percent). In the 89th Congress (1965-66) the White House rarely failed to pass what it wanted. But under more normal conditions the power of the presidency vis-à-vis Congress came closer to the problematic model than to the supremacy model.

Historians are fond of saying the past is prologue. But the history of executive-legislative relations shows that this is not necessarily true. The past is prologue only if presidents learn from the past. And learning occurs only if the goals and situations of past presidents are similar enough to those of the current president so that past strategies are judged relevant to the present.

John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson institutionalized the OCR making it, under the direction of Larry O'Brien, a major factor in promoting presidential programs on Capitol Hill. O'Brien's reputation as a bridge builder and as a skillful political operator assumed almost heroic proportions during the 1960s. The lesson for future presidents, and currently for Jimmy Carter, seems obvious: emulate the example of the OCR under O'Brien.

The most important lesson that might be drawn from this study is the need for presidents to establish a working relationship of "favor" with as many congress-

TABLE 2

OCR Evaluation of Congressional Action

	Major Bills	*Passed*	*% Passed*
1961	53	33	62
1965	87	84	97
1966	113	97	86
1967 (House only)	50	31	62

Sources: Data for 1961, 1965, and 1966 are taken from O'Brien, *Victories*, pp. 130 and 196; data for 1967 come from a memo to the president from Barefoot Sanders, January 11, 1968, LE5, 1970.

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men as possible. This relationship takes time to develop but without a large core of legislators who are prepared to support the president because their political needs coincide with his, the president's program is in trouble. Even with such support, nurtured by the skill of a Larry O'Brien, Kennedy and Johnson suffered many legislative defeats. Given the importance of "favor" as the crucial strategic background for presidential-congressional relations, some of the early actions of the Carter Administration seem dubious in the extreme. Imperial presidents might be able to afford amateurish mistakes by OCR lobbyists, make patronage appointments without consulting the Speaker of the House, and announce wholesale cutoffs of public works projects without prior consultations with interested congressmen. But for a president without imperial power who must deal with a Congress that is both more assertive and more decentralized than at any time in recent memory, Jefferson's advice seems apropos: great innovations should not be (and cannot be) forced on slender majorities.*

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Migrant Workers and European Democracy

CHERYL BENARD

The 20 to 30 million migrant workers and their families who have moved around Europe in search of work since the end of World War II have become an integral but at the same time problematic and uncertain part of the Western European industrial system. In the theory and policy of the countries concerned they are perceived variously as a threat, an economic necessity, or a coincidental transitory surface development in the pan-European modernization process. Table 1 gives some figures on the number and distribution of migrant workers; these figures must be taken as conservative estimates.[1]

Among the leftists and the more radical socialist groups in Europe it has become fashionable to refer to the foreign migrant workers as twentieth century slaves;"[2] as the "niggers of Europe"[3] and to the often dubious recruiting

[1] WHO and the UN Population Division confirm that reliable and consistent statistics are not available on migrant workers in Europe to an extent that would permit any degree of comparability. There are various reasons for this: to circumvent governmental quotas on immigration, workers enter the host country illegally; they do not, of course, appear in the statistics. In France illegal migration reached such proportions that it began to exceed legal migration, and the government had to register these workers ex post facto. In other countries, such as Austria, the government tolerates illegal work unless the abuse becomes excessive. The statistics are not reliable. Some countries register the place of birth of the worker as the place of origin, and therefore show a large proportion of workers from agricultural regions; others record the place of registration, which is generally a large town or a city, and their figures show urban origin.

On the problem of statistical information for migrant work, see Stephen Castles and Godula Kosack, *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe* (Oxford: U. Press, 1973), appendix; WHO Report on a Working Group, "Health Aspects of Labour Migration," Algiers, Nov. 1973; E. Adams, *International migration trends affecting Europe in the 1960's*, Population Division, U.N.

[2] *Neues Forum*, May/June 1975, p. 35 ff, focus kollektiv, "Die weissen Sklaven"; Francisco

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TABLE 1

Distribution of Migrant Workers in Western Europe

Migrants Country of Origin	*West Germany 1971*	*France 1971*	*Belgium 1971*	*Switzerland 1969*	*Austria 1971*	*Sweden 1971*	*Great Britain 1966*
Spain	270,000	589,925	51,485	97,860	270		34,510
Greece	395,000	10,125	14,050	8,000	550	14,000	8,520
Italy	590,000	588,740	188,430	531,500	1,510	8,000	96,660
Portugal	55,214	694,550	4,280	2,000			5,420
Turkey	633,000	18,325	12,250	9,651	22,415		4,310
Yugoslavia	594,000	65,220	2,930	20,800	131,835	37,000	12,290
Total Incl. N. Africa	3,400,000	3,505,210	716,237	971,795	172,205	411,280	178,600

SOURCE: Leggewie and Nikolinakos, eds., *Europäische Peripherie—Zur Frage der Abhänggigkeit des Mittelmeerraumes von West Europa* (Meiseheim: Dritte Welt Sonderdruck, 1975).

and hiring practices by which they are legally and illegally brought to the host countries as the "slave trade."[4]

This terminology is purely polemical in intent, but the analogy is not entirely unjustified. To the traditional economic theorist, an analogy between slave and free labor may seem inadmissible. The premise of this paper is that migrant workers in Europe are a phenomenon not adequately subsumable under any of the categories of liberal theory or orthodox Marxist analysis.[5]

The mere fact that migrant workers receive a cash wage and sign a contract is not a sufficient reason to classify them as "free labor." The situation and status of migrant workers is in many other critical aspects comparable to peonage or slavery. An analysis of the situation of migrant workers in Europe reveals structural characteristics that lend support to theories concerning marginalized and peripheral groups and allow generalizations about possible consequences of this phenomenon for European society.[6]

The specific form of migrant labor has an effect on the future development of the structure of domestic labor, because the lower sectors of work become increasingly "denationalized"; on the social structure of the host country, because the presence of a foreign group imported to do lowly and

Estéban, "Vier Sklaven für die Firma Scriba," in *Gastarbeiter, Analysen und Berichte*, ed. Ernst Klee (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1975), p. 162.

[3] Ernst Klee, "Beschwichtigen und Betreuen," in Klee, *Gastarbeiter*, p. 20.

[4] Gerd Fiedler, "Sklavenhandel in Europa," *Forum Europa*, April/May 1976, p. 35.

[5] *Orthodox Marxist* is here used in the same sense as it is in so-called radical social science to distinguish it from the dependence school of economics. It is not meant to imply, for example, that Marx's analysis of the situation of Irish workers in England (a prototype of marginalized migrant labor) is not relevant.

[6] Senghaas, *Weltwirtschaftsordnung und Entwicklungspolitik, Plädoyer für Dissoziation* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977) and Castles and Kosack, *Immigrant Workers*.

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TABLE 2

Foreigners and Nationals Employed in Switzerland, 1970

	Swiss	*Foreign*
total	2,338,747	657,030
construction	169,529	115,622
industry, mining, manual labor	816,092	320,471
other	1,353,126	220,937

SOURCE: *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz, 1976.*

poorly paid work activates a number of prejudices and hostilities; on the countries of origin, because the exportation of cheap labor as a type of natural resource is bound to have effects on industrially underdeveloped economies; and on the social structure of the workers themselves, as their self-perception and their family structure undergo the strains of migration. What the long-range effect of these changes is likely to be is a matter of intense concern to labor and the left, because they must determine what influence these developments will have on class structure and the bargaining position of labor; to the host countries, which must decide whether the costs and dangers of foreign labor exceed the benefits; to the countries of origin, which must determine whether their expectations from this labor export are being met; and to the migrant workers, whose personal hopes and needs are soon confronted by the realities of this labor system. As tables 2 and 3 show, foreign workers in Switzerland and Austria tend to be concentrated in a few sectors of industry where they perform the lowest, worst paid and most dangerous work.

TABLE 3

Foreigners Employed in Austrian Industry, 1972

Industry	*% Foreigners*
construction	23.9
hotels, restaurants, etc.	20.2
cleaning	18.0
textiles	16.0
metals	12.6
machines	11.7
rubber and synthetics	11.6
auxiliary construction	8.5

SOURCE: *Arbeitsmarktvorschau*, Vienna, June 1972.

Analysts of the migrant worker phenomenon generally attempt to fit it into familiar categories; to refer to them, for example, as a "subproletariat,"[7] or to compare their role to that of foreign migrant workers in Europe at the turn

[7] Klee, *Gastarbeiter*, p. 25.

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of the century.[8] An examination of their situation shows, however, that such a comparison is invalid and it is more correct to classify them as a marginalized group. Such a classification would require a thorough comparative study of the basic similarities between the situation of migrant workers and other marginalized groups, which obviously cannot even be attempted here. The purpose of this paper is to point out some of the basic similarities that justify further study by describing the main conditions that characterize the situation of migrant workers.[9]

Shock of the Unfamiliar

Western European governments have labor recruitment agreements which allow them to maintain hiring bureaus. West Germany, for example, has such bureaus in Istanbul, Verona, Belgrad, Madrid, Athens, and Lisbon. Workers can be ordered from these bureaus like replacement parts for machines. The German office in Turkey assured employers in 1972 that "orders for any type of female unskilled labor can be rapidly filled in the quantity desired."[10]

To fill such orders, applicants are assembled and the youngest, healthiest and strongest selected after thorough examination.[11] The country has been promised that its workers will acquire technological skills in the industrial centers of Western Europe, but the German doctors employed by the hiring bureaus have different instructions. They are told to "test especially the functioning of the muscles for lifting and transporting weights, since the foreign worker will as a rule be engaged in heavy physical labor."[12] Those selected are loaded onto trains and delivered to their employer, for whom they must work for one year. They may not quit or change jobs, or they will be deported. If they have complaints, questions, or grievances they must transmit them through the interpreter, who is hired by their employer.[13]

Research by psychologists on the personality damage done by such an abrupt dislocation and separation from family and environment is only beginning to outline the dimensions of the problem.[14] WHO in 1973 described these damages as the "psychopathology of transplantation."

[8] Johannes Papalekas, ed., *Strukturfragen der Ausländerbeschaftigung*, (Herford und Bonn: Maximilian Verlag, 1969).

[9] The conditions described in the following are "ideal types"—details vary according to bilateral agreements, countries, regions, membership or nonmembership in the EEC, etc. It is possible, however, to extract a basic model of the migrant worker phenomenon.

[10] Klee, *Gastarbeiter*, p. 29.

[11] For a very vivid description of the "career" of the average migrant worker, the dehumanizing aspects of the hiring process, the cultural dissonances in his daily existence, etc., see John Berger and Jean Mohr, *A Seventh Man, A Book of Images and Words about the Experience of Migrant Workers in Europe* (Penguin, 1975).

[12] Director of Medicine Dr. Hoeschel, National Labor Department, in *Der Arbeitgeber*, 6, 1966.

[13] *Forum Europa*, 1, April/May 1976.

[14] M. Marković, "Einfluss einiger sozialer Faktoren der alten und neuen Umgebung auf den

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> In general, the development of mental troubles is related to maladaptation of the migrant to his new environment, an environment completely different from his former one from the economic, social and cultural points of view. These difficulties are often accentuated by an atmosphere of rejection by the host population. . . Psychiatrists have suggested that a special psychopathology of adaptation exists. . . the signs are rather non-specific and pleomorphic, the illness passing through several levels of regression.[15]

Paternalism and Dependency

In several countries, including Austria and West Germany, the employer must sign a form assuring the department of labor that the worker has "adequate" quarters. For the construction and building industry in Germany, in which approximately one-fourth of all migrant workers are employed, "adequate" is determined by an ordinance from 1959, which in turn is based on a law of 1934. It provides the following guidelines on quarters: "The worker is entitled to a bed, a chair, a locker and one-fourth of a table. The sheets must be changed every month. The straw[!] . . . must be replaced every three months."[16]

In many cases (varying by nationality and branch of the economy) the employer is also the landlord, requiring wokers to live in company barracks. Since the rent is deducted from the paycheck automatically, increases must be accepted and no pressure can be exerted by an organized refusal to pay.[17] Discrimination in housing and the fact that the factory or construction site is generally some distance from the nearest town or city prevent the worker from finding his own room. Groups "looking after" migrant workers foster this dependence. The churches in Germany are an example; an information pamphlet for Greek workers contains the following helpful instructions for finding a place to live: "Where can we live? The employer will not always be able to provide for the family and offer a place to live. However, he will surely help the father and advise him in his search for an apartment."[18]

The migrant worker is as a rule relegated to passive positions; decisions are made about him above his head in a language he doesn't understand; he is not allowed to represent himself on the job market, before the administration, or in court. He is generally not allowed to apply for a work permit for himself—his employer fills out the forms; the terms of his employment are

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Ausbruck seelischer Störungen bei Emigranten" ("The influence of social factors in the old and new environment on the appearance of psychic disturbances in emigrants"); Draganov: Rajić and Moravek, "Paranoide Bilder der Psychose bei vorübergehend im Ausland beschäftigten Arbeitern," ("Paranoid images of psychosis in the case of workers temporarily employed abroad"); Puscarić and Turcin, "Psychische Störungen bei Wirtschaftsemigranten" ("Psychic disturbances in migrant workers"), all in *Sozialpsychiatrie* (Zagreb, 1971).

[15] WHO Report on a Working Group, *Health Aspects*, p. 20.

[16] Klee, *Gastarbeiter*, p. 25.

[17] Bernd Mühlens, "Wohnsituation ausländischer Arbeitnehmer," *Forum Europa*, 1, 1976, p. 21.

[18] "Diakonisches Werk Deutschland," pamphlet circulated among Greek workers.

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negotiated by the respective governments. If he lives in communal quarters, company-owned or private, he is subject to regulations and restrictions no college freshman, and certainly no adult, would be expected to tolerate in West Europe or in the United States.[19] In 30 percent of such communal quarters, for example, no guests at all are allowed to visit; visitors of the opposite sex, including husbands or wives, are allowed to visit in only 5 percent of these "dormitories."[20] Though there is a considerable reform movement to abolish similar rulings in prisons, no one is especially scandalized by the living conditions and social deprivation of migrant workers.

Ambiguous Legal Status

The legal status of migrant workers is confused. According to ILO agreements and the German constitution, for example, they are entitled to treatment absolutely equal to that of national workers.[21] Because they are foreigners, and racially different, these rights are systematically legislated or interpreted away from them and they find themselves *de jure* and *de facto* disenfranchised. The German constitution, for example, guarantees protection to the institution of marriage and the family. The marriages and the integrity of the families of migrant workers, however, are excepted from this legal protection and are dependent instead on the grace and good will of the visa department, which in turn is instructed to base its decisions on the current economic situation. Even with the good will of the bureaucracy, migrant workers are not allowed to send for their spouses or families until they have worked in Germany for a year (in many cases, three years).[22]

The main characteristic of the legal situation of migrant workers is the ambiguous nature of the rulings and laws, which allow for arbitrary interpretation and cause constant insecurity to the worker.[23] For example, his residence permit can be instantly revoked for drunken driving, or, incredibly, for living

[19] Ekmel Zadil, "Auswirkungen der Arbeitskräftewanderung in der Türkei," in Lohrmann and Manfrass, eds., *Ausländerbeschäftigung und Internationale Politik* (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1974), p. 213; Nermin Abadan in *Arbeitsplatz Europa*, Schloesser, Kaufmann et al. (Cologne, 1966). The Nuernberg Labor Department publishes lower figures than these sources. They do not, however, allow for the unregistered "illegal" workers of which there are an estimated 200,000 in Germany alone.

[20] Reinhard Lohrmann and Elias Hadjiandreou, "Auswirkungen der Ausländerbeschäftigung auf die soziale Struktur der BRD," in Klee, *Gastarbeiter*, p. 85 ff.

[21] The German constitution provides that "no one may be disadvantaged on account of his origins and country." The ILO Agreement number 97 concerning migrant workers (July 1949—Germany legally acceded to this agreement in 1959) and the European Social Charter, Oct. 1961, require Germany to guarantee equal treatment before the law to migrant workers. See Fritz Franz, "Die aufenthaltsrechtliche Stellung der ausländischen Arbeiter," in *Gastarbeiter in Gesellschaft und Recht*, ed. Tugrul Ansay and Volkmar Gessner (Munich: Beck, 1974).

[22] The bilateral agreements of the countries involved determine the time.

[23] Fritz Franz in Ansay and Gessner, *Gastarbeiter in Gesellschaft*, p. 46.

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with a German woman who is not his wife.[24] Migrant workers are, like slaves and peons, at once human beings and instruments of production—where there is a conflict of interest, it is nearly always the first identity that is sacrificed. A Bavarian court in 1970 refused a father permission to live with his daughter, who was employed in Germany, with the following noteworthy justification:

> The applicant has no real function to perform in the family of his daughter. Because of age and infirmity he is unable to work actively for the welfare of his daughter in Germany. Instead, he by his own admission needs her care, which he could only receive in her time off from work. The daughter's labor would therefore be in use even during her free time. This is not provided for in the German-Spanish labor agreement.[25]

According to this interpretation, the work capacity of migrant workers is owned in full by the German employer, who therefore decides what the worker may or may not do in his free time. And what he may not do, it seems, is reduce his ability to work for the employer by taking care of a close relative in need of support.

The German National Welfare Law guarantees support to everyone unable to earn a living due to sudden illness, unemployment or pregnancy.[26] The Alien Law,[27] however, erases this guarantee by determining that any foreign national unable to support himself or his legal dependents without recourse to welfare can be expelled from the country. Laws regulating the maximum number of working hours are circumvented as well; the municipal and state authorities permit contracts containing passages like, "weekly working hours can be increased at will." As a result, the Mannesmann-Feuerfest company in Bad Honnigen, for example, recently had its Turkish laborers working 13 1/2 hours a day.[28]

Laws against discrimination are also circumvented. In Munich, for example, a court upheld the right of a restaurant proprietor to refuse admission and service to foreign workers on the grounds that "foreigners are not part of the population"; a clear violation of contrary ILO agreements and constitutional provisions.[29] Signs saying "foreigners not welcome" are permitted in the

[24] Fritz Franz, "Die Rechtsstellung der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer in der BRD," in Klee, *Gastarbeiter*, p. 47.

[25] In the mid-1960s approximately 83 percent of the wives of Turkish migrant workers remained at home. The pattern has since changed, and it is now more common for both the husband and the wife to seek work abroad while leaving their family at home. Thus a 1970–71 study of Yugoslav migrant workers from Croatia showed that 21.6 percent of the emigrants were married couples leaving their children behind. See Ivo Baucic in Lohrmann and Manfrass, *Ausländerbeschäftigung*, p. 205.

[26] Klee, "Gastarbeiter als Subproletariat," in *Gastarbeiter*, p. 28.

[27] The Alien Law is called "Ausländergesetz."

[28] Klee, *Gastarbeiter*, p. 31.

[29] Ibid., p. 29.

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restaurants and bars of several major German cities.[30] Such rulings are clearly racist in intent, since the Austrian, French and Dutch workers in West Germany, even when engaged in similar physical labor, are not considered "foreigners."[31]

Various cities, townships, and municipalities have established residence quotas restricting the number of foreign workers who may live in the area. This decision was not without its ironic aspects since the racial intent behind the ruling could not be specified clearly enough and indignant Austrians found themselves barred from taking up residence in areas where the quotas had been filled. However, the resultant indignation and intergovernment exchange of protests did not lead any Western European to question the ruling; only its application to himself.

The ambiguous status of the migrant worker is convenient for employers and governments, since it makes him more tractable, less likely to complain or insist on his "rights," and easier to dispose of in the event of a recession. The uncertain status of the migrant worker is therefore institutionalized, and he is often unsure whether he is an immigrant, a potential immigrant, a transient laborer, or a commuter.[32] West Germany has legislated itself a set of residence rules so "flexible" that the decision to grant or not grant permission is left up to individual officials, who receive instructions according to the current economic situation.[33] Opposition voices, most notably that of Berlin Superior Court Justice Fritz Franz[34] criticize the arbitrary nature of these rulings as irreconcilable with a modern democratic state, but powerful interests stand behind "flexibility." Ulrich Freiherr von Ginanth, chairman of the German Employer's Organization, summarized the interests of his group: "The main value of foreign labor is its mobility. It would be disadvantageous to allow these workers to settle down to any extent."[35]

Economists agree that on a cost-benefit plane from the perspective of the host-countries the so-called rotation system (rotationsprinzip) is most profit-

[30] Mustapha Maamar and Andrija Redzek, "Nur weil sie anders sind—Vorurteile gegenüber ausländischen Arbeitnehmern," *Forum Europa*, 1, 1976, pp. 62-65.

[31] In 1970 80,000 Austrians, 60,000 Dutch, and 40,000 French nationals were working in West Germany.

[32] Papalekas, *Strukturfragen*. p. 9. This uncertainty contributes greatly to family instability, since workers are unable to plan for their future and have difficulty deciding whether they should send for their families, enroll school-age children in the schools of the host country, send them home while they are young enough to adjust, rent an apartment and settle down, or live in dormitories and save as much as possible for the return, etc.

[33] Klaus Peter Hamm, "Anwerbestopp—Reaktionen und Auswirkungen," *Forum Europa*, 1, 1976, p. 11. The German Department of Labor instructed all officials in 1973 to grant work permits only after "rigorously examining whether this was economically advisable in that particular case." This order contradicts the 1955 ruling that foreigners and nationals are to be treated alike in all aspects of work and wages.

[34] Dr. Franz is of the opinion that "a minority has been deliberately excluded from society and kept in a situation of uncertainty, confusion and fear." (interview in *Forum Europa*, 1, 1976, p. 42).

[35] *Der Arbeitgeber*, 6, 1966.

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able.[36] According to this system, workers are not allowed to remain in the country long enough to become eligible for increased legal rights or job promotions or to be able to send for their families and make use of the infrastructure to a larger extent (schools, housing, medical care, etc.). Switzerland, with the most blatantly pragmatic legislation, recognizes three categories of migrant workers.[37] "Seasonal workers" have work permits for nine months of the year. During that time they may not change jobs or be joined by their families. A recent agreement between Italy and Switzerland provides that a worker who has been employed in Switzerland for forty-five months over a period of five years has the right to annual residence. To circumvent this, workers in the construction industry are now hired for only eight months and three weeks per year, making it impossible for them to acquire the necessary forty-five months.[38] "Annuals" renew their residence permit every year; if they have been fired or have quit their jobs, they are ineligible for renewal. Workers from Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia must have worked in Switzerland for three years before their families can join them. To attain a legal status equal to that of a Swiss citizen the worker must live in Switzerland for three consecutive years. The third category, the "transient laborers," cross the border daily to work in Switzerland, at considerable infrastructure cost savings for the Swiss.[39] There is one area in which full equality exists between migrant and native workers: that of tax liability.

Discrimination

The media reinforce xenophobia. For example, they exaggerate any crime news involving a migrant worker. His transgressions are punished much more severely than the same offense would be if committed by a citizen.[40]

The children of the workers are severely disadvantaged in a number of ways. First of all, the school system makes few concessions to their language difficulties. Since their legal status is as ambiguous as their parents' they are subject to the often contradictory socialization and education policies of the host country and the country of their parents. Frequently, they are shuffled back and forth between special nationalistic course programs provided by the government of their country of origin and a variety of "normal" and special adaptation courses of the host countries. The aim of the host countries is to acculturate the children just enough so that, should economic conditions make it advisable that they stay permanently and become a second generation

[36] Ernst Gehmacher, "Probleme der Kosten-Nutzen Analyse der Gastarbeiterbeschäftigung," *Europäische Rundschau* 4, 1975, p. 97 for the Austrian situation; for West Germany, cf. Papalekas, *Strukturfragen*, p. 11.

[37] Focus Kollektiv, "Die weissen Sklaven," *Neues Forum* May/June 1975, p. 37.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Maamar and Redzek, *Forum Europa*, May/June 1975, p. 63.

[40] Fritz Franz in Klee, *Gastarbeiter*, and in Lohrmann and Manfrass, *Ausländerbeschäftigung*.

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reserve army,[41] they will be sufficiently adapted, while not acculturating them so much that they cannot be instantly sent home if *that* should become advisable.[42]

As one might expect, given the racial element in the situation, much of the discrimination against migrant workers focuses on sexual issues. Stereotypical images of foreign workers correspond to those generally attributed to ethnic or racial minorities and other marginalized groups.[43] They are considered to be promiscuous and sexually aggressive toward Western European women.[44] Miscegenation is severely sanctioned socially and legally, not so much when Western European men marry foreign working women but when migrant workers marry Western European women.[45] Until recently, foreign husbands of German women had no right to residence, a flagrant violation of the constitutionally guaranteed legal equality of the sexes, since foreign wives of German men were never denied residence rights. After several controversial decisions, including the case of *Toko* vs. the *City of Lübeck*,[46] in which the court denied a residence permit to the foreign husband and required the German woman to leave the drugstore she had inherited from her father, and her child by a former marriage, over whom she had legal custody, to live in Cameroun with her husband. This ruling was changed, but numerous discriminatory practices remain legal.[47]

Pious Rationalizations

The influx of migrant workers is explained by an updated white man's burden or "mandate" theory:

[41] Of the 91,063 children of migrant workers in Germany in 1969, 78,653 attended the type of school which produces workers and does not entitle the "graduate" to apply for higher schools, college, or advanced training programs for qualified positions. See Antony Ward, "Reservearmee des Euro-Kapitalismus," *Monthly Review*, German edition, 7, 1975; Bernd Mühlens, "Europäische Arbeiterkinder, Stiefkinder und Ausgestossene," *Forum Europa* 1, 1976, p. 47; Doris Diamant, "Ausländische Arbeiterkinder in der deutschen Schule," in Klee, *Gastarbeiter;* Elias Hadjiandreou, "Schulprobleme der Kinder der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer," in Lohrmann and Manfrass, *Ausländerbeschäftigung*, p. 90 ff. Castles and Kosack also conclude: "Most immigrant workers' children become manual workers." *Immigrant Workers*, p. 478.

[42] The problems of such a "reintegration" can be expected to be severe and the governments fear a socially and politically destabilizing effect. Research indicated that the psychological problems of migrants returning home with unfulfillable expectations are likely to be even more severe than those experienced abroad (Astrup and Odegard, "The incidence of psychoses in migrants and non-migrants in Norway," in WHO Report, "Health Aspects", p. 23.

[43] Gordon Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (New York, 1954).

[44] Heinz Günther Ney, "Was deutsche Volksschüler über ausländische Arbeiter denken," in Klee, *Gastarbeiter*, p. 158.

[45] R. Almanasreh, "Frauen zweiter Klasse, Situation der mit Ausländern verheirateten deutschen Frauen," *Forum Europa*, 1, 1976, p. 26 ff.

[46] Lüneburg, 1970.

[47] Ansay and Martin, "Die Gastarbeiterfamilie im Recht," in Ansay and Gessner, *Gastarbeiter in Gesellschaft*, p. 190 ff.

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TABLE 4

Use of Transferred Earnings in Italy, 1970

family consumption	73.2%
house or apartment	6.3
savings[a]	19.2
other	1.3

SOURCE: M. Livi Bacci, ed., *The Demographic and Social Patterns of Emigration from the Southern European Countries* (Florence, 1972).

[a]One-third was allotted for the future purchase of a house or apartment; one-fourth was set aside for future family consumption.

> Unemployment is high in the countries of origin, because they have not become industrialized. They have not become industrialized because they lack capital, technological know-how and a body of modern labor. By sending workers to Western European industrial centers, they can solve all these problems. Unemployment will be reduced, capital will be transferred back in the form of savings (thereby favorably affecting the balance of payments) and the workers will acquire the industrial skills and the discipline prerequisite to a modern economy.[48]

The modern version of this argument, which tries to portray the industrial centers of Western Europe as giant Tuskegee institutes, is equally transparent, as is evident when one examines the points in order.

To say that hiring out their workers to Western Europe helps the economies of these countries is, given the political and economic situation, illusory. As evidence, it is generally asserted that migrant workers improve the balance of payments of their countries dramatically. In 1970, for example, the three major export products of Turkey brought in $280 million, while wage transfers from Turkish migrant workers amounted to $273 million.[49] Critics point out that the transferred wages are used to increase demand for the import of luxury products and do not stimulate industrialization; and that in addition, dependence on the wages of migrant workers for paying the foreign debt makes a country very vulnerable. In the event of a recession, when migrant workers are forced to return home in large numbers, their economies are faced with a crisis in payment; even without a crisis, the long-run structuring of the economy to depend on exporting its most able labor population leads to extreme deformations. Transferred wages are not equal to capital for industrial investment. The wages of migrant workers are either used to buy a small house or spent on European luxury items, cars, electrical appliances, etc. Table 4 shows the distribution of the transferred wages of Italian migrant workers.

The savings are either spent on goods that stimulate consumer demand for

[48] See Papalekas, *Strukturfragen*; Ekmel Zadil, "Auswirkungen der Arbeitskräftewanderung auf die Türkei," in Lohrmann and Manfrass, *Ausländerbeschäftigung*, p. 211.

[49] Ekmel Zadil in Lohrmann and Manfrass, *Ausländerbeschäftigung*, p. 225. Massimo Livi Bacci, "Auswirkungen der Arbeitskräftewanderung in Italien," in Lohrmann and Manfrass, *Ausländerbeschäftigung*, p. 244; Corsini and Sonnino in *The Demographic and Social Patterns of Emigration from the Southern European Countries*, ed., M. Livi Bacci (Florence, 1972).

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industrial products that must be imported from Western European industrial centers, thereby exerting a demand-pull inflationary effect,[50] or they are pumped into unproductive sectors of the economy such as the building industry.[51] This was perceived as a serious problem by the governments of the countries of origin, and the investment associations of Turkey, founded to rechannel and guide the use of resources, were viewed with great optimism as a possible counter to such negative developments. The optimism was premature. The associations were involved in a series of corrupt affairs and scandals; honestly run associations still concentrated on construction and the establishment of building funds.[52]

The costs in structural and social damage are incomparably higher than any modest benefits to individual families. Divorce rates rise,[53] families are separated, the youngest and strongest and healthiest elements of the population—who under other circumstances would be the basis for building up the country—are lured away to contribute to the prosperity of another country where they are partially alienated from their own culture, damaged psychologically by deprivatin, isolation, and discrimination,[54] and when they are no longer needed, returned.

Secondly, the argument that the migrant labor system teaches unskilled workers industrial skills is defective: A considerable portion of the migrant workers is not unskilled at all. Thus the system constitutes a brain as well as a brawn drain. Genuinely unskilled workers are employed at the outer margins of the industrial system and are therefore not really industrial workers as such. According to the figures from the German Department of Labor,[55] the following percentages of migrant workers were *qualified* skilledworkers:

Country of Origin	Percent
Italy	36.1
Turkey	46.3
Portugal	23.0
Yugoslavia	30.1
Tunisia	34.5

[50] M. Nikolinakos, "Zur Frage der Auswanderungseffekte in den Emigrationsländern," *Das Argument*, 6, 1971, p. 782 ff.

[51] This is a characteristic of dependent economies. Compare the case of Lebanon, in Muhammad Kischli, *Kapitalismus und die Linke im Libanon* (Frankfurt, 1970).

[52] Icen Börtücene and Turan Ersoy, "Labour migration and its relationship to industrial and agricultural adjustment policies, the Turkish case," OECD Seminar on International Migration, Vienna, May 1974.

[53] In Serbia separation of couples through migration resulted in the divorce rate rising from 1.5 percent to 10 percent. Olivera Burić, "A new type of incomplete family," *Sociologija* 1973, cited in Mirjana Morokvasic, "Emigration of Women and some subsequent social transformations," paper presented at the OECD Seminar on International Migration.

[54] These are the so-called "transient situational disorders."

[55] Disagreement over what constitutes a "qualified" worker causes the figures to vary greatly. The Department of Labor figures may be taken as middle values, but the figure for Turkey is certainly too high. Zadil gives 242,348 qualified workers out of 1.1 million applicants for emigration. Zadil, in Lohrmann and Manfrass, *Ausländerbeschäftigung*, p. 212.

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In 1970, 32,545 qualified Turkish workers were employed in West Germany.[56] Genuinely unskilled laborers perform crude, unpleasant, and heavy physical labor in mining, in construction, and in the service sector. It is difficult to see how carrying bricks, washing dishes, and collecting garbage will help them acquire the skill required to build up a competitive national industry in their own countries. Even when skills *are* learned, they are not necessarily usable upon return, as Table 5 suggests:

TABLE 5

Occupations of Workers Before and After Migration: Southern Europe

	Before Leaving	*Abroad*	*Upon Return*
Agriculture	24.8%	6.6%	21.9%
Metal industry	5.7	13.7	6.6
Masonry	16.6	24.7	17.2

SOURCE: M. Livi Bacci, ed., *The Demographic and Social Patterns of Emigration from the Southern European Countries* (Florence, 1972), p. 102.

The experience of working abroad is, as a rule, an unpleasant interlude without lasting consequences aside from a possible gain in status and prestige through the acquisition of consumer goods, gadgets, and possibly a small house or apartment. M. Livi Bacci summarizes his study as follows:

> As the theory predicts, migrant workers move into more highly qualified jobs during their stay abroad. When the worker takes a job in a more industrialized country, he is integrated into a work situation which teaches him the necessary minimum skills very rapidly. Upon his return home, however, he again takes up the occupation he gave up when he left.[57]

The "tutor" theory is in fact so manifestly implausible that it is hardly worth elaborate refutation. A quotation from the "Industriekurier," July 17, 1965 suffices:

> The dilemma begins when foreigners reach the stage when they could be moved up to more qualified work, could leave the communal barracks, have their families join them and live in a regular apartment. At this point, when the foreign worker begins to approach the social status of the domestic workers, his value for the labor market and the economy disappear.[58]

Foreign labor is cheap because it is unskilled and uncompetitive. It provides domestic labor with chances for upward mobility,[59] and does the kind of work no one else wants to do. There is no incentive whatsoever for an employer

[56] Ibid., p. 213.

[57] Bacci, in Lohrmann and Manfrass, *Ausländerbeschäftigung*, p. 244.

[58] Homer Agnostidis, "Gewerkschaften und Ausländerbeschäftigung," in Lohrmann and Manfrass, *Ausländerbeschäftigung*, p. 125.

[59] Papalekas, *Strukturfragen*, p. 10; Bohning, *The Migration of Workers in the U.K. and the E.E.C.* (London, 1972).

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TABLE 6

Women in the Swiss Migrant Labor Population: by Nationality, 1975

Country of Origin	*Women*
Spain	25,919
Italy	48,824
Yugoslavia	13,894
Turkey	4,454

SOURCE: *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz, 1976.*

to train these workers and to turn them into skilled labor, because he doesn't *need* skilled labor; there is no incentive for the unions to press for training programs because they would turn foreign labor into competition for national labor; there is no incentive for the government to establish training programs[60] because they would imply that foreign workers would settle down for long periods of time and become immigrants, which is against the publicly proclaimed policy of West Germany, France, Austria, and Switzerland.

Thirdly, there is no basis for the claim that the economies of the countries of origin will benefit in any significant way from the foreign labor system. All the evidence supports the reverse conclusion. As we have seen, returning workers overwhelmingly tend to take up the same kind of occupations they left. The national employment situation may in fact become aggravated where jobs vacated by workers who had gone to West European industrial centers had been filled by women who had stayed behind. As Mirjana Morokvasic of Yugoslavia has observed: "the national authorities will be obliged to exert pressure on women to leave their jobs in order to secure employment for returning men."[61] This may well be expected to cause conflicts. In addition, the participation of women in the migration itself increases the active labor force. Women who have not previously worked for wages enter the labor market, either to take the jobs vacated by migrating men, or to seek jobs abroad themselves. Of the Yugoslav migrant workers, 31.4 percent are women; 70 percent of them (as opposed to 53.7 percent of the men) had no job before migrating.[62]

[60] With some exceptions. The West German government, for example, spends DM 2.5 million a year on training programs for Turkish workers: "The German government is trying to establish a structure resembling that created by England and France in their former colonies: a semi-qualified group of employees, who . . . can be relied upon to order W. European machine parts, products, and expertise in perpetual dependence, rather than trying to develop initiative and alternatives." Godula Kosack, "Arbeitsemigration—Entwicklungshilfe der armen an die reichen Länder," in *Europäische Peripherie—Zur Frage der Abhängigkeit des Mittelmeerraumes von West Europa*, ed. Leggewie and Nikolinakos (Meisenheim: Dritte Welt Sonderdruck, 1975) p. 236 ff.

[61] Morokvasic, "Emigration of women", p. 11.

[62] Ivo Baucic, "Auswirkungen der Arbeitskräftewanderung in Jugoslawien," in Lohrmann and Manfrass, *Ausländerbeschäftigung*, p. 202.

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TABLE 7

Women in the Swiss Migrant Labor Population: by Industry, 1975

Industry	*Women*
Metals and machines	14,144
Construction	1,001
Hotels, restaurants, etc.	23,620
Health services, cosmetics	20,941
Trade, banks, insurance	18,772
Clothing	13,947
Textiles	7,710

SOURCE: *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Schweiz, 1976.*

Tables 6 and 7 show the distribution of female migrant workers in Switzerland by nationality and branch of the economy. Because women can often find work more quickly than men (especially in the domestic field), Spanish, Turkish, and Yugoslav married women sometimes migrate before their husbands and families, and unmarried women migrate alone. Such an initiative requires considerable deviation from traditional roles and forms of behavior and will cause tension and conflict when the women return and are expected or forced to resume their former social role.[63] The theory further promises that the labor-to-capital movement will be followed by a capital-to-labor movement, that Western European industrialized states will eventually invest in the countries of origin, and that the development disparities between regions and countries will blur. There is no justification whatever for this expectation. First, 70.4 percent of West Germany investments abroad go to industrialized countries; of the 29.6 percent invested in LDCs, the majority goes to Latin America, Hong Kong, and Singapore.[64] Secondly, the reasons labor was brought to capital in the first place have not changed and will not change: mining industries, construction and building industry and service sector jobs can't be "moved"; infastructure is inadequate in the LDCs; highly qualified experts are lacking.

For these reasons, as investors, industry, and capital in West Germany freely and frequently state,[65] capital-to-labor industry is not profitable for the countries with capital. If labor were not willing or were not permitted to migrate *to* industry, the situation might be different. The availability of migrant

[63] Ibid., p. 184, shows statistics on Yugoslavian working women abroad. The double exploitation of female foreign workers is evident in wage figures. The average wage of male migrant workers is DM 1000 a month in Germany, that of women slightly over DM 500 (1971), a difference which corresponds to the difference between the wages of the men and women in the national labor force but is even more striking when one considers that the female workers are often better educated and more highly qualified than the men. See Jankowski, *Gastarbeiter—Mitbürger* (Burckhardt-Haus, 1971).

[64] Klaus Manfrass, in Lohrmann and Manfrass, *Ausländerbeschäftigung*, pp. 73 and 343.

[65] Rolf Weber, "Einstellung und Politik der Arbeitgeberverbände," in Papalekas, *Strukturfragen*, p. 47 ff.

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workers increases tendencies toward agglomeration and concentration of industry in the highly developed centers and leads to increasing disparities between central industrial regions and nonindustrial, underdeveloped, and dependent peripheries.[66] Labor is drained from agricultural areas, which eases the local employment problem at least temporarily, as the theory claims. This, however, is not a positive effect, since it thereby reduces the pressures that might under other circumstances lead to agrarian reform.[67] The critical neglect of agriculture, already a dangerous trend in the LDCs, and the consequent dependence on imported food, is at least encouraged by migrant labor. Ivo Baucic points out that the amount of uncultivated arable land rose from 493,000 hectares in 1968 to 594,000 hectares in 1971, a rise he attributes to migration.[68]

Co-opted Guardians

In spite of their evident implausibility, theories of "development through migration" continue to be expounded by employers, which is not surprising, and by union leaders, which is slightly more so, given their alleged international orientation. The reason is that, like the universality of the Christian church, the internationalism of European labor unions is a myth. The missionaries accompanying trade expeditions to Africa baptized the natives, and the unions admit the migrant workers as members, both considering their obligations thereby met. Instead of biblical exhortations to suffer patiently in anticipation of the next world, foreign workers are presented with apocalyptic visions of industrialization and the delights of the modern age which will dawn for them, their families, and their countries if they will but work and save diligently and uncomplainingly. Lest I be accused of exaggeration I hasten to quote Günther Stephan, board member of the German union DGB. After the obligatory ritual denunciation of people with nationalistic orientations he agrees that foreign workers face some difficulties in host countries and that on the whole it would be better if industry could go to labor. Regretting that unfortunately this is not feasible in the near future, he concludes that, for humanitarian reasons, the migrant labor system must remain:

> The silver glow on the horizon is surely a cause for hope for the unemployed man in Calabria, but to reach it he requires the fountain by the roadside, or, in less poetic (!) terms, the job in the industrial centers of Central Europe.[69]

(One is tempted to propose as a working hypothesis: when union leaders wax poetic, suspicion is in order.)

[66] Folker Frobel, Jürgen Heinrichs, Otto Kreye, "Tendency toward a new international division of labor," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Annual Number, Feb. 1976, p. 159 ff.; for the macroeconomic aspects, see Leggewie and Nikolinakos, *Europäische Peripherie*.

[67] Bortucene and Ersoy, "Labour migration"; Baucic, "Auswirkungen", p. 202.

[68] Baucic, p. 202.

[69] Günther Stephan, "Einstellung und Politik", p. 36 ff.

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Economic Consequences of Migrant Labor

Whether slave labor was economical remains in question. Similarly, elaborate cost-benefit analyses of foreign migrant workers fail to reach definitive conclusions, mainly because strict economic cost-benefit analyses cannot successfully be matched by the pitifully inadequate attempts at quantified social cost-benefit analysis.[70] The cynical pragmatism of the calculations is so innocent and unconscious that one is induced to believe that these problems are, after all, purely numerical. In shuffling the figures and calculations and in the debates between economic experts over plans and policies, the one fact invariably forgotten is that the units being maneuvered and rotated are people. National policy toward migrant workers is the result of conflicts between pro- and anti-foreign groups.

The simple fact is that no one can really be sure whether the long-term effects on structural economic development are beneficial or harmful. One can speculate but not know how the economy of Western Europe would have developed had this labor reservoir not been available when the national reservoirs from traditional agricultural areas were exhausted.[71] Adam Smith considered slavery uneconomical in the long run because he thought it would retard the dynamic development of modern industrial society. Similarly, some theoreticians warn that cheap and plentiful imported labor slows the rationalization of industry, undercuts the incentive to achieve technological advance and regional decentralization of production, accustoms the economy to wasteful labor-consuming production, damages the ecology by concentrating industry in central areas, neglects agriculture, prevents the substitution of labor by capital, and permanently deforms the national labor market:

> The trend toward increased female economic participation is reversed and women are again pushed out of the national labor force of highly industrialized countries; labor is available at conditions unacceptable to the domestic population; industry moves further and further from residential or accessible areas and concentrates instead in purely industrial regions, making the eventual replacement of foreign by domestic labor increasingly difficult . . . migrant workers are advantageous for individual plants, but their effect is negative on the whole because their presence increases the percentage of the nonproductive national population who become a burden on the economy.[72]

[70] On the problems of social cost-benefit analysis, see Bortucene and Ersoy, "Labour migration"; Gehmacher, "Probleme einer Kosten-Nutzen Analyse" p. 91 ff.; Joachim Lamel, "Umfang und Bedeutung der Gastarbeiterbeschäftigung in Europa," *Europäische Rundschau*, 4, 1975, pp. 79–90. For a particularly good summary of the weaknesses of cost-benefit analyses of the migrant worker phenomenon, see Abdelkrim Belguendouz, "Some Considerations on Moroccan Emigration in Relation to Development," OECD Seminar on International Migration.

[71] Antony Ward writes, "the percentage of people employed in agriculture in 1972 had sunk to 7.5% in West Germany, 12.6% in France, 6.7% in Holland and 3% in G.B. The agricultural population could therefore no longer provide a potential labor reserve," *Monthly Review* 6/1975, p. 33, German edition.

[72] Günter Schiller, "Arbeitskräftereserven," in Leggewie and Nikolinakos, *Europäische Peripherie*,

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Several authors claim that migrant workers are responsible for rising unemployment in France and Belgium.[73] Other authors deny this causal effect and point out that West Germany industry, for example, had reached a plateau in automation some time before migrant workers became numerous; that industry would not automate further even if they were not available, but that national reserves would be activated more intensively (women, young people).[74] Depending on the variables used, it is possible to make an equally convincing case for both arguments: that the European economy as a whole benefits from migrant labor; or that it is damaged.[75] Migrant labor creates and increases structural/regional imbalances within individual European countries,[76] and—through the "transnationalization of capital"[77]—at a global level as well.[78]

Fear of Migrant Labor

While rationalizations for the inferior status and ill-treatment of the groups in question flourish and abound, disparities are too obvious to be overlooked, and an awareness of the inequity gives rise to the fear that the group so treated may eventually try to alter its condition—possibly by violence.

Western European politicians and theoreticians fear foreign workers as a potential source of revolutionary unrest, as a new kind of undomesticated proletariat. Papalekas writes:

> The main danger in the present North-South migration is the possible formation and cementation of a class with a radical self-perception and the consciousness of being socially outcast. . . . Measures must be taken to prevent foreign workers from becoming victims of demagogic manipulation.[79]

Two types of development are feared: that contacts with leftist groups and ideas in the industrial centers and the experience of possible alternatives to the life style and form of government in the country of origin will radicalize the

p. 263 ff.; Volker Merx, *Ausländerbeschäftigung und Flexibilität des Arbeitsmarkts in der B.R.D.* (Cologne, 1972); and M. Nikolinakos, *Politische Ökonomie der Gastarbeiterfrage* (Hamburg, 1973).

[73] Karl Bingemer, E. Meistermann-Seeger, "Struktur und Strukturveränderungen ausländischer Arbeitnehmer der EG von 1960-1970," mimeographed (Cologne, 1972).

[74] Schiller, "Arbeitskräftereserven," p. 263.

[75] Compare G. Völker, "Turkish Labour Migration to Germany: Impact on both economies," *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 12, Jan. 1976, and Börtucene and Ersoy, "Labour migration," for an example of the divergent evaluations.

[76] This development is most dramatically evident in Italy, where the South has become impoverished as the North industrialized: in Calabria, for example, where the population has grown by 74 percent since 1861, fewer workers were employed in *absolute* figures 100 years later. See Paolo Cinanni, "Die meridionale Frage und die Emigration," in Leggewie and Nikolinakos, *Europäische Peripherie*, p. 270.

[77] This term is taken from Nikolinakos.

[78] Dieter Senghaas, ed., *Imperialismus und strukturelle Gewalt* (Suhrkamp, 1973), and Senghaas, ed., *Peripherer Kapitalismus* (Suhrkamp, 1974).

[79] Papalekas, *Strukturfragen*, pp. 10-11.

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workers and cause them to return home as revolutionaries, or that resentment caused by discrimination, double standards, and the perceived dissonance between democratic ideals and actual disenfranchisement in the industrial centers themselves will cause the foreign workers to become a base for revolutionary unrest within Western Europe and to form coalitions and alliances with dissatisfied groups in the metropolis. Regarding the first danger, Papalekas writes: "The rotation principle is more likely to prevent the . . . formation of politically dissatisfied groups of returnees who are willing to participate in the overthrow of their regimes."[80] (The possibility that some of the regimes in question may well be deserving of overthrow is, of course, not considered in the analysis.)

In 1973 the Turkish government officially protested against the Communist indoctrination and infiltration of its workers abroad.[81] The governments of Spain and Greece in 1972 protested against political broadcasts on German television in which their regimes were criticized; a temporary ban on commentaries of this type followed until various German groups protested against this foreign interference with German media. Regarding the second danger, Lohrmann writes:

> As long as the material situation of migrant workers is unsatisfactory, they are socially discriminated against, their residence right is constantly in danger and they have no real right to political participation, a growing socially critical mood may be expected among them. It seems likely that they will next try to defend their interests in a more direct and conscious way. This could have serious consequences, ranging from outbreaks of protest to the polarisation with the national population in the form of race conflicts. There are already several precedents for this. In 1971 and 1972 France experienced race riots against the Arabs and in Amsterdam there was similar violence against the Turks . . . Another danger is the formation of subgroups among the national minorities and their isolation in ghettos, organization in separate unions, establishment of private national schools, etc. . . . As long as our democracy continues to exclude foreign workers and disenfranchises them, the danger exists that the political behavior not only of the foreigners themselves but also of the German population will be affected. This could take the form of antiforeign reactions, but *there is also the danger that lines of* solidarity could form between German groups and the migrant workers.[82]

To counteract the danger of political destabilization through the activities of migrant workers, a number of measures curtailing their political rights have been instituted. In West Germany, for example, foreigners are excepted explicitly from the right to free assemblage, the right to move freely about the country, the right to form groupings, the right to choose their job, school, and place of employment.[83] What to the institutions of the political/social

[80] Ibid., 11.
[81] *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 7.8. 1973.
[82] K. Lohrmann in Lohrmann and Manfrass, *Ausländerbeschäftigung*, p. 139.
[83] Fritz Franz in Klee, *Gastarbeiter*, p. 36 ff.

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system appears as a destabilizing threat appears to proponents of change as a revolutionary potential.

Migrant Labor and the European Left

In rough outline, and with many variations in weighting, the Left theorizes that advanced industrialized countries have bought off the working class, which can no longer be considered the genuine source of social change.[84] Marginalized and discontented groups must instead be mobilized to disturb the stability of the modern international capitalist order, and to establish the ground for a new revolutionary situation, in which proletarian consciousness can again form as the contradictions within society again become manifest and the crisis reaches a peak. In 1973 there was a wave of strikes throughout Europe in which migrant workers participated; several were initiated by migrant workers,[85] one by foreign women.[86] This was hailed by leftists as the beginning of a radicalization of the passive labor and union movement. Given the power situation, however, such events have little chance of initiating fundamental changes.

Given their lack of political awareness and the extreme economic and social vulnerability of migrant workers, they cannot be viewed as an active political force in the immediate future. The orientation of the workers is individualistic or family-centered and focuses on the very real and immediate problems of survival. There is little awareness of the political aspect of the grievances which appear, to the worker, as isolated and personal difficulties. The employer, the hiring agent, the landlord, or the prejudiced population may be blamed; seldom does the foreign worker view himself in a larger context. Confronted with the daily problems of loneliness, disorientation, bureaucratic harassment, the difficulties of adhering to cultural norms and religious rules, the average worker has little opportunity to reflect on his situation and abstract from his subjective condition an objective analysis of power relationships.

José Moll Marqués reports that Communist party gains in Italy are widely considered to be due to workers returning from abroad with a new radicalized consciousness, but agrees that the workers as a group are not realistically to be viewed as revolutionary; their aspirations do not go in the direction of social change, but are essentially petit-bourgeois consumption oriented: "The migrant workers experience discrimination, exploitation, etc., but what they perceive most vividly is the self-satisfied German worker with a car, vacations

[84] This theory is most widely propounded by Marcuse, Baran and Sweezy, and the authors of the dependencia school.

[85] The strikes against Peugeot and Renault in April received wide publicity, for example. See Marios Nikolinakos, "Streiken Gastarbeiter als Erste?" in *Neues Forum*, May/June 1975, p. 29.

[86] Claudia Pinl, "Pieburg KG Neuss—Beispiel eines erfolgreichen Frauenstreiks," *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, 1, 1974, p. 54; *Streik bei Ford* (Cologne: Rosa Luxembourg Verlag); Hildebrandt and Olle, *Ihr Kampf ist unser Kampf* (Offenbach, 1975).

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abroad, and, frequently, a house of his own."[87] He will tend to view his ordeals and suffering as a kind of purgatory to be endured preparatory to the blessings of affluence; the experience of being dislocated and removed from his own social reality increases his sense of disorientation and his general paralysis.[88]

The personal and cultural alienation experienced by the individual workers is used by employers and industry to extract a maximum of subservient labor from the migrant; in this they are frequently aided by social scientists, who publish instruction manuals for authoritarian managers under the title of "research" into "migrant labor." One such study was performed by Ernst Gehmacher for the Austrians:

> Migrant workers, especially the Turks, willingly submit to the judgment of respected persons and are grateful for any attention paid to their problems. Firmness and clear orders (guest-workers are far less touchy about authority than Austrians) should be combined with personal friendliness and attention. For example, it is far more profitable with foreign workers than with Austrians to make a note of their birth date and to say a few nice words to them on this occasion.[89]

Treatment of the workers as mere units in a production system is uncritically accepted by this kind of social science, as the following sentence, taken from the same study, illustrates:

> Most married workers who have migrated without their wives, but many single workers as well, are deprived of sexual activity. This sexual abstinence helps them avoid a number of problems, but may in the long run have psychological consequences *which can be unfavorable to their performance at work.*[90]

The isolation and disorientation of the migrants is increased by authoritarian attitudes at work and the deliberate differences in treatment of foreign and domestic labor.

Protest and the Prospects for Revolt

The most frequent response among migrants to the problems of migration is to try to make the best of the situation. Resistance takes the form of trivial victories over the bureaucracy—sneaking a wife or husband into the country as a tourist and finding her or him an unregistered job, pilfering from the factory, doing the least work possible in the longest possible time, etc. The question is whether these forms of responses are an early, rudimentary phase in a process

[87] Klee, *Gastarbeiter*, p. 139.

[88] For the sociocultural aspects of the problem, see Hoffman-Nowotny, *Soziologie des Fremdarbeiterproblems* (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1973).

[89] Ernst Gehmacher et al., *Gastarbeiter: Wirtschaftsfaktor und soziale Herausforderung*, (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1973), pp. 45–46.

[90] Ibid., p. 55.

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of consciousness-building which ultimately may metamorphose into genuinely political action.[91]

Occasionally, as we have seen, migrant workers participate in or even initiate a strike; more often, they are used as strike-breakers, as the weakest sectors of labor have traditionally been used. Easily fired, subject to having their residence permit revoked instantly at the slightest provocation, in danger of immediate expulsion from the country for "agitating" or spreading unrest, without a strong backing from the unions, treated with mistrust and hostility by the national population, migrant workers act rationally and on a realistic appraisal of their situation when they remain docile and inconspicuous, though radical groups would not hesitate to use them as cannon fodder. The vulnerability of foreign workers: "means that a considerable proportion of the working class in contemporary Europe is disenfranchised . . . Even where immigrant workers do in theory enjoy certain rights, these can be eroded by repressive use of labour market legislation."[92]

The fears—or hopes, depending on the ideological orientation of the author—for the potentially disruptive role of migrant workers are well-founded in the long run. Foreign workers have become a new kind of reserve army of labor, what some authors call a "proletariat on loan." They are geographically (horizontally) highly mobile, can be drafted into service in boom times, are expendable in times of economic slump or stagnation. More ideal than slaves, one rarely has to be concerned about their means of survival in hard times. More ideal than racial minorities, their slums and ghettos can be located abroad.[93] Ostracized socially, discriminated against legally, this army of foreign workers is highly marginalized not only in the advanced industrial centers where it is deployed, but increasingly in the countries of its origin, which eventually find themselves faced with the problem of semi-peasant/semi-industrial unemployed and culturally alienated returnees. They lack a political opposition mentality, striving only to return home and become there a petit bourgeois. Given the economic situation in their countries of origin and the nature of their experience abroad, this goal can be realized only by a small minority. At the moment, it can be said of foreign workers that they are the most fervent believers in the European dream of democracy, prosperity, opportunities for individuals showing initiative, in modernity and progress. The structural developments within Europe—which ironically would not be possible without the migrant workers—make the frustration of these ideals inevitable. The regional concentration of industry and the direction of capital flow (away

[91] Hildebrandt and Olle, *Ihr Kampf*; the creation of their own unions by the migrant workers would have to take place in the face of massive opposition from unions, governments, and in most cases the media and the governments of the countries of origin. No study of this possibility exists to my knowledge.

[92] Castles and Kosack, *Immigrant Workers*, p. 480.

[93] As Antony Ward writes, "to find the slums of West Berlin, Düsseldorf or Cologne, one must travel farther south, to the impoverished cities and towns of the Algarve, Andalusia, Calabria, Greece and Anatolia." *Monthly Review*, 6/1975, p. 34, German edition.

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from the LDCs of Europe) and the perpetuation of an unequal international division of labor (under the slogan of "comparative benefits") will, if developments continue, lead to increasing disparities along racial, cultural and national lines. The "countries of origin" will continue to supply labor as an export product, becoming the Bantustans of Europe.[94]

Their governments, increasingly aware of the dangers and negative effects of this system, are nevertheless helpless; unable to provide an alternative, they are trapped between two equally undesirable options: to continue to export their most productive population groups, even though they have meanwhile realized that "the returning emigrants will not contribute to the development of their country in any way, either through their savings or through their experiences and acquired skills,"[95] or to cut down on migration and be faced with a large number of unemployed citizens, regional imbalances and a failing agriculture that can no longer be covered by imports, or by the relocation of the inhabitants of these regions, and the collapse of the delay system in balance of payment deficit-concealment.[96]

Among the migrant workers, a small segment of professionals and semi-professionals is able to raise itself above the general level of poverty and low-status work and make a bid for the political leadership of the group. The dominant society is eager to co-opt such aspiring leaders, and the leaders try to follow a line of cooperation with big industry. These leaders proceed on a false estimate of the economic situation and believe they can "industrialize" their populations on a large scale, move them into the modern labor force and "share the wealth." In fact, migrant labor is the expression of systematic dependence and imbalance. Given the added factor that disparities are regional and the ghettos divided from the metropolis and the suburbs by national boundaries, and given the fact that the countries of origin are not distinguished by political stability, and are buying time by spreading expectations that cannot possibly be met,[97] the contours of emerging conflict begin to appear.*

[94] For this most expressive phrase I am indebted to my colleague Dr. Arno Tausch, Vienna Institute of Development.

[95] OECD Observer 47, 1970, "International Migration and its Repercussions," in Ward, *Monthly Review*, 7/1975, p. 46.

[96] An added complicating factor, in Yugoslavia, for example, is the interest groups that stand to gain by the continuation of the migrant worker system. Smaller industries and factories hire out whole groups of their employees to Western European countries on a seasonal basis. In Lohrmann and Manfrass, *Ausländerbeschäftigung*, p. 85.

[97] Turkey already has a list of more than one million workers waiting to migrate who tolerate poverty and unemployment because of this prospect of improvement. Authors like Ekmel Zadil fear the consequences should migration come to an end: a "dream deferred," he believes, that may well 'explode." Zadil, in Lohrmann and Manfrass, *Ausländerbeschäftigung*, p. 225. According to Turkish government projections, there will be 2 million unemployable workers in 1987.

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Eastern European Ethnic Groups and American Foreign Policy

STEPHEN A. GARRETT

Among the more interesting as well as surprising features of the 1976 presidential election was the way in which Eastern Europe became a campaign issue. The Eastern European situation and American policy toward it had received little attention in recent elections, but after Gerald Ford's statement that he did not believe Eastern Europe was under Soviet domination the region acquired fresh significance in the eyes of the American electorate—or at least in the eyes of nervous Republican campaign strategists. Jimmy Carter's later pronouncement that he would not use American troops to repel a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia also kept Eastern Europe in the news.

Quite aside from Eastern Europe's intrinsic significance to American foreign policy, the potential importance of the eastern European question to the 1976 election's outcome, as perceived by politicians of both major parties, derived from their awareness that there are large numbers of Americans of Eastern European ethnic background. Whether the voting behavior of these groups has in fact been conditioned by a given party's or administration's stance toward Eastern Europe is a question which we shall consider later. The more general concern in this article is with the overall role of the Eastern European ethnic population in the definition and execution of American policy toward Eastern Europe. A central focus is the consideration of how the U.S. "national interest" can or should be seen when influential ethnic minorities press for their particular version of that interest. May there not be a "general" interest which supersedes more particularistic definitions? Is the concept of the "general" interest meaningful in an avowedly pluralistic society, even in terms of foreign policy? The discussion covers several

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distinct areas: the present and past facts on the Eastern European ethnic presence in the United States; the general nature of the foreign policy decision-making process in the United States, particularly in terms of its susceptibility to pressure from specialized interests; and the substantive effect on American policy toward Eastern Europe of the efforts of these groups. A particular point of concern is how the rising ethnic consciousness in the United States might influence future American relations with East Central Europe in the era of détente.

Eastern European Ethnics in the United States

The Eastern European ethnic presence in the United States really began to take shape only with the advent of the so-called new immigration dating roughly from the last decade of the nineteenth century. Prior to this time the vast majority of emigrants were from Northern and Western Europe. Beginning about 1890, however, a remarkable shift developed. Southern and Eastern Europe accounted for 52 percent of total American immigration from 1891 to 1900 and this soared to more than 70 percent during the next ten years.[1] The political, economic, and social factors that underlay the transition from the old to the new immigration are complex and lie outside the scope of this article, as does the complicated reaction that greeted the new immigrants and eventually resulted in the Immigration Act of 1924. The act set quotas using 1890 as a base year, thus effectively ending large-scale Eastern European immigration. Despite these restrictions, there were by 1930 about 2 million first and second generation Poles in this country, almost 1 million Czechoslovaks, 320,000 Hungarians, 260,000 Yugoslavs, and 150,000 Rumanians.[2] Since these groups tended to be concentrated in cities—they had come to the United States in part because of the growing demand for cheap industrial labor—and since they tended to assimilate less easily than earlier immigrant groups they were a distinct and potentially powerful presence in American life. Table 1 gives figures from the 1970 census on the present Eastern European ethnic population in the United States.

The data in Table 1 are open to various interpretations as to what they say about the current Eastern European ethnic representation in the United States. Although it is obvious that even today significant numbers of Americans have an Eastern European ethnic background, it is also true that Americans of foreign stock (defined as first or second generation) are an increasingly smaller percentage of the total population. In 1940 for instance, the figure was 26 percent, but by 1970 it had fallen to an esti-

[1] Marion T. Bennet, *American Immigration Policies* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1963), p. 31.

[2] Mamatey, *The United States and East Central Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957) p. 24.

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TABLE 1

Mother Tongue of the Population by Nativity and Parentage: 1970

Group:	Total:	Native of native parentage:	Foreign Stock				
				Native of foreign or mixed parentage			
			Total:	Total:	Foreign parentage:	Mixed parentage:	Foreign born:
Albanian	17382	1571	15811	8283	6730	1553	7528
Czechoslovakian	963178	235894	727284	574020	442907	131113	153264
Hungarian	447497	52156	395341	234088	195556	38532	161253
Polish	2437938	670335	1767603	1347691	1035041	262650	419912
Rumanian	56680	5166	51424	25369	21809	3560	26055
Yugoslavic (Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian and Dalmatian)	331578	36173	295405	191147	160015	31132	104258

SOURCE: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population.* Subject Report IA: "National Origins and Languages." Table 19. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970).

mated 15 percent.[3] It is vital to note, however, that the census figures cited only relate to first- or second-generation ethnic groupings. Clearly a great many more Americans, who may not fall within this classification, may nevertheless feel at least some significant ethnic ties. Indeed an abundance of material appearing in recent years has attested to the growing power of "white ethnic" consciousness.[4] A study by the Census Bureau in 1971 of the numbers of Americans claiming a single ethnic origin produced figures on Polish ethnicity that almost doubled the numbers of "foreign stock" Polish.[5] Indeed, almost 5 million Americans fell into this category. Some students of the Polish ethnic population in the United States think this figure too low by at least 1 or 2 million.[6]

Two other measures of the strength of the Eastern European ethnic presence are the number of foreign-language newspapers and periodicals currently being published, as well as various organizations specifically devoted to ethnic concerns, particularly organizations which for purposes of the present essay demonstrate an interest in American foreign policy. Table 2 summarizes the current situation as far as the media are concerned. The circulation figures in the last

[3] Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1970), p. 66.

[4] For two representative studies, see Michael Novak, *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971) and Perry L. Weed, *The White Ethnic Movement and Ethnic Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1973).

[5] Weed, p. 5.

[6] For an interesting survey of the present Polish community in the United States, see Leonard Chrabot, "The Elusive Polish American," *Polish American Studies* 30 (1973):54–59.

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TABLE 2

Foreign Language Media of Eastern European Ethnic Groups in the United States, 1975

Language	Number of Newspapers and Periodicals:	Number Reporting Circulation:	Total Circulation Reported:	1958 Reported Circulation:
Albanian	1	–	–	2,015
Czechoslovak (Czech & Slovak)	28	18	187,000	406,410
Bulgarian	2	1	750	12,048
Hungarian	14	9	55,000	132,379
Polish	25	15	318,000	727,218
Rumanian	2	2	7,000	11,207
Yugoslavic (Croat, Serb, Slovene, and Macedonian)	13	1	88,000	106,248

SOURCE: *1975 Ayer Directory of Publications* (Philadelphia: Ayer Press, 1975).

column are taken from Louis Gerson's earlier study of ethnic influence on American politics and diplomacy.[7] He used 1958 as his reference year and a comparison of the earlier figures with the later ones is revealing, particularly when census figures on the total numbers of Americans commanding the relevant mother tongue are included. The data reveal remarkably little variation in this respect. In 1970 there were some 2,437,000 claiming Polish as a mother tongue compared with 2,416,000 in 1940 (the census that Gerson employed in his own study). The statistics for Hungarians are 447,000 in 1970, 453,000 in 1940; for Rumanians 56,000 in 1970, 65,000 in 1940; for Czechs 452,000 in 1970, 520,000 in 1940.[8] Given these results (no decrease in the numbers of Americans able to *read* the foreign-language press), the declining circulation of foreign-language media is striking. To be sure, statements on circulation from these publications are often vague or missing altogether and, as we have already noted, a decrease in readership of such media does not necessarily negate other ways in which ethnic consciousness can or is being maintained. Nevertheless, the relative decline of the Eastern European foreign-language press does have some implications, particularly in terms of the potential ability of ethnic organization leadership to communicate with their constituents and impress upon them a given position on American policy toward the homeland.

If the foreign-language media are one indicator of ethnic consciousness in the United States, the number and variety of formal organizations devoted to ethnic concerns are another. Of primary concern here are organizations with at least some announced interest in American policy toward the mother country or

[7] Louis L. Gerson, *The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy* (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1964), pp. 264–65.

[8] Ibid.

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toward the Eastern European area as a whole. There are a great many groups operating in the United States today whose prime function is social and cultural and who take little, if any, active part in communicating views to the administration and Congress on American foreign policy. Some organizations address themselves to both social and political matters. In a third category are groups that are avowedly almost entirely political. Their stated *raison d'être* is to influence American policy. Among the groups having a mixed function, perhaps the best known is the Polish National Alliance which is in essence an umbrella organization. Others falling into this category include the Pan-Albanian Federation of America, the American-Bulgarian League, the United American Croats, the American-Hungarian Federation, the Slovak League of America, and the Union and League of Romanian Societies of America. Groups specifically organized to sway American foreign policy include the Bulgarian National Front, the Hungarian Committee, the Hungarian Freedom Fighters Federation (U.S.A.), the International Peasant Union, the National Committee for the Liberation of Slovakia, and perhaps most prominent, the Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN).[9] The latter bears closer examination as being perhaps the most visible group bringing pressure to bear on American policy toward Eastern Europe.

According to the organization's official literature, the ACEN was founded on September 20, 1954 "to provide an instrument for action on a sustained basis." The overall goal is the freedom and independence of the nations of East and Central Europe. ACEN is careful to state that it "does not support the aspirations of any given political group nor does it advocate future establishment of any specific form of government. ACEN champions the right of the captive peoples to select, through democratic processes, the system under which they wish to live—once they have regained freedom and independence." ACEN has both member and associate member delegations. The former include the "national committees or councils" of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Rumania while the latter embrace the "international organizations" of Central and Eastern European political parties or movements. The ACEN features a Plenary Assembly which meets yearly in New York, coinciding with the opening of the annual debate in the General Assembly of the United Nations. "Issues of prime interest to the people of the captive East-Central European lands are discussed and documents of import forwarded, when appropriate, to the United Nations and to the free governments of the world." ACEN also has a general committee composed of a delegate from each of the nine captive nations, various political, legal, economic, social, and cultural committees, and a secretariat headed by a secretary-general who "directs the work of the organization and implements its policy." Of particular concern to ACEN is Captive Nations Week in the United States, established by Congress in 1959 to fall annually in the third week of July until such time as the captive

[9] Margaret Fisk, ed., *Encyclopedia of Associations*, vol. 1., *National Organizations of the United States* (Detroit: Book Tower, 1975), pp. 861–897.

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nations achieve their freedom. The president is directed by Congress to issue a proclamation noting Captive Nations Week and various activities around the country are designed to stress the import of the Captive Nations Resolution. "ACEN and local Captive Nations Week Committees throughout the United States help organize fitting observances, public rallies and religious services."[10] Altogether the ACEN today and in the past has probably been the most vocal of those groups pressing for a particular definition of the American national interest in Eastern Europe. How successful such efforts have been in the past and may be in the future is an interesting matter for consideration.

The Failure of a Lobby

The numbers of Americans with ethnic ties to Eastern Europe, the existence of widespread if declining foreign-language media and numerous political and cultural organizations devoted to ethnic concerns might lead one to conclude *prima facie* that American foreign policy toward East Central Europe has necessarily been heavily influenced by these factors. How important ethnic groups *in general* have been to American diplomacy is one question. Daniel Moynihan for one argues that they have been vital and that their influence is likely to increase. He writes that "the immigration process is the single most important determinant of American foreign policy," and concludes that even though foreign policy "responds to other things as well" it reacts "probably first of all to the primal facts of ethnicity."[11] Bernard Cohen is less certain. In surveying the opinions of high officials in the State Department he notes that they do stress the multitude of their contacts with ethnic group demands. However, these contacts emerge as being frequently formalistic in character, designed actually to mute ethnic demands or to manipulate them rather than to respond positively to them. Cohen, in fact, judges that it "is hard to discover in these broad contacts much contemporary support for the view that ethnic groups exert a significant impact on American foreign policy."[12] The one exception that Cohen notes is the Jewish lobby vis-à-vis Israel. State Department officials were highly sensitive to the electoral power and political sophistication and organization of this latter group.

When we turn to ethnic lobbying on American policy toward East Central Europe, however, it is hard not to conclude that at least in this particular case the evidence supports Cohen's overall thesis. Despite an infrastructure that ostensibly might lead to a significant role in the making of policy, Eastern European ethnic groups seemingly have had little direct influence on American

[10] *Assembly of Captive European Nations* (New York: Assembly of Captive European Nations, n.d.). This is a brief publicity brochure describing the origins and functions of the ACEN.

[11] Daniel P. Moynihan and Nathan Glazer, eds., *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 22–23.

[12] Bernard C. Cohen, *The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), p. 104.

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diplomacy toward their homeland. These groups have not always been united or consistent in the kind of policy they have wanted Washington to adopt vis-à-vis Eastern Europe. On balance, however, there is no question that calls for a "tougher" line in East Central Europe have been the basic thrust of ethnic advice in this area. Operationally this has meant a conscious American policy of detaching the states of Eastern Europe from the Soviet orbit and overturning their socialist economic and political systems. Despite a brief period of lip-service to "liberation" in the Republican campaign of 1952, official policy makers have consistently rejected any serious attempts in this direction, as was amply demonstrated by our inaction during the East German, Hungarian, Polish, and Czechoslovak events of the 1950s and 1960s. It seems apparent then that ethnic pressures have indeed been ineffective. To the extent that these pressures have had any effect it has been primarily negative—that is, Eastern European ethnic groups have not been able to force the government to do something it did not want to do but on occasion they have been able to sabotage certain steps that Washington would have liked to undertake. George Kennan speaks bitterly for example of Croatian immigrant groups in this country who "never failed to oppose any move to better American-Yugoslav relations or to take advantage of any opportunity to make trouble between the two countries. And this they succeeded, with monotonous regularity, in doing."[13] Kennan was referring specifically to the period of the early 1960s and the kind of obstructionism he alluded to was responsible, for example, for temporarily denying most-favored-nation trade status to the Yugoslavs. Yet in the grand scheme of American foreign policy during this period a degree of American-Yugoslav tension may have been unfortunate but was hardly a critical setback to the overall thrust of our diplomacy. What is important is that the efforts of the Croatian lobby to reverse basic American policy toward Yugoslavia—which since 1950 involved a tolerance of and even support for Belgrade's form of national communism—were almost totally futile.

The broad assertion that ethnic group influence on American policy toward East Central Europe has been minimal of course skates over the more interesting and important question of why this should have been so. In arriving at an answer we have to recognize first of all that an organization like the ACEN is in essence only one of a larger class of specialized interest groups that have traditionally attempted to influence American foreign policy. Most such groups have no particular ethnic identification. They can be based on common economic interest, on concern about a particular foreign policy issue (such as arms control), or on any of a variety of desiderata. There is a limited though growing literature on the influence of such groups on American foreign policy.[14] A

[13] George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1950–1963* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1972), pp. 286–87.

[14] See for instance Raymond Bauer et al., *American Business and Public Policy*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972), and Roger Hilsman, *The Politics of Policy-Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

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common thread runs through these writings: special interest groups must have some uncommon characteristics if they expect to influence the development and execution of U.S. diplomacy. Particularly among the foreign policy "professionals"—concentrated primarily in the State Department, but found also in the Defense Department and in other government agencies—there is a built-in reluctance to give a really concrete role in policy making to the variety of groups that press for the professionals' attention. To the extent that *all* special groups are excluded from the policy process, then Eastern European ethnic organizations have suffered a fate similar to that of many other quite dissimilar groups.

Why do interest groups have relatively little identifiable effect on foreign policy? Part of the explanation lies in the professional esprit, pride—some might say arrogance—of those whose careers are devoted to foreign policy making and execution. Simply put, there is a strong commitment to the notion that these career civil servants have the function of serving the national interest and should not be misled or deflected from this purpose by the special pleadings of some particular group. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson expressed this feeling when he argued that "there are so many opportunities for special groups to profit at the general expense that we cannot expect concern for the public welfare to be sufficient as the sole restraint upon them."[15] Since the conscientious professional usually regards himself as the ultimate defender of the "public welfare," at least in foreign policy, the tendency to look askance at the opinions of admittedly *engagé* organizations is strong.

Another factor in professional disdain for interest group activity relates to the matter of information. The range of domestic problems is so vast that quite often a given interest group will have specialized information that will be taken seriously by executive departments and also by Congress. In foreign policy, however, the tendency of the professionals is to feel that they usually possess more facts than the groups importuning them. As Spanier and Uslaner say, "on foreign policy questions interest groups seem no better off than Congress in terms of the amount of information each has and in a considerably weaker position than either the State or the Defense Department."[16] If information is power, it is evident that on the range of issues associated with Eastern Europe the "information" and analyses of ethnic groups has generally been regarded as partial in scope and quite frequently outdated or twisted by the ideological biases of those presenting them, especially since many of the most fervent representatives of such groups have not in fact been in their homelands for years or even decades.

Finally, the government is responsive to interest groups partially in terms of how directly such groups can demonstrate that a given policy or its alternative really does help or hurt its interests. The American Trial Lawyer's Associa-

[15] Dean Acheson, *Power and Diplomacy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 28.

[16] John C. Spanier and Eric M. Uslaner, *How American Foreign Policy Is Made* (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 84.

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tion, for example, may be able to do this with some effect as far as no-fault automobile insurance is concerned, but demonstrating a cause-and-effect relationship in foreign policy is generally much more difficult. As one of the leading students of interest group activity states, "domestic policies often have direct economic consequences for citizens; these consequences are fairly easily demonstrable in a message. Foreign issues, on the other hand, usually have more indirect consequences (tariff questions excepted) and it is difficult to demonstrate in a message how a certain group might be hurt."[17] It is evident that successive administrations have indeed found it hard to understand how the interests of Americans of Eastern European ethnic background were sufficiently damaged by the continuance of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe to warrant a fundamental change in American policy. To be sure, the existence of such regimes, particularly because of their subservience to Moscow, was a bitter disappointment. Whether this essentially abstract and emotional aversion warranted a course of American action that threatened a potentially catastrophic showdown with the Soviet Union was not something most policy makers found difficult to resolve.

There are, of course, certain interest groups that have had at times a demonstrable effect on foreign policy; the previous strictures on interest group influence do not imply that under no circumstances is American diplomacy subject to group pressure. As noted, however, such groups that do have influence tend to share certain characteristics and a review of these indicates that few if any Eastern European ethnic lobbies have enjoyed the requisite qualities. An effective lobbying organization, according to an analysis by the State Department itself, has to be national in scope and importance, have an interest in diverse aspects of international affairs, have effective informational and educational media for the dissemination of knowledge about foreign affairs, and, perhaps most important of all, have a reputation from the perspective of the State Department and similar national organizations of being "responsible" in their approach.[18] On each of these points it is clear that, fairly or unfairly, the ethnic lobby on Eastern Europe has been seen as wanting. The criteria of diversity of interests and reputation for responsibility have been particularly important in this regard. One State Department official commented, for instance, that most pressure groups in foreign policy, not excluding the ethnic lobby, "have a hobby horse which they beat to death; they use every opportunity to press their views."[19] Another stated that he would be more inclined to solicit group views on policy matters if the relevant groups ever allowed him to forget them.[20] The tunnel vision of Eastern European ethnic groups has clearly worked to their dis-

[17] Lester W. Milbrath, "Interest Groups and Foreign Policy", in *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, ed. James Rosenau (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 241.

[18] William Chittick, *State Department, Press and Pressure Groups* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1970), pp. 224–25.

[19] Ibid., p. 234.

[20] Ibid.

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advantage; there is inherent benefit in seeming to be interested in all phases of foreign policy simply as concerned citizens. As far as the image of moderation and responsibility is concerned, there operates what might be called the "lunatic fringe syndrome." Proposals that fall much outside the current mainstream of American policy tend to have a very difficult time getting a hearing, even if they have elements of logic and perhaps intellectual sophistication to them. The protest against the Vietnam war in its early phase, for example, fell into this category and was accordingly ineffective.[21] The message of the ethnic lobby on Eastern Europe has suffered from the same disability. The impression one gets is that even relatively subtle and well thought-out appeals from this group have been dismissed mainly because as a group they have been regarded as incorrigibly beyond the pale of respectable opinion.

Leaving aside the question of a group's overall characteristics and reputation, the theory has been advanced that "those issues that attract the attention of special publics, but that attract little general public attention, are more open to group influence than issues that attract wide and/or intense public scrutiny."[22] If this argument is accepted, it would presumably provide for a heavy Eastern European ethnic influence on American policy, since East Central Europe has been the object of comparatively little attention or knowledge on the part of the American public as a whole. This conclusion is largely negated, however, by two considerations. Carrying out the ultimate policy proposals of most of the relevant ethnic lobbies would have involved consequences of such a serious nature as to arouse and involve "general public attention." It was no doubt in recognition of this fact that successive administrations deflected such proposals. There is also the reality that over the past thirty years there have been really only a few occasions in which the ethnic desire for liberation of at least part of the homeland seemed perhaps within potential reach. Certainly, the Hungarian uprising of 1956 was a prime example: this presumably was an ideal time for restoring Hungary to the Western cause. Yet it is precisely in times of crisis such as this that various studies have shown the president and his advisers to have widest *latitude*. The country tends to rally around their leaders and to accept whatever judgments concerning the national interest they choose to make. The ironic result is that it has been exactly during the periods of what the ethnic lobby might consider maximum opportunity that administration has been most free from their special pressures.

Alternative Strategies for the Ethnic Lobby

We have argued that ethnic pressures applied directly on the professional foreign policy establishment have generally proved unavailing as far as American policy toward Eastern Europe has been concerned. This does not mean, however, that the relevant groups necessarily had to abandon their efforts. There were other

[21] Cohen, p. 157.
[22] Milbrath, p. 249.

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modes of action open to them. One that was employed in past years was economic reprisal. In response to President Johnson's tentative efforts at "bridge-building" to Eastern Europe in the middle 1960s ethnic organizations in this country organized boycotts of goods imported into the United States from various East European countries. American cigarette manufacturers, for example, who attempted to use Yugoslav tobacco in their products felt the wrath of anti-Communist Yugoslav-Americans. A campaign against consumption of Polish hams undercut the administration's opening to Warsaw. The Firestone Rubber Company was pressured into giving up an important contract with Rumania.[23] The temper of all these efforts was perhaps best caught in the slogan invented by a Florida chiropractor and placed in the local press, advising customers to "buy your Communist merchandise at 'Super Giant.' "[24] Once again, however, the most that these efforts could accomplish was to obstruct or delay a liberalization of American policy toward Eastern Europe. They were hardly useful in forcing the administration to adopt a harder line toward the area. To accomplish this, two other avenues of influence were in theory available.

POWER OF THE BALLOT BOX

The first of these involved using the political process itself to convey pressure for a change in policy. The desk officer in the State Department may not want to return the calls of an emigré organization demanding the liberation of Hungary, but he clearly does not perform his tasks in a political vacuum. Indeed, the evidence is that the State Department is quite sensitive to political forces in Congress and feels far more subject to these than to pressure applied directly from the outside by various interest organizations.[25] Then there is the opinion at the White House itself, of course. Direct orders from the president presumably have to be obeyed, even if they go against the consensus of professional judgment. Actually, this has to be qualified somewhat. There are myriad examples of the bureaucracy being able to deflect or even to smother seemingly precise foreign policy directives from the president.[26] Nevertheless, an option always open, at least in theory, to Eastern European ethnic organizations was to employ electoral pressures to create a Congress and even a presidency that would be responsive to their demands and would compel the State Department and other executive agencies to conform to a new line despite their professional doubts.

[23] John P. Leacacos, *Fires in the In-Basket* (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1968), p. 234.

[24] Chittick, pp. 240–41.

[25] Cohen, p. 152.

[26] An excellent instance of this was the State Department's success in blunting the decision by the Kennedy White House on the "opening to the left" in Italy during the early 1960s. Kennedy's position was to encourage the left coalition efforts in Italy but for a long time the State Department simply continued its previous support of conservative elements on the Italian scene. Arthur Schlesinger relates that it took almost two years for Kennedy's decision to be implemented. See his *A Thousand Days* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 877–81.

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At first glance the prospects for using the vote to influence American policy toward Eastern Europe would seem to have been a promising course of action for Eastern European ethnic groups in the United States. There was the example of the Jewish vote and American support of Israel to offer encouragement. A great deal of evidence seemed to point to the fact that the Jewish electoral power in certain large cities, particularly New York, exerted heavy pressure on successive administrations, particularly Democratic administrations, not to stray too far from uncritical support of Israel.[27] Moreover, the factor that gave the Jewish vote its supposed potency—that is, its concentration in swing states such as New York and New Jersey—also applied to the Eastern European ethnic population. Michigan, Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, for instance, all had unusually large concentrations of Americans of Eastern European ethnic background. Then, too, in the post-1945 period an increasing number of Congressmen were themselves of Eastern European heritage. At the end of the 1958 congressional campaign, for example, the Polish-American press exulted over the fact that an unprecedented thirteen Americans of Polish descent had been elected to Congress.[28] Perhaps what should have been the most encouraging sign of all, however, was the fact that American politicians of both parties and at various levels of elective office clearly took the "ethnic vote" seriously and designed their campaigns on the premise that ethnic identification was a key factor in voting choice. A review of the measures the national party organizations have taken to appeal to the various ethnic groupings is of interest in this regard.

Both the Republican and Democratic national committees currently have sections permanently established for appealing to Americans of diverse ethnic backgrounds. Among the Democrats, the Nationalities Division, according to a personal communication from its current Executive Director, Andrew J. Valuchek, dates from 1932 and was at the time one of the campaign arms of the party. It is nominally headed by a chairman who also bears the title of vice-chairman of the Democratic National Committee (this position was recently held by Congressman Thomas Morgan, a Democrat from Pennsylvania who was also chairman of the House International Relations Committee). The Nationalities Division is composed of twenty-four separate nationality sections ranging from Armenian to Yugoslav. Each has its own separate chairman. The division works closely with the presidents of the national ethnic organizations, with editors of ethnic newspapers, and with what Valuchek calls "opinion-molders" among the ethnics. He stresses that the function of the division is really twofold: to convey the views of ethnic groups to Democratic political candidates while at the same time advising these groups of the positions which the party is adopting on various domestic

[27] An interesting discussion of the Jewish vote and the creation of Israel is John Snetsinger, *Truman, the Jewish Vote and the Creation of Israel* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1974).

[28] Weed, p. 131.

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and foreign policy issues and the rationale for them.[29] As far as the Republicans are concerned, they have lagged behind the Democrats in having a nationalities division of the National Committee operating full-time. To be sure, a heavy Republican appeal to the ethnic vote has been made in past presidential campaigns, especially those of 1944, 1948, and 1952. These appeals, however, were orchestrated by essentially ad hoc sections of the National Committee which ceased functioning once the campaign was concluded. In 1971, however, the Republican party finally established the Heritage Group Section as a permanent operating branch of the party's national committee. Its first chairman was one Laszlo Pasztor, a Hungarian freedom fighter in 1956. Initially, some fifteen state Republic Nationalities Councils were set up under the overall supervision of the Heritage Group Section. A *GOP Nationalities News* was first issued in October 1971, as a newsletter specifically directed toward ethnic concerns. The establishment of the section was clearly evidence that the Nixon administration now saw an historic opportunity to woo the ethnic vote away from its traditional Democratic affiliation. The president spoke directly to this point in a letter to Pasztor designed for distribution to the delegates to the first organizational meeting of the Heritage Groups Section. "The formation of this permanent auxiliary to the Republican Party represents a major landmark in our party's history," Nixon said. "To bring together the best of our rich and varied traditions and talents and direct them to the fulfillment of our common hopes is in the finest spirit of Republicans."[30] The success which the Republicans had in winning the Eastern European ethnic vote in the 1972 campaign seemed to attest to the wisdom of their establishing a permanent ethnic division. Among voters of Polish extraction, for example, Nixon increased his totals in various big cities compared with 1968 anywhere from 12 to 30 percent.[31]

This brief discussion gives little hint of the intense competition the two parties have frequently waged for the Eastern European ethnic vote in presidential campaigns since 1944 and earlier. For present purposes, there are two key points to be made about this competition. First, presidential elections have not been an effective occasion for Eastern European ethnic groups to bring pressure to bear on American policy toward the homeland. Both national parties may have been conscious of the ethnic vote and have organized their campaigns with a view to appealing to this vote, not only on domestic but also on foreign policy grounds, but in actuality the foreign policy planks calculated to attract Eastern European ethnic support have, to put it politely, been somewhat misleading. Both parties have made promises to ethnic minorities which the leadership at least had little intention of or interest in keeping. To cite only one example, in 1944 President Roosevelt and his political aides were concerned that the large Polish-American vote in the United States

[29] Personal communication, December 23, 1975.

[30] Weed, p. 173.

[31] Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President 1972* (New York: Atheneum, 1973), p. 369.

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might be alienated from the Democratic party because of concessions that the administration had made or would likely make to the Soviet Union over the future territorial boundaries and regime of Poland. On the urging of his associates Roosevelt agreed to see a delegation from the Polish-American Congress led by its chairman, Charles Rozmarek. The president "allowed photographers to take a picture of the delegation shaking hands with him in front of a large map of Poland on which the prewar boundaries extending far to the east into territory now held by Russia, were marked in heavy ink. In the remaining weeks of the campaign, Democrats arranged for the publication of this photograph in Polish-language papers across the nation, leading many to believe the President backed the London government in rejecting the Curzon line."[32] The fact was, however, that the administration never had any serious intention of pressing for the prewar Polish boundaries, some of which extended almost 200 miles east of the Curzon line. Indeed, at the Tehran Conference, Roosevelt had more or less accepted the Curzon line as the legitimate eastern boundary for postwar Poland.

The second point to be considered with regard to presidential politics and American policy toward Eastern Europe is that for the mass of ethnic voters foreign policy does *not* seem to have been a decisive criterion in electoral choice. Party promises of a tough policy in Eastern Europe may have been important for ethnic group leadership—and at times may have been seen by the parties themselves as effective in swaying the mass of ethnic voters—but the evidence is that most voters have not in fact been especially influenced in this regard. The Republicans, for instance, made a major effort to win over the Polish-American vote in 1944. Despite Roosevelt's guile on the Polish issue, Dewey and other Republican politicians ran a very intense and skillful campaign accusing the administration of selling out Polish interests to the Soviets. The Republican strategy caused a great deal of concern in Democratic circles. Yet Republican candidates did far worse in industrial districts with a high ethnic concentration than they had in 1940. What happened was perceived quite clearly by Senator Vandenberg in a letter to one of his constituents in Michigan: "I can fully understand that most of the Polish-Americans in our own Michigan area are also in the CIO and that these labor considerations were much too strong to be offset by any doubtful considerations in behalf of the old fatherland."[33] Indeed, other concerns have on balance definitely outweighed foreign policy issues in the voting choices of Eastern European ethnics. Mainly these have fallen in the economic realm but recently the so-called social issue has loomed important as well. Concern about a deterioration in traditional American values, forced measures of racial integration, and law and order moved ethnics in 1972, for instance, to support

[32] Robert A. Divine, *Foreign Policy and Presidential Elections 1940-1948* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), p. 140.

[33] Martin Weil, "Can the Blacks do for Africa what the Jews did for Israel?" *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1974):112.

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Richard Nixon in record numbers, despite the fact that the Republican platform was totally silent on the question of the "enslaved" Eastern European nations. The Democratic platform applauded steps toward normalization of American relations with the Soviet Union but also called for a mobilization of world opinion to help the "oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe" maintain their culture and religion. The Democrats also urged that pressure be brought to achieve liberalized emigration practices in these countries.[34] None of this, however, seemed to affect the rush of ethnic votes from the Democratic to the Republican camp. This swing was all the more striking in view of the fact that the Nixon administration's policies had implied acquiescence in the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.

APPEALS TO PUBLIC OPINION

Given the fact that Eastern European ethnic organizations had little influence on the foreign policy professionals, they had two principal alternative means by which they could seek to bring pressure for a change in policy. One of these involved using the power of the ballot. The other pointed to a strategy of arousing public opinion in general against the present course of American diplomacy. To be sure, the two modes of action were related—a ground swell of sentiment against American policy in Eastern Europe might have at least some repercussions at the polls. Yet appeals to the public as a whole had broader implications. Given a perception at the State Department, for instance, that there is a wide consensus among the public for a certain stance, the credibility and impact of groups pressing for such a stance is bound to be greater. The case of Israel is a classic example. The so-called Israel lobby has great influence in part because they are seen as reflecting a general attitude among all Americans—Jew and non-Jew alike. Efforts of Eastern European ethnic leadership to arouse support for their cause among Americans with no ethnic ties to East Central Europe are thus worthy of examination.

As one astute study has concluded, the efficacy of ethnic appeals to the American people have depended very much on the degree to which the relevant ethnic group could demonstrate that their appeal was basically an expression of American nationalism rather than, say, Polish or Hungarian nationalism. The message has to stress those values and ideals that Americans in fact consider as the essence of the American way of life. The Polish-American Congress after World War II, for example, under the leadership of Charles Rozmarek insisted that fundamentally they were interested in the establishment in Poland of a free press, parliamentary institutions, secure civil liberties, and the free enterprise system. Whether in the absence of Soviet pressures in Poland such ideals would have been spread by the postwar Polish regime was not a question that in the circumstances had to be answered. Another important factor in the ethnic leadership's attempt to rally American public opinion

[34] *Congressional Digest* (October 1972), p. 249.

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was their assurance that as far as they personally were concerned America was now their permanent home. They were not asking the American people to make sacrifices simply so that they could repatriate themselves to a more congenial Poland. On the contrary what they were pressing for was a Poland that could provide at least some of the blessings of American life to those who had not had the good fortune to be able to emigrate to the United States.[35]

Perhaps the most notable, certainly the most visible, effort to stir American opinion concerning conditions in Eastern Europe has been the Captive Nations Resolution mentioned earlier. Passed unanimously by Congress on July 17, 1959, it provided for the establishment of a "Captive Nations Week" to fall annually in the third week of July "until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world." Among the latter were cited not only all the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe but also such areas as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Byelorussia, Georgia, Idel-Ural, Cossackia, and Turkestan. On first impression, passage of the CNR would seem to have been indicative of considerable political clout among ethnic groups in Congress. In reality it seems to have been passed without much thought as to its implications. The resolution itself was adopted verbatim from a draft submitted by Professor Lev Dobriansky of Georgetown University and was not even sent to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations for approval. One commentator caught the flavor of the occasion in saying that the resolution had simply been churned out "along with other casual holiday proclamations, such as National Hot Dog Month."[36] It is apparent that few—or, in this instance, none—in the Congress wanted to be put on record as opposing freedom for the captive peoples.

The CNR was formalized as Public Law 86-90, and each July after a presidential proclamation of Captive Nations Week the public is invited to observe the week "with appropriate prayer, ceremonies and activities expressing their sympathy with and support for the just aspirations of the captive peoples." Publicity attendant on the occasion has ebbed since the original resolution was passed but it still continues to receive some attention. In July 1975, for instance, there were remarks in the Congress on Captive Nations Week by such congressmen as Zablocki of Wisconsin and Badillo of New York and senators Hruska of Nebraska and Helms of North Carolina. In fealty to the call of the CNR, the mayors of Providence, Rhode Island; New Haven, Connecticut; Mobile, Alabama; Youngstown, Ohio; and Elizabeth, New Jersey, all issued proclamations noting Captive Nations Week.[37] In New York City, Msgr. John Balkunas marked the opening of Captive Nations Week with a mass at St. Patrick's Cathedral and there was a round of speeches and parades

[35] Weil, p. 117-18.

[36] Gerson, p. 26-27.

[37] U.S., *Congressional Record*, vol. 121, no. 118. 94th Congress, 1st Session (July 23, 1975), pp. H7358-7359.

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in other parts of the city commemorating the occasion.[38] Governor Meldrim Thomson of New Hampshire was the lone governor to issue a proclamation on Captive Nations Week. His statement accompanying the proclamation took his fellow governors to task for not giving the week the attention it deserved and he assured the captive nations that "the people of New Hampshire share with them our aspirations for the recovery of their freedom and independence."[39]

In assessing the effectiveness of ethnic group activity in the mobilization of public opinion, several observations may be offered. There is no question but that the impact and hence the presumed efficacy of measures such as Captive Nations Week are at a low point today. To be sure, the American public may be increasingly critical of détente but this does not amount to a revived concern about the specific situation in Eastern Europe. Governor Thompson's complaint was echoed in a mournful editorial in the *New York Sunday News*, which said that "as far as official Washington is concerned . . . minimal, dutiful attention will be accorded to the occasion. Sad to relate, Captive Nations Week has come to be regarded by many of our leaders as a disquieting, embarrassing ghost from the past haunting détente banqueters."[40] Senator Helms took note of the very vague language of President Ford's proclamation of Captive Nations Week and pointed out a significant substitution of language in some presidential remarks shortly before Ford signed the Helsinki treaty on European Security and Cooperation. The original draft of the president's speech noted that "United States policy supports the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe by every peaceful means." This was changed in the actual address to "United States policy supports the aspirations for freedom and national independence of peoples everywhere." As Helms correctly noted, this reduced the statement to a "bland generality of no significance whatsoever."[41] Also of interest is the fact that of those in Congress who did address themselves to Captive Nations Week the message with respect to Eastern Europe was hardly in line with the original spirit of the CNR. Charles Whalen, Jr. (R-Ohio), for example, insisted that "détente is a noble objective" and he saw evidence of an increasing Soviet inclination toward "reasonableness." His hope simply was that this latter might gradually be extended to granting the right of "individual nationalities to determine their own destinies."[42]

Examining the overall record since 1945, it seems evident that in those periods in which American opinion was generally disposed to be anticommunist or anti-Soviet, the appeals of Eastern European ethnic groups have been received with some sympathy. It is important to stress, however, that these

[38] *The New York Times*, July 14, 1975, p. 28.

[39] U.S., *Congressional Record*, vol. 121, no. 123. 94th Congress, 1st Session (July 29, 1975), pp. S14120–14121.

[40] Ibid., vol. 121, no. 118 (July 23, 1975), p. H7359.

[41] Ibid., vol. 121, no. 123 (July 29, 1975), p. S14120.

[42] Ibid., vol. 121, no. 117 (July 22, 1975), p. E399.

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groups by their efforts have only produced an added edge to the general viewpoint that already existed. At the most, they have been able at times to focus attention on a specific issue in which Soviet behavior was perhaps most reprehensible and which might be made good if the United States "won" the cold war. The exertions of the Polish-American Congress were effective in the late 1940s precisely because the American public was increasingly hostile to the Soviet Union for reasons above and beyond the situation in Eastern Europe. What the ethnic groups cannot do is to turn American opinion in a totally different direction, particularly if the administration has put its own public relations apparatus behind a given policy. As Professor Milbrath comments, "The ability of interest groups specializing in foreign policy to affect broad public opinion on foreign policy is severely limited. Compared to the power of the President in this respect, their direct impact on opinion is miniscule. . . . The basic difficulty is that few people listen to group propaganda. Only as part of a concerted campaign, in close collaboration with public officials, are group propaganda efforts likely to attract sufficient attention to have even a slight effect."[43]

Two other factors bearing on the efforts of ethnic groups to mobilize opinion on Eastern Europe may be mentioned. One concerns their relationship with the press. Certainly, if a campaign to arouse the general public is to succeed, the relevant ethnic organizations have to find press outlets going beyond their own foreign-language media. To a large degree, however, they find the same obstacles to having their views represented, at least in the national press, as in the State Department. Most influential journalists and editors stress that their job is to inform the public generally and objectively. Their perception of the ethnic lobby is that it has only narrow interests and even these are presented in a warped fashion. Journalists are wary of the "hobby horse mentality" displayed by the ethnic spokesmen fully as much as official policy makers. Finally, there is a general prejudice in the press against the legitimacy of special interest groups, at least in foreign policy, since they seem to represent the particular as opposed to the general interest, which the press at least in theory is designed to serve.[44]

There is also the social-cultural factor. It was precisely the fact that the "new immigration" found it harder to assimilate than the older Western and Northern European emigrants that contributed to an enduring sense of ethnic identification in this country amongst Poles, Slovaks, etc. This ethnic bond fostered a continuing devotion to the fortunes of their countries of origin. The "separateness," which resulted from WASP prejudice and shaped political consciousness, proved to be an obstacle when Eastern European ethnic groups made appeals to the general American public for support for the homeland. Bluntly put, a campaign organized to insure that there will always be an England falls on an audience that is likely to be receptive. A similar

[43] Milbrath, pp. 250–51.
[44] Chittick, pp. 261–266.

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campaign for American help to the oppressed of Ruthenia or Bulgaria runs the risk of arousing the antagonisms that Ruthenians and Bulgarians themselves met when they came to the United States. Woodrow Wilson described the new immigration in the following terms: "There came multitudes of men of lowest class from the south of Italy and men of the meaner sort out of Hungary and Poland, men out of the ranks where there was neither skill nor energy nor any initiative of quick intelligence and they came in numbers which increased from year to year, as if the countries of the south of Europe were disburdening themselves of the more sordid and hapless elements of their population."[45] It was this sort of attitude—shared not by everyone but by enough—that Eastern European ethnics had to contend with in asking the American public to support an expenditure of treasure and even blood for those left behind.

Ethnicity and Foreign Policy

The normative question remains: What after all is the legitimate role of various ethnic groups in the United States in the definition and pursuit of the national interest? I have attempted to show that Americans of Eastern European ethnic origin have not in fact had much influence on American diplomacy toward Eastern Europe. Whether they should have been given a larger voice is a matter that deserves some consideration. It relates to a broader question, namely, the place of ethnic consciousness in American society in general. Under the old "melting pot" ideal, ethnic separatism was deplored: the goal was to convert successive waves of new emigrants to a common Americanism. More recently the legitimacy of a continued sense of ethnic bonds has been strongly defended. One of the leading spokesmen for this view writes that "the new ethnic politics is not, in the end, interest politics. It is cultural politics. It is the seizing of one's own finite, concrete, social identity upon this huge, interrelated planet."[46] Of course, one may accept that a strong sense of ethnicity may be important as far as maintaining one's identity within American society is concerned without at the same time approving the injection of this ethnic consciousness into the foreign policy process. Many students of American diplomacy would continue to support the basic idea—if not the flamboyant language—of an item in the Democratic party's platform in the 1916 presidential election. The platform denounced "all alliances and combinations of individuals in this country, of whatever nationality or descent, who agree and conspire together for the purpose of embarrassing or weakening our government or of improperly influencing or coercing our public representatives in dealing or negotiating with any foreign

[45] Woodrow Wilson, *History of the American People* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1902), pp. 212–13.

[46] Novak, p. 289.

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power."[47] At the very least it is hard to disagree with Charles Maynes's comment that there is a "possibility of very negative consequences following from a new intersection between American ethnicity and American foreign policy . . . ethnicity alone, divorced from larger foreign policy values or goals, can be a highly disruptive diplomatic wild card, working in unpredictable ways that can be destructive of national interests and priorities."[48]

It would be fatuous to pretend that we can resolve the complex problems related to ethnicity and foreign policy here. A few brief observations on how we might at least approach the problem can, however, be offered. If the point of American foreign policy is to defend the national interest, certainly that interest involves at least the following elements: the physical security of the United States, the protection and advancement of our economic well being, the preservation of our democratic institutions and, finally, the maintenance of what might be called the "national morale." The latter is the most amorphous element in the national interest, but this does not reduce its importance. National morale means general feelings of moral self-respect, confidence in the future, and pride in the country. It is obviously shaped by the course of domestic social, political, and economic events. It is also influenced by the nation's international situation, however, and I would suggest that it is in this particular respect that ethnic consciousness has its most evident role in the determination of American foreign policy, that is to say, of the American national interest. Judgments on what is necessary to secure the continued physical survival of the United States hardly seem an appropriate object for ethnic pressures. However, if large ethnic populations consider the safety and welfare of their compatriots in the homeland to be an important factor in their personal "morale," there is no inherent reason why American foreign policy should not give at least some attention to this fact, particularly when one of the supposed strengths of American society is precisely its rich pluralistic character. It seems inconsistent to praise this characteristic as important to the vitality and unique character of America while denying it any place in our foreign policy. Sticky problems do remain, however. One involves the kind of message that an ethnic group will or properly should give policy makers and also the matter of representativeness: what does a given ethnic community really consist of and who is qualified to speak for it? Both of these points bear on judgments we may make on the legitimate and/or possible relationship between ethnicity and foreign policy.

MULTIPLE MESSAGES

Throughout this essay I have assumed that the basic thrust of ethnic pressure on American diplomacy toward East Central Europe was for a "harder"

[47] Cited in Gerson, p. 65.

[48] Charles W. Maynes, "The Domestic Requirements of a Successful Foreign Policy," in *Proceedings of the National Security Affairs Conference*, July 14–15, 1975 (Washington, D.C.: the National War College, 1975).

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line. There were variations on this theme at times, however, and the ethnic lobby on Eastern Europe was in fact subjected to cross-pressures not touched on so far.

The first point that might be mentioned is that immigrants to the United States have historically been solidly isolationist. Fleeing from hard experiences in their homeland, their instinct was to have the United States remain as free as possible from the corrupting influence of the Old World. These isolationist instincts, of course, varied in different parts of the country—the Midwest is considered the heartland of isolationist feelings—but for our purposes what is important is that to the extent ethnic groups called on the American government to intervene in Eastern Europe, they were proposing just the sort of expansion of American involvement in the world that they resisted in other circumstances.[49] Perhaps more fundamental to the dilemma of many East European ethnics, however, was the fact that their interests as far as the homeland was concerned were really twofold, and satisfaction of the one could and did conflict with the other. Most of them were opposed to the internal Communist regimes of the area and would have welcomed their ouster in favor of governments supposedly more true to the will of the people. At the same time, they were also nationalists and thus committed to freedom of action for Eastern Europe vis-à-vis the Soviets. These strong nationalistic feelings were as strong or stronger than their anticommunism. One way to support national independence was to press American policymakers to extend economic and diplomatic support to the Eastern European regimes. The latter could use this support to extend their independence from the Soviet Union (in the manner, say, of Yugoslavia). Aid to the regime, however, had the effect of strengthening its hold over its own people. The question then really became which was more important: greater freedom for the homeland from the Soviets or opposition to communism per se. One need only look at the debate among Americans of Yugoslav extraction following the start of American economic and military aid to Yugoslavia in 1950 to observe how difficult a choice this was. Also of interest is the reaction of the Polish-American community after the successful defiance of the Russians by Gomulka in 1956. In a startling turnaround most Polish ethnic groups in this country now *supported* American aid to Poland as a measure to insure the continuance of Polish autonomy. Indeed the State Department actually went to Polish-American organizations and formed an alliance with them to get the Polish aid program through Congress.[50] These organizations later lost enthusiasm for Gomulka and reverted to a tougher stance when it became apparent that internal liberalization in Poland and freedom from Russian dictation were less than had been expected in 1956. However, the whole episode illustrated the

[49] Paul Seabury, *Power, Freedom and Diplomacy* (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), pp. 43–47.

[50] For a discussion of aid to Poland, see Stephen S. Kaplan, "United States Aid to Poland, 1957–1964: Concerns, Objectives, and Obstacles," *Western Political Quarterly* (March 1975): 147–166.

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complexity of the ethnic's relationship with his homeland which was somewhat submerged in the ritual calls for liberation evident particularly in the 1950s. The point is that even if one accepts as proper an important ethnic influence in foreign policy, it is not always clear in what direction that influence will lead. Moreover, it is the nature of the message itself that may and in my view should determine how large that influence is. Indiscriminate calls by East European ethnics for a grand American offensive in Eastern Europe hardly provided a framework within which their influence on foreign policy could be maximized. The conduct of the Polish community in 1956 was a more promising model.

RIVAL REPRESENTATIVES

Arriving at a consensus on what an ethnic lobby's message should be to the policymakers is not simply a matter of debating the merits of alternative approaches. The fact is that the whole concept of a single "message" from an ethnic "lobby" presupposes a degree of unity within the relevant ethnic grouping that may be quite absent. Throughout our discussion we have used the phrase ethnic lobby but when it comes down to it, we have been studying the activities only of those vocal organizations claiming to speak for the ethnic community. It is clear that two basic problems in establishing a proper role for ethnic groups in American foreign policy are sociological and organizational: generational, economic and social splits within an ethnic community that make it difficult to determine whether a consensus *does* in fact exist for a given foreign policy stance, and the existence of various formal lobbying groups that may or may not be reflective of the ethnic group generally and the leadership of which may or may not in fact be in touch with the membership itself.

On the matter of Communist governments in Eastern Europe, for example, it is of interest that many of the earlier Eastern European immigrants to the United States were radical in their politics. Socialism and even anarchism were philosophies held by many. The strident anticommunist rhetoric of the most visible ethnic lobbying organizations in, say, the 1950s was hardly consistent with this tradition. An important segment of the earlier immigration was also Jewish and as Jews they had little reason to desire a return by the Eastern European regimes to the quasi-fascist politics of the interwar years, when antisemitism was a common political theme.[51] It is notable, in this connection, that many of the Communist elite in Eastern Europe in the early post-1945 years were themselves of Jewish background. In terms of social origin, there is also the fact that immigration from Eastern Europe at the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth centuries was primarily composed of the uneducated and the unskilled. Those involved were mainly from rural areas and their interest in coming to the United States was

[51] Novak, pp. 139, 188–190.

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essentially economic. By contrast, those who left Eastern Europe after 1945 were far better educated and in general held positions of relative prominence in their homeland, including political positions. It was natural that they should lead in bitter denunciations of the course of events in Eastern Europe and by virtue of their background they tended to assume leadership in those ethnic organizations actively interested in foreign policy.[52] Finally, to speak of the "Eastern European ethnic lobby" is to disguise the fact that in many instances nationalistic rivalries among various Eastern European ethnic groups were as important as the common bonds they shared. The Hungarian and Rumanian communities in the United States, for instance, may have agreed that the Soviets were not to be trusted, but at the same time they were in violent disagreement over whether in the "postliberation era" Hungary or Rumania should have possession of Transylvania. The point is that old quarrels from Eastern Europe itself were carried to the United States and frequently made the notion of a united Eastern European ethnic lobby illusory.

In sum, any debate over the appropriate role of an American ethnic community in American diplomacy has to begin by defining and explicating that community itself. I would suggest that one of the tragedies of the Eastern European ethnic input in Amrican foreign policy has been that the voices that have spoken for the community—or at least have been perceived as speaking for it—have in fact reflected only a very partial measure of the insight and humanity of Eastern European ethnics as a whole. That Americans of Eastern Europe ethnic background should remain concerned about the condition of their fellows in the homeland seems to me not only logical but laudable. The problem has always been to place this concern within the context of the larger national interest of their adopted land. At least judging from the actions of the most vocal ethnic groups of the 1950s and 1960s this problem never came near to solution. Given greater moderation and subtlety in the rhetoric—and perhaps a broader perspective as the more immediate memory of the homeland fades—it may yet be solved.

[52] Weed, p. 184.

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Book Reviews

Nuclear Weapons and World Politics *by David C. Gompert, Michael Mandelbaum, Richard L. Garwin, and John H. Barton. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1977. 370 pp., $6.95.*

For more than three decades scholars and statesmen have pondered the impact of nuclear weapons on international politics. Have nuclear weapons been a positive force in world politics, creating a stable balance of terror between the United States and the Soviet Union? Or have they been a baleful influence, providing the world a fragile peace at the cost of threatening catastrophic destruction?

If the choice were ours, what sort of nuclear future would we wish for the world? Would we eliminate nuclear weapons altogether? Or proliferate them and extend the benefits of nuclear deterrance to all nations? Would we prefer to maintain the current nuclear regime, which for all its faults has not seen a nuclear weapon exploded in anger since 1945? Or would we give nuclear weapons a lower profile, reducing the role they play in international politics?

Every informed citizen probably has a clear preference for one of the four nuclear futures just described. But few of us have considered our choice in any depth. We hold intensely to our preference, but seldom reflect on the assumptions and consequences of our choice. *Nuclear Weapons and World Politics* is a welcome volume precisely because it forces us to think through the implications of our preferred nuclear future. It explores the vast but surprisingly seldom visited territory between detailed evaluation of armaments and policies and general expressions of satisfaction or discontent with the current nuclear situation.

Each of the volume's four authors sets out a nuclear alternative for the future and then examines the values, goals, premises, and implications of the regime. Michael Mandelbaum defends the nuclear status quo, and argues that the current regime will serve as a force for moderation and stability in the years ahead. Richard Garwin proposes a second nuclear regime that would reduce dependence on nuclear weapons through a series of arms control measures, bilaterally negotiated if possible, unilaterally adopted if necessary. The third regime, advanced by John Barton, sees nuclear weapons

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as an intolerable long-term threat to global security and proposes a denuclearized world as an alternative. David Gompert sketches a gloomy fourth regime of widespread nuclear proliferation and significant nuclear imbalance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Michael Mandelbaum's eloquent defense of the existing nuclear order is perhaps the most interesting essay in the book. The current nuclear arrangement comes in for much more criticism than praise these days, and it is time someone pointed out that there are a few silver linings in the mushroom cloud. But Mandelbaum plays Pangloss a little too enthusiastically. He attributes the nuclear peace of the past thirty years in part to the strategic equilibrium of the United States and Soviet Union. For most of the past three decades, however, the United States was the nuclear *superior* of the Soviet Union. Many analysts would contend that it was American superiority which kept the cold war from going hot. Strategic equality between the superpowers is a fairly new phenomenon in world politics, and we should be cautious in projecting it as the best prescription for peace in the years ahead. On the whole, Mandelbaum does an excellent job proclaiming the virtues of the current state of nuclear affairs.

The appeal of the existing nuclear regime is reinforced by David Gompert's description of how very much worse things might be in a deteriorated nuclear environment. Richard Garwin's vision of a nuclear future which de-emphasizes nuclear weapons and politics should appeal to those disillusioned with the current regime and interested in how much the United States could do unilaterally to alter the rules of the game.

John Barton's description of a denuclearized world is the most educative of the four essays. As a long-term goal, many of us might impulsively share President Carter's often-expressed commitment to a world of no nuclear weapons. Barton attempts to put as optimistic a face as he can on such a world, but he is too astute an analyst to gloss over the problems that would attend a totally denuclearized world order. Such a world might not have nuclear weapons, but the knowledge of how to build such weapons would be impossible to eradicate. There would be tremendous temptations to renuclearize. Suspicion and anxiety would abound. Barton is quite right to conclude that so long as the world remains divided into sovereign nation-states, the abolition of nuclear weapons is neither feasible nor particularly desirable.

Each of us is entitled to develop a preferred view of the nuclear future. There is no grand design, no secret formula for peace in the nuclear age. Each alternative must make difficult calculations of perceived benefits and potential costs. It behooves us to examine more carefully than we have in the past the implications of our preference. How will conflicts be resolved in our preferred system? How flexible will such a regime be? How feasible is it?

The nuclear age is an endless minefield, as David Gompert reminds us in the introduction to this book. We will need more than intuition to guide us safely through the hazards. *Nuclear Weapons and World Politics* is an excellent evaluation of various routes which we might follow.

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Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study *by Richard Cottam. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977. 374 pp. $12.50.*

Richard Cottam's recent book approaches the study of foreign policy through an analysis of decision makers' motives and perceptions. Although the relationships between the two are not adequately discussed—and the author's statement that perceptual "patterns, once described, are the tools used to infer . . . motivations" (p. 313) does not help—the analysis and the supporting case studies are filled with important insights.

Dissatisfied with the academic treatment of foreign policy motives which, the author notes, are less rich than the decision makers' discussions, Cottam develops his own typology. With the main headings of "economic," "communal," "messianic," "governmental," and "defense" and sub-classifications within each of these, he has provided a useful check list. Although alternative classification schemes may be more appropriate to some cases, Cottam's serves him well in his own analysis. Problems arise, however, in going further. Cottam realizes that "a motivational compound is far more than the sum of its parts" (p. 43), but does not provide us with the tools for this kind of understanding. Furthermore, we receive little guidance on the terribly difficult question of how to determine what a decision maker's motives were. Although his analysis of particular cases is usually plausible, there is no way to rule out competing explanations.

Cottam's discussion of perception is built around five ideal types of images of other states: "enemy," "allied," "imperial" (the perception of the other as inferior to the state in culture and power), "colonial" (the perception of the other as superior to the state on both these dimensions), and "complex." The final ideal type is never better defined than "reality . . . in all its complexity" (p. 65), and it forms a pole in four different continua, each of which has as its other pole one of the other four ideal types. The problem is that this means that by definition the view of another state as an enemy will be greatly distorted. There may well be an empirical correlation here—and an important one—but it must be demonstrated rather than built into the analytical scheme. Chamberlain's view of Nazi Germany approximated the "complex" ideal type and Churchill's view approximated the "enemy," but the latter was much closer to "reality in all its complexity" than was the former. For Cottam, "complex" is almost a synonym for "accurate." This creates intellectual as well as semantic confusion. Images can be equally complex but differ greatly in accuracy and the determinants of one may be different from the determinants of the other.

Cottam is on firmer ground when he examines British perceptions and motives in six key episodes in Anglo-Egyptian relations from 1876 to 1956. Although readers may not always agree with his conclusions—and I would dissent from his claim that the most important motive in the British intervention in Egypt in 1882 was "an increasing sense of humiliation" (p. 207)—they always convey a good sense of what was happening and what the world views of the participants were. No trace of condescension or hindsight mars his presentation of the beliefs of the diverse actors on the scene.

What is perhaps most important in this discussion of these cases is Cottam's view of what might be called "rationalizing man." Once a statesman has decided what he must do, he will often bring his perceptions into line so as to minimize psychological conflict. Thus the degree to which British perceptions of Egypt approach the "imperial" ideal type is best explained not by the available evidence about Egyptian politics and society, but by the

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degree to which Britain feels threatened by another great power. A serious threat means that the canal must be protected; protection of the canal requires tighter control over Egypt; tighter control requires—psychologically—the belief that the Egyptians are not yet capable of self-government, that unrest in Egypt is caused by unrepresentative agitators, and that British rule is in the country's interest and is recognized to be by most of the populace. This image changed startlingly after the First World War and Britain granted Egypt a large measure of autonomy. But the reason was not that Egypt had changed or that British statesmen had suddenly learned to understand underdeveloped countries, but that the costs of maintaining control were now too high.

This argument is most persuasive in the case of the latter change. But in several other cases increased information about Egypt, filtered through the prevailing view of colonial societies, would also account for the perceptual alterations. Furthermore, Cottam's argument that from 1898 to 1914 the British image of Egypt moved away from the imperial type because of a decreased perception of foreign threat (p. 240) is open to criticism on the ground that while the danger of French intervention vanished, the fear of Germany more than took its place.

Regardless of any disagreements on this particular case, Cottam has raised an important issue. To what extent and under what conditions do man's perceptions represent his best efforts at appraisal of reality and to what extent and under what conditions are they influenced by desires and the drive to minimize psychological discomfort? Psychologists have not been able to answer this question in the easier realm of controlled laboratory studies and we cannot expect that our own progress will be more rapid. But it is by contributions like Cottam's that we can hope to increase our understanding of these complex phenomena.

ROBERT L. JERVIS
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Toward New Human Rights: The Social Policies of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations *edited by David C. Warner. Austin, The Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, 1977. 448 pp. $5.95.*

In September 1976 a conference to discuss the social programs enacted during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations was held at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs. There were panels to review the Kennedy-Johnson programs in the areas of employment, health, housing, education, and civil rights. In preparation for the meeting, a number of well-known scholars and policy makers in each of these policy areas were commissioned to write working papers. These papers were intended to be used to frame and organize the discussion which took place at the conference. To illustrate the notoriety of the contributors, the working papers for the panel on health care were written by Wilbur Cohen, Theodore Marmor, Karen Davis, and David Warner. The book consists of these papers and the brief summary comments made by the rapporteurs at the end of each of the panels.

This background information is important in any review of *Toward New Human Rights* because the papers were not written for a scholarly audience or a professional

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journal, but were intended for a broader and more general audience. The objective of this anthology is not to formulate theoretical statements or suggest new avenues of research; instead, it is to address the concerns of those special and interested "publics" who play a role in the policy-making process.

The substantive policy objective of the book is to publicize and favorably evaluate the social policy initiatives of these two administrations. All of the contributors can be characterized as "supportive" of the programmatic thrust of the New Frontier and the Great Society. The papers are intended as a response to the growing criticism of these programs. Almost all of the contributors allude to the current conservative mood of the nation and the widespread attacks on these programs. They note that many of these programs—such as Title 1 (compensatory education), model cities, and community development efforts with respect to manpower—had apparently little success in achieving their goals. Still other programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, while aiding their intended beneficiaries, had deleterious side-effects (for example, higher medical costs). The antipoverty/manpower programs of these administrations had, at best, a limited success with respect to minority employment. The authors attempt to rebut these critiques of government efforts to aid the disadvantaged; they seek to persuade the reader that the "new federalism" and limited government are not the paths to follow.

The organization of the book reflects this objective. The volume has six sections, five of which cover the policy initiatives in various substantive areas. Each of these five sections follows a similar format. The initial articles provide the historical background by focusing on the changes resulting from the various programs. The papers which follow focus on current problems and issues. Taken as a whole, these sections attempt to persuade the reader that significant advances were made and that the solutions to the remaining problems call for more, not less, government intervention.

Unfortunately, the argument of *Toward New Human Rights* is not persuasive. The core of the difficulty stems from the failure to analyze the structural limitations of the American political system. Throughout the volume, the various authors note that the Kennedy-Johnson social programs were enacted as a result of compromises with opposing interests. Medicare and Medicaid went through Congress after the providers of medical services and supplies had been placated. The 1968 housing act, which provided subsidized housing for low-income families, depended on incentives to the private housing industry. In short, the lesson of the Kennedy-Johnson years appears to be that government programs intended to benefit the disadvantaged will only partially succeed, at best, in achieving that objective; all efforts at reform are circumscribed by the power of the private sector to limit the expenditures available for such programs and by the power of provider groups to protect their occupational interests. This contextual understanding of our political system leads one to a much more limited and realistic view of the possibilities of using government to redress the inequities of the market place. Unfortunately, *Toward New Human Rights* views the contending interests as complementary, thereby promoting the illusion that government can be a significant force for change.

STEPHEN DAVID
Fordham University

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A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Washington *by Hugh Heclo. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1977. 272 pp. Cloth, $10.95; paper, $4.50.*

Between 1973 and 1976, the author had extensive discussions with about 200 active and former government executives, including both political executives and senior servants. This book draws on these discussions to describe and analyze the struggle in every new administration between political leadership and bureaucratic power. The title of the book dramatizes the fact that political appointees in a new administration in Washington do not share a group commitment to political leadership in the executive branch and therefore constitute a government of strangers.

The subject matter of this book is the every-day conduct of the top people in government. It explores the process by which high-ranking political executives and bureaucrats interact, take the measure of each other, and try to direct programs by controlling government personnel. The author hopes to provide useful clues and guidelines for political and bureaucratic executives on how to learn on the job more quickly and effectively and to develop "the statecraft of political administration" (p. 3).

The relationship of political executives and bureaucrats lies at "the heart of modern democratic government." It is a relationship that "persists as one of the linchpins of effective government performance" (p. 6). One of the main emphases here is the identification and analysis of the service and resistance that bureaucrats can offer to political executives.

The author presents a number of thoughtful insights into the problems facing a new administration. Presidential campaigns, he notes, do not produce action programs that can be legislated and then put into operation by the bureaucracy. The president's executive team is likely to be poorly organized; teams of political executives are created after rather than before a government is formed. White House operations may make the president's office a slow-moving bureaucracy by sucking problems into the White House, by complicating major choices with irrelevant details, by sending out confused signals in the president's name. And "if political leadership in the bureaucracy depends mainly on what the President can supply, there is unlikely to be enough to go around" (p. 14).

The author inevitably concentrates on the pathologies of administrative leadership in the federal government. For example, the opportunities for political executives to provide fresh directions are severely limited; executive institutions are highly accessible to outside pressure; Congress is more inclined today to participate in detailed administrative decisions; courts have become increasingly involved in administration of programs. He also concludes that "hard-pressed political executives can find themselves nominally in charge of not only a particular government agency but of a societal process in which it is difficult to have any clear idea of who is responsible for what is happening" (pp. 18–19).

The relationship of political appointees and top civil servants operates in a "smudgy zone," a "ragged terrain," and "jagged, blurred, and variable boundaries." The dominant characteristic of the executive environment is uncertainty. One of the primary

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pressures is the bureaucratization of political leadership and the politicizing of the bureaucracy.

Many of the author's observations and conclusions are scarcely original, but the second half of the book does cover some new ground in examining how political executives "try to cope with the resident experts in bureaucratic power and vice versa" (p. 153). Here the author analyzes the strategies that political executives may employ if they want to be productive. He argues that "political executives can usually do better by evoking conditional cooperation rather than by invoking their authority" (p. 220).

In concentrating on the constraints and pathologies of life at the top of federal administration, the author risks exaggeration. He offers a lively and instructive manual for those committed to mastering the statecraft of political administration. His limitation is that he does not provide a usable explanation of how some useful things do get done in Washington.

MARVER H. BERNSTEIN
Brandeis University

Grassroots: The Autobiography of George McGovern *by George McGovern. New York, Random House, 1977. 307 pp. $12.50.*

In 1972 my first, sinking apprehension that once again I was backing a losing presidential candidate came in June when Hubert Humphrey, his campaign in organizational shambles and financial disarray, desperately challenged his front-running rival to a series of television debates in the closing days of the crucial California primary. As the centerpiece of a mildly redistributionist economic platform, McGovern had proposed a $1000 demogrant. An agile debater, Humphrey assaulted the plan as a massive welfare give-away and quite reasonably called upon its author to deliver a firm estimate of its cost. McGovern, to the despair of his supporters, flunked the test. He neither refuted the deadly welfare tag nor advanced a credible account of his plan's financing. Before a national audience, he gave an excellent demonstration of how to look foolish in public.

Sad in itself, the episode is sadder because on the evidence of this volume, McGovern has learned so little. Here is how he recalls the episode:

> I approached the debate as the virtual nominee of the party needing the support of Humphrey and his followers if I were to defeat Nixon. I had no interest in attacking Hubert or in embarrassing him. Quite the contrary, I was chiefly concerned about doing nothing that might anger his supporters. Thus the stage was set for a damaging last-minute Humphrey attack without adequate rejoinder on my part. . . . I . . . know that Hubert in retrospect came to share my regret that those destructive encounters ever took place (p. 185).

As McGovern seems still not to grasp, the "destructive" impact of the debate was its lurid revelation of him as a candidate who didn't understand his own policies or care about their costs.

The debate was paradigmatic. Confusion and uncertainty turned the Eagleton affair

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into a grander disaster. In retrospect McGovern realizes that he should either have stuck grimly with his running mate or disposed of him quickly and decisively. A smaller flap over whether McGovern had or had not authorized Pierre Salinger to converse on his behalf with the North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris buttressed the public perception of McGovern as a well-meaning bumbler. So did the contretemps between Jean Westwood and Lawrence O'Brien over the national chairmanship. Nothing at all was gained when in August McGovern withdrew his ill-presented demogrant and substituted a conventional program of tax reform concocted by his Brookings advisers.

In this apologia, quite possibly written by McGovern himself, the prose is leaden, the tone is both moralistic and accusatory, and the numerous admissions of error are embedded in self-exculpation. McGovern blames Humphrey for staying too long in the primary race and then sanctioning a challenge to the winner-take-all rule in California; Muskie for withholding his endorsement in the weeks before the convention; Eagleton for concealing his medical history; George Meany for AFL-CIO "neutrality"; the media for concentrating on his blunders and allowing Nixon to get away with hiding in the White House; and the media a second time for failing to pursue *Washington Post* Watergate exposures.

Each complaint is plausible enough but the list omits the major cause of McGovern's disaster, the fatal series of blunders, reversals, and miscues which eventuated in the discovery by the pollsters that a majority of Americans thought Nixon (Nixon!) was personally more reliable than his opponent.

I cannot recall ever reading a book about a good man and an honorable politician that I found as infuriating. Please, George, don't try again.

ROBERT LEKACHMAN
Lehman College, City University of New York

Robert S. Kerr: The Senate Years *by Anne Hodges Morgan. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1977. 337 pp. $12.50.*

Morgan sets out, not to provide "a full-scale biography," but rather to identify the reasons for Robert Kerr's "prominence" as a senator and "to assess his contributions to Oklahoma, the Democratic party, and national politics" (p. vii). Accordingly, Kerr's acquisition of the three things he told his father he wanted in life, "a family, a million dollars, and the governorship of Oklahoma" (p. 7), is dealt with only in an introductory chapter. The remaining seven chapters sketch in considerable detail the episodes and involvements which dominated Kerr's fourteen-year Senate term.

First elected in 1948, Kerr was spared a lengthy apprenticeship by virtue of his prior experience and prominence, his extraordinary confidence and ability, and (Morgan might have added) the variability and erosion of the apprenticeship norm itself. He quickly assumed a leading role in the Senate's refusal to confirm Leland Olds for reappointment to the Federal Power Commission and in legislative efforts to limit natural gas regulation. While such involvements greatly increased Kerr's visibility, they also typed him as a "special-interest, oil-and-gas senator" (p. 136), an identification which Morgan regards

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as primarily responsible for his failure to be taken seriously in his quest for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1952. After that humiliation, as his friend Clinton Anderson recounted in his autobiography, Kerr "put more and more attention into becoming a power in the Senate—and in that field he succeeded mightily." Faced with a re-election contest, he also became even more singleminded in his determination to secure as many projects and benefits as possible for his Oklahoma constituents.

Kerr's later years are thus quite instructive for one who would understand the bases of political power in Congress during the first two postwar decades and the rewards which such power could bring. Showing little interest in party leadership positions, Kerr used his chairmanship of the Public Works Subcommittee on Rivers and Harbors and Flood Control as his main base of operations during the 1950s. Given what Anderson described as "Bob's willingness to make any trade that would give him a lever on someone else's vote," his subcommittee post enabled him to accumulate credits and to promote Arkansas River development and other favored projects with remarkable effectiveness. Meanwhile, Kerr's accession to the second-ranking majority slot on the Finance Committee and to the chairmanship of Aeronautical and Space Sciences made it critically important for the new Democratic administration to develop a cooperative working relationship with him in the 87th Congress. Kerr, as Morgan notes, was in a position to be "the administration's best friend or most effective enemy" (p. 210). His help was crucial to the success of President Kennedy's tax, trade, and space measures, and, by the same token, his continued opposition was a major factor in medicare's defeat. Meanwhile, Kerr enjoyed "virtually a blank check" from the administration for water resource development, and Oklahoma began to overtake California as the leading state in space construction (pp. 217, 233). Kerr died on the first day of 1963, widely referred to as the "uncrowned King of the Senate."

Morgan, having perused the papers of Kerr and other principals as well as the printed record and contemporary journalistic interpretations, provides a thoroughly documented account of Kerr's major involvements. This documentation is a mixed blessing, for she sometimes seems dominated by her sources, piecing them together rather than bringing her own questions to the material or stepping back to explain or generalize. Morgan reports that she generally found the Kerr papers unrevealing; nor, apparently, was she able to muster the alternative sources (or interpretive powers) that would have let her get "inside," or even very far behind the scenes with, the public man. The book will also disappoint those who wish to understand the political conditions which allowed Kerr to assume the role he did in the Senate and in his several committees, for Morgan provides no more than cursory institutional analyses. Her approach to her subject is not totally uncritical, but she too often is content to take his explanation of an action at face value or to accept a favorable characterization of the man, for example, "a man of vision [but] not a visionary" (p. 44), without specifying her criteria of judgment. The book is flawed, then, even given its limited objectives as a political biography. But it is a useful book nonetheless, a diligent amassing of source material and a careful rendering of important episodes that will serve those well who wish later to cover the period or the institution with the broader strokes of analysis and assessment.

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Duke University

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Congressional Staffs: The Invisible Force in American Lawmaking *by Harrison W. Fox, Jr. and Susan Webb Hammond. New York, The Free Press, 1977. 227 pp. $12.95.*

The role and influence of congressional staff have, rather suddenly, become popular subjects for pundits and commentators on the American political scene. Serious observers writing in *CQ* and the *National Journal* have been joined by those with rather more modish concerns, like the *New York Times Magazine*, and even by the annual conventions of political scientists. Because the topic is current and the empirical footings rather loose, this book by Fox and Hammond is especially timely. Based on work that has been conducted over the last several years, it provides us with much the most substantial descriptive baseline we have on the matter.

The construction of the book is awkward. It is built upon two separate dissertations, one by Fox on Senate staffs, the other by Hammond on House staffs. The two studies focused on the personal staffs of senators and representatives, though supplementary data were gathered on committee staffs. Further, both Fox and Hammond have worked in and around Congress for several years so that their understanding of staff activities is not altogether confined to the questionnaire responses.

It is, therefore, a matter of some disappointment to report that the book resulting from their joint efforts is considerably less substantial than it might have been. This is not at all to suggest that it is useless. Far from it. But it might have been much more. Let us begin with the strong points. First, there is a careful review of the growth of staff, detailing the changes in authorization, especially in the House, which allowed the growth. Little explanation is offered to account for the successive stages of expansion nor are the measurements very detailed, but it is a most helpful beginning. Demographic data are provided for the samples of staffers, and we can thus compare them with other political elites in terms of standard background characteristics. A major omission in the study design is any effort to determine whether the observed patterns of background variables are stable over time. It is difficult to do, of course, but even with cross-sectional data it would have been instructive if such knowledgeable observers as Fox and Hammond had commented on the changes, if any, in recruitment and career lines resulting from the enormous recent expansion of congressional staff.

Senate personal staff answered questions about how they allocated their time, and their responses have been subjected to factor analysis to yield a set of what the authors call staff roles. The concept of role is probably inappropriate in this context, and in any case is unexplicated. But the differentiated activity sets—Interactor, Supporter, Corresponder, Advertiser, and Investigator—are rather interesting. One wishes that further analysis had been undertaken regarding what kinds of staffers engaged in which sets of activity.

Fox and Hammond present a brief chapter on the impact of staff, but there is little exploration of what that impact might be. Much of the chapter, in fact, examines background variables but without relating them to any particular impact standard. Standards that are offered include the number of hearings and proportion of bills reported, and those are related to the size of committee staffs. The relationship is positive, but neither

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very strong nor, admittedly, very instructive. Again, one wishes there were more analysis, despite the limitations of the surveys employed.

Fox and Hammond have done some of the spadework and provided some descriptive baseline data for others to build on. That is not a trivial accomplishment. The difficulty with the book is that it reflects too faithfully the limitations of its origins, two different dissertations that happened to deal with parallel subject matter. But neither the dissertations nor the book had a clear idea of political purpose. Why are we suddenly interested in staff? Not simply because they are there, but because we suspect, even know, that they make a difference to public policy outcomes. Hardly a hint of this shows through the Fox and Hammond survey data on background characteristics and activity patterns. Staffers are bound to, and serve as extensions of, the members of Congress. Those relationships are dependent on trust and mutual advantage that require subtle observation and thoughtful reflection to comprehend and interpret. It will require considerably more investment in sophisticated investigation, utilizing diverse methods of data gathering and analysis, before we gain confident closure on the role and impact of congressional staff. Fox and Hammond have given us a most useful beginning, but there is much work yet to be done.

ROBERT H. SALISBURY
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Lobbying for the People: The Political Behavior of Public Interest Groups *by Jeffrey M. Berry. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977. 329 pp. $20.00.*

One of the conspicuous features of the political scene in recent years is the loud, sometimes strident, clamor of an array of organizations claiming in one way or another to speak for the public interest. The phenomenon certainly is not new; one needs only to recall that the Anti-Saloon League was a target of investigation for its lobbying activities as far back as the 71st Congress. Today, however, we see along with groups of some age such as the League of Women Voters newcomers such as Common Cause, Environmental Action, and the complex of organizations associated with Ralph Nader. Across the nation there may be as many as 20,000 conservation groups if local bodies are included.

What we are to make of the recent development is the topic of Jeffrey M. Berry's *Lobbying for the Public*. The title is somewhat misleading since Mr. Berry very properly does not restrict his discussion to lobbying as this is commonly understood but treats standard topics of origins, resources, internal organization as well as differing tactics and strategies. His study focused on national "public interest groups" with Washington offices of which he found a total of eighty-three, each of which met his definition of a group that "seeks a collective good, the achievement of which will not selectively and materially benefit the membership of the organization" (p. 7). He interviewed staff members of these groups, following a standardized questionnaire; he also made a more detailed study of two of them with which he briefly served as a volunteer worker, the

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Fund for Animals and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. Almost half the groups were five years old or younger. The time of the study was 1972 to 1973.

For the most part the findings of the work are what might be expected. There is much diversity among the groups both as to organization and manner of operation. Some have genuine membership and participation by members; others have no members and are little more than the small staffs that operate them. There is relatively little or no membership influence on policy or decisions. A few have quite substantial resources of finance and personnel; most have resources ludicrously small in relation to the scale of their objectives. The two groups selected for intensive study might well be regarded as pitiful on this score, but Mr. Berry carefully avoids making this judgment. He reflects what was apparently the sense of numerous of his respondents that the Nixon administration constituted a major obstacle to achievement of their goals. He gives little attention, however, to the presence of other active opponents, perhaps taking these for granted. He does not ask why these groups have been modeled on the interest-group pattern. A major problem for Mr. Berry is how effective the public interest groups are. He gravely notes that present political science does not permit him to "operationalize" the concept of influence but does indicate that he considers the public interest groups ineffectual (as well he might, having spent so much time with the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; peace is indeed not yet).

Undoubtedly his judgment is colored by the particular time, a short one, covered by his study. By the very nature of the causes espoused by his subject groups their wins or losses can only be judged over long-term periods and then can never be measured. This, however, is a quite minor difficulty in a study that in its own terms is clearly competent. It nonetheless points to the trouble that accounts for the banality of the enterprise. To Mr. Berry there is no discernible difference between the public interest groups and their private interest "counterparts." His definition of the former, which allows him to select them for study, is presumably merely "operational." All groups of whatever sort presumably have equal legitimacy—and equal validity. Each represents an interest and the public interest activists have their own and are different from others only in their greater self-righteousness and openness to the charge of "elitism."

This is a familiar stance, one that has been incorporated into a major part of political science. By now, however, enough should have been said and written about the problems inherent in the approach to obviate any requirement for this variety of relativism. The groups that have been studied here are interesting and perhaps important in their recent development. To assess and place them in the scheme of politics is a worthy undertaking. To do so, however, it is inescapable that their ends as well as their means be weighed and evaluated. But to do this it is imperative that the familiar opening ritual of self-emasculation be foregone.

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Taking Rights Seriously *by Ronald Dworkin. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1977. 295 pp. $12.00.*

The close and systematic reasoning of this work, along with a prose that is at times painstakingly careful, place it in stark contrast to the rest of the unphilosophical world of American jurisprudence. Most of the book is familiar, having been published as separate essays and articles over a span of ten years. Initial reflection might well lead to the commonplace observation that it is nice to have these pieces conveniently in one book, but more mature consideration, based on a second reading required by the very philosophical nature of these items, dictates that it is incumbent that they be repeatedly perused if their full significance is to be savored. The eleven pieces in the book previously published (the author has added two short concluding essays in summary) cover a wide variety of topics: an extensive critique of legal positivism focusing on its foremost practioner, H.L.A. Hart; a sharp attack on Nixon jurisprudence; empathic analyses of John Rawls's *A Theory of Justice* and John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty*; a discerningly disapproving assessment of Lord Devlin's concept of the enforcement of public morality; and sophisticated defenses of civil disobedience and affirmative action (the latter theme dealing primarily with *DeFunis* v. *Odegaard*). The disparity of these subjects would seem to preclude the development of a common theme, a circumstance that is not improved by the different publication dates, and by the fact that a number of these pieces were originally published in the form of review essays. Dworkin recognizes the difficulty of maintaining unity and notes that he has not only not tried to anticipate all possible objections, but has not said all that he has to say on the topics covered. Yet there emerges from this collage a highly methodical, philosophical, and moral basis for preserving human rights.

Dworkin has chosen to take the difficult route between legal ontology and legal formalism. Difficut to maintain, because of Dworkin's renunciation of balancing, as, for example, between defendants' procedural guarantees and law enforcement. Throughout the study Dworkin makes subtle, yet sharp, distinctions between principles and rules, principles and policies, and equality as policy and equality as a right. Ultimately the "rights thesis" emerges. The heart of this moral thesis is equality: "Government must not only treat people with concern and respect, but with equal concern and respect" (pp. 272–73). Dworkin's concept of equality elevates it from policy to principle—"a standard that is to be observed, not because it will advance or secure an economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality" (p. 22). This seems to put Dworkin close to legal ontology, but he emphatically opposes "the idea that 'the law' is a fixed set of standards of any sort" (p. 76). "Any sort" includes, in particular, systems of rules which separate legal and moral standards. Since legal positivists are the foremost champions of such a distinction, Dworkin is compelled to refute them as thoroughly as possible. The distinction between principle and policy is important because in adhering to principle rather than policy in deciding cases judges can eschew the role of superlegislator, leaving policy considerations to the legislative realm, where they belong. This rather truncated, simplistic, and perhaps syllogistic explanation of Dworkin's thesis does little justice to what evolves into the very best justification of the Warren Court's assertion

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of human rights—providing solid proof for the author's assertion that the philosophical approach is the best one for protecting human rights.

DONALD M. ROPER
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Retreat to the Ghetto: The End of a Dream? *by Thomas L. Blair. New York, Hill and Wang, 1977. 255 pp. $8.95.*

This book, written for the general reader, provides an interesting overview of the black revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. Blair attempts to show how two divergent ideologies—nonviolent integration and revolutionary black separatism—"were formulated and expressed, and then tempered and transformed in the crucible of racial dialectics" (p. viii). He begins by reviewing the themes of integration and separatism, emphasizing how blacks have used these two opposing philosophies to deal with a hostile white society and how in the process they have shaped images of themselves. The focus then turns to key contemporary ideologies: revolutionary black nationalism, cultural unity, economic equity, and the "new black politics." One of Blair's central concerns is what is likely to happen to the urban poor now that blacks have faded from their central place in the superego of America. If the book has a general conclusion, it is that "black cities are the black man's last hope, for better or worse" (p. 242) and that fresh ideas and actions are needed if poor and slum-locked blacks are to be protected from exploitation by powerful external forces, middle-class blacks, and paramilitary youth gangs.

The book is both interesting and well written, and should give the general reader an understanding of some of the forces that have helped shape the current emphasis on the new black politics. For example, Blair describes how the themes of integration and separatism have been in constant interaction, each vying at different times or stages in history for the all-consuming interest of black people. His discussions of the eclipse of integration, the images of cultural unity, the quest for economic equity, and the new black politics have as their basic theme the exploitation of the black urban poor by hostile whites and the black middle class. Blair asserts that "the black poor are frustrated and hostile to white society for not fulfilling its pledges; they criticize the expanding black middle class for being more concerned with their own well-being than with completing the unfinished Black Revolution" (p. 190). There are other suggestions which imply that the new black politics, with its emphasis on electing black politicians, will also lead to exploitation of the urban poor. One of the problems with this simplistic analysis is that it is long on criticism but short on remedies. For example, the author ends by extolling the virtues of the same black politicians that he criticizes, for their ability to improve the lives of ordinary citizens.

The value of this book to political scientists is limited. It is basically a summary of old arguments and adds no new knowledge to the subject under discussion. Indeed, it is more a historical account of events than a political analysis. The absence of footnotes also impairs the book's usefulness to scholars.

On balance, however, this is a well-written book that should appeal to the general

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reader who desires an overview of both the past and present events that have led blacks to shift their emphasis from protest to politics.

MICHAEL B. PRESTON
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In Search of the Silent South: Southern Liberals and the Race Issue *by Morton Sosna. New York, Columbia University Press, 1977. 275 pp. $11.95.*

When Morton Sosna was a graduate student searching for a dissertation topic, he decided upon a study of white liberals. His adviser inquired whether he intended to include any Southern liberals. "Were there any?" asked Sosna. The adviser replied affirmatively and gave him several leads. Despite this unpromising beginning, the author has produced an acceptable study.

The author is careful to define liberalism in a racial rather than in an economic sense. He classifies as liberal

> . . . those white Southerners who perceived that there was a serious maladjustment of race relations in the South, who recognized that the existing system resulted in grave injustices to blacks, and who either actively endorsed or engaged in programs to aid southern blacks in their fight against lynching, disfranchisement, segregation, and blatant discrimination in such areas as education, employment, and law enforcement (viii).

As far back as 1885, the prominent novelist George W. Cable was disturbed by the movement for the systematic reduction of blacks to an inferior status. He was convinced that many Southerners rejected this growing orthodoxy, chiefly those of superior education, and constituted a silent South, which needed only to be urged to speak out. Cable's writing made a few converts, but evoked instead such uniformly vitriolic abuse that he moved his residence out of the South.

The following seven chapters take us down through the 1960s with biographical sketches of liberal leaders and descriptions of organizations they founded. Southern liberals were not of one mold, but they did agree on one basic point: since only Southerners could understand the South, outlanders must not try to interpret the region or offer any prescriptions for its ills. It followed that southern liberals held the key to the region's salvation. Yet they differed widely in basic attitudes. Virginius Dabney was clearly an elitist, whereas Professor Howard Odum had great faith in the white yeomanry whom he viewed as sterling citizens misled by demagogs. Yet a common difficulty beset all Southern liberals. A Southerner was defined not only in terms of nativity, but also in terms of adherence to a set of beliefs. If he strayed too far from orthodoxy on racial attitudes, he became less Southern and less effective.

Given these limitations, what could a Southern liberal do? As a youthful reporter, the manner in which Virginius Dabney covered the trial of a Negro woman sentenced to thirty years for stealing less than $200 aroused public indignation against the ruling judge. The coming of the New Deal offered opportunities for greater boldness. With federal money to dispense and powerful friends in Washington, New Deal administrators

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in the South could give many benefits to impoverished blacks yet avoid the racial issue by stressing the fundamentally economic nature of the region's problems.

Almost without exception, Southern liberals avoided a direct attack on the issue of segregation. Some truly believed in the wisdom of segregation; others, more pragmatic, regarded it as an institution too deep-rooted to be successfully attacked. In theory, much could be done for blacks under the separate-but-equal approach. With racial conditions profoundly unequal, there were numerous ways to elevate the lot of blacks within the framework of segregation. Yet, no silent South arose to demand segregation without discrimination.

Eventually the march of history overtook the white liberals. World War II led blacks to demand equality and an end to segregation since there was little incentive in fighting for the white man's freedom. And the balance of power in the Democratic party changed. Black Democrats in nonsouthern states became an important part of the New Deal coalition, and this situation led to President Truman's civil rights proposals, thus starting the frontal attack on the caste system that the liberals feared to make. The civil rights movement of the 1960s and the resulting federal legislation meant that blacks and nonsoutherners were leading the struggle.

So what was the impact of these lonely voices crying in the wilderness of segregation for seventy-five years? *In Search of the Silent South* does not recount the activities of a group of people who engineered social change. Instead, the book is a chronicle of sensitive and courageous people battling to free themselves from the shackles of their own socialization and striving unsuccessfully to bring the same degree of liberation to their fellow Southerners.

DONALD S. STRONG
The University of Alabama

Hoover, Roosevelt, and the Brains Trust: From Depression to New Deal *by Elliot A. Rosen. New York, Columbia University Press, 1977. 446 pp. $16.95.*

It is difficult to balance the virtues of this book against its defects. Both are real, and so is the danger that they will cancel one another out. First of all, the virtues. The author provides New Deal historians with a number of very useful and significant analyses of the politics which brought Franklin Roosevelt to the presidency. It was by no means inevitable, as Rosen makes clear; nor have some of the claims made by those who chose to see themselves as the architects of inevitability stood up under the very careful research presented here.

The Roosevelt Brains Trust provides the New Deal with a significant historical legacy. The leading figure in the Brains Trust, Raymond Moley, contributed much more to the genuine originality of the New Deal than he himself was later willing to admit; and contrary to Moley's arguments after he left the administration and joined Roosevelt's critics, the New Deal was a distinct break from previous approaches to federal management of American society. While the argument itself is not altogether new, the

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evidence the author brings to it is certainly distinctive and most assuredly useful. His treatment of the interallied debts, for example, and their relation to both American and world politics is extraordinarily effective. He fills in for us a picture which is far more complex and much richer than others have thought it to be. Historians will have much reason to be grateful for the intensity of his research and the new arguments he presents. His treatment of the First New Deal/Second New Deal distinction helps clarify a much abused device for giving a sense of program to the period. And much of his evidence will help make the necessary distinctions between Hoover's policies and Roosevelt's, although one wonders who the Hoover revivalists he wants to combat really are and how seriously professional historians are inclined to take them. The ones he cites are not supporters of Hoover's own claims, outsized as they were.

At the same time, however, this is perhaps the most partisan New Deal history yet to appear, and given the nature of New Deal historiography, that's every bit as extraordinary a statement as it may seem. The use of the New Deal as a model for liberal political reform has led to a great deal of exaggeration of both its accomplishments and its failures. Part of Roosevelt's charismatic impact on post New Deal politics was the belief that there was some possibility of an Arthurian return that could be stimulated by singing "Happy Days Are Here Again." While Rosen's partisanship is of a somewhat different order, though no more sophisticated, it comes to the same thing where historical judgments are concerned. Nothing Hoover does is right. Nothing Roosevelt does is wrong. Hoover's inaction is a personality defect. Roosevelt's reluctance to act on some of the same problems is intuitive political genius. Hoover does not understand the causes of the Depression, poor man, and Roosevelt—well, the author acknowledges that he didn't at first, but the implication is clear that he was going to, possibly that he actually did. The suggestion boggles the imagination. The author takes up an enormous amount of space trampling through arguments no one professionally involved with the field has seriously depended on for years, now, as though Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s account were an accepted gospel that even Schlesinger would defend in each of its details. Schlesinger took pains to warn his readers that his was a "proximate" account, the term he himself used to describe it, that later studies would have to correct; but that does not get him off Rosen's hook. The Savonarolesque condemnations proceed at an unrelenting pace. All have sinned, all must suffer.

A Donnybrook like this can be interesting, at least to other historians, if it is done skillfully, in prose that amuses those it is not destroying, a technique of which Schlesinger is a consummate master. Rosen is not blessed with that kind of talent. Nor did he have the advantage of a merciful editor or compassionate friend who could tell him how to unscramble his metaphors or suggest a subtle softening here and there to persuade his audience rather than trying to bludgeon them into submission. In a book that actually does have some very useful things to say, such defects are costly indeed.

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The University of Chicago

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The Federal Writers' Project: A Study in Government Patronage of the Arts *by Monty Noam Penkower. Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1977. 266 pp. $11.95.*

This book is not the first published history of the Federal Writers' Project, one of the four arts projects established in 1935 as part of the Works Progress Administration (WPA). Six years ago Little, Brown published a somewhat less formal study by the novelist and critic, Jerre Mangione, former National Coordinating Editor of the Project. At the end of Mangione's highly individualistic but excellent account he happily commented on the fact that the academic world was no longer ignoring the Project, and "that lately a number of graduate students had chosen some aspect of the subject as the theme for their dissertations and have been digging into its story with the eagerness of gold-rush prospectors." (*The Dream and the Deal*, p. 372).

One of these eager young graduate students to whom Mangione referred was Penkower, who has hit pay dirt. His account of the Project is a model monograph—thoroughly researched, closely reasoned, intelligently argued, carefully written. These qualities are best demonstrated in Penkower's treatment of the development of "the American Guide," a series of guidebooks to each state and territory. Yet, for all of his occasional overattention to detail, Penkower does not overburden the reader with too many facts. In relatively straightforward fashion Penkower describes the Project's history (warts and all) from its inception in 1935 to the demise of the WPA arts projects in 1939; a cursory and somewhat uneven chapter describes the continuation of the Project as the Writers' Program for another four years under complex local sponsorship arrangements.

To produce this first-rate study Penkower obviously mined a wide range of primary and secondary sources, including diverse WPA and Project records at the National Archives. Given the sheer bulk of this material Penkower showed considerable discernment in his use of it. He also made good use of interviews and correspondence with numerous people who had been associated with the Project. One of these persons, the late novelist Vardis Fisher, summed up one point of view on the impact of this WPA program when he stated "Did the project have literary or historical value? Of course, but not much in proportion to the money spent" (p. 247, n. 22). Penkower is much more sanguine about the $27,000,000 spent on the Project, maintaining that both artistically and as a relief vehicle, it had an "outstanding record of success."

There is no gainsaying, however, that the Project during the course of its existence had serious problems. And Penkower is not afraid to make some very harsh judgments about these problems. He discusses, for example, in considerable detail (albeit with obvious sympathy) the shortcomings of the Project's director, Henry Alsberg. Whatever his fine qualities and his contributions to the establishment and success of Project endeavors, Alsberg's "ineptitude" resulted in administrative chaos. Penkower also proves quite deft in handling the thorny question of Communist influence on the Project, a problem that had caused it to be dubbed "a Red nest" and that aroused negative Congressional interest. With some sophistication, and without stooping to Red-baiting, Penkower pinpoints "the influence of the party's fronts" on hiring and firing as well as on the work of the Project, especially on some of the manuscripts of the state guides.

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It is possible to take issue with Penkower on some points; for example, it seems to me that he has misread the situation of the editorial worker in the newspaper industry during the early 1930s. And there are occasional niggling little errors to be found in the book such as the mistake in the spelling of Sarah Josepha Hale's middle name. In fine, however, Penkower has written a splendid monograph—one that compares favorably to Mangione's account, which, like Penkower's, made extensive use of interviews and correspondence, but, unlike his, seems to have made little use of Project or WPA records. Anyone interested in the four-year history of the Federal Writers' Project should look at both works, but if only one is available, let us hope that it is Penkower's book; it offers not broad brush strokes but a Brueghel-like picture.

DANIEL J. LEAB
Seton Hall University

Food Policy: The Responsibility of the United States in the Life and Death Choices *edited by Peter G. Brown and Henry Shue. New York, The Free Press, 1977. 344 pp. $14.95.*

The 1973–75 world food crisis has come and gone, and with it another wave of public interest in international food policy. But scholarly debate provoked by that crisis continues to appear in print. *Food Policy* offers a fresh look at one continuing food policy question, U.S. food aid to poor countries.

Most of the essays in this volume were stimulated by a "Working Group on Moral Issues in the Distribution of Food" at the Academy of Contemporary Problems. Brown and Shue, both of the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland, ask their contributors to review U.S. food policy in light of various notions of distributive justice. The voluminous response, for the most part an endorsement of food aid, will be of interest to those concerned with the ethics of public policy. Indeed, *Food Policy* might well be re-titled "The Ethics of Food Aid." More than a dozen of the eighteen individually authored chapters in this book focus squarely upon some aspect of U.S. food aid to poor countries. Little or no attention is given to domestic farm and agribusiness policy, international food trade policy, agricultural development, investment, or technology transfer.

Not all contributors embrace the editorial emphasis upon a "fair distribution" of world food supplies. Thomas Nagel properly observes that the distribution of food cannot be dissociated from the distribution of power and wealth, particularly within poor countries. Charles B. Shuman provides a reminder that food is not a natural resource available in fixed supply awaiting "fair distribution." Food must be produced, and opportunity for abundant production is his crucial test of policy ethics. Edwin M. Martin, seeking a larger range of moral choice, cautions against any belief that food aid alone can meet the needs of poor people in poor countries. These judgments are a minority view, however; most contributors remain preoccupied with the maldistribution of available food supplies, and with the use of food aid to accomplish redistribution.

Among the most useful chapters are a fine summary of world production and con-

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sumption trends during the turbulent period 1971–76, authored by Lyle Schertz; a history of U.S. food export policies, by Lawrence Witt; and a detailed review of recent P.L. 480 legislation, by Thomas Saylor. (These three food policy practitioners, as well as the many other well-known contributors to this volume, are nowhere identified by discipline or by affiliation, one drawback to an otherwise convenient and well-indexed format.) Also of particular interest, Michael F. Brewer reviews links between food aid and population growth; Joseph D. Sneed offers a challenging "utilitarian framework" for analysis of food policy, referring extensively (as do many other contributors) to John Rawls's theory of justice; and the editors' own introduction deserves mention as a concise summary statement of food policy choices and dilemmas.

This, and much more. Brown and Shue have edited a valuable contribution to the literature of ethics and public policy. At the same time, their volume will remain a limited resource for students of food policy. While seeking to combine political and ethical concerns, the editors have at times sacrificed a complete and candid treatment of the former, and have allowed a quite wishful treatment of the latter. The volume does not concede the past record of abuse of food aid policy, in Chile and in Indochina, for example. Here is where an examination of the practical ethics of food aid might well begin.

ROBERT L. PAARLBERG
Wellesley College

Mutual Accommodation: Ethnic Conflict and Cooperation *by Robin M. Williams Jr. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1977. 458 pp. Cloth, $15.95; paper, $8.95.*

In the immediate aftermath of World War II wholesale numbers of American social scientists, reacting to the deadly dimensions of European ethnic hatreds, began in earnest to explore the weaker but nevertheless ominous strain of the American version of the virus in the hopes of stamping it out. They produced a large and enduring literature on the subject of intergroup relations, one contribution to which was Robin Williams's *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions* (1947). That book ended with a propositional inventory which, among other things, offered a series of tentative conclusions about reduction or control of interethnic hostility or conflict. Now, thirty years later Williams has returned to this same theme on a far more elaborate scale.

In the present book Williams sets out to assess what we know about the ways in which often antagonistic American ethnic or racial groups manage to influence one another and resolve conflicts in constructive, mutually satisfactory ways. Drawing heavily on various conflict theorists, particularly William Gamson, the author has produced a cross between a cookbook for the practitioner—mediators, "partisans," minority groups and such—and a scientific propositional inventory.

Wearing the hat of the manual writer, Williams seldom misses an opportunity to give advice. Like the earlier book, the present work is motivated by the interventionist belief that social science is best justified when it is enlisted in the cause of purposive

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action. Thus the book is full of dicta: how best to effect school desegregation, for example, or how low-power minorities might best use strategies of persuasion.

These lessons emerge quite naturally, however, from the book's more scientific aim, which is nothing less than to assess and summarize the state of knowledge regarding the conditions under which strategies of influence and power work to maintain or change various kinds of ethnic relationships. The central portion of the book is thus devoted to an exploration of persuasion, inducement, and constraint, the three major types of strategies of influence.

Williams pursues his quest through a tireless literature review, which seems, even to the most dogged reader, apparently endless (although he tells us in the acknowledgements that the original typescript was more than twice as long). The material is summarized through the device of propositional inventories, no boon to the art of prose composition. The flavor of individual propositions, which range from vast generalities to microscopic specificities, is illustrated by a few examples: two-sided rather than one-sided presentations seem more effective in changing attitudes when recipients are well-informed or well-educated (p. 185); or, violence does not create an effective political threat when it appears to be sheerly expressive (p. 205). Occasionally, the propositions are painfully obvious, as when we are told that the success of efforts to settle conflicts primarily depends on the basic causes of the conflict and the objectives of the parties (p. 365).

The basic argument that Williams makes here is a supremely optimistic one, namely, that social change in American ethnic and race relations is possible, that change for the better has steadily occurred, and that we know a good deal about how to promote and shape such change. This is an uncommon view, but it is an important one and in no sense naively put. This emergent sense that we might begin to understand and affect complex social processes is, I believe, the chief virtue of the book. It suggests both the practical validity of social science as well as the currently unfashionable liberal notion that societies might perhaps be able to orchestrate social progress.

Yet the book is weak finally as a didactic instrument. Both its very exhaustiveness and its penchant for list-making produce a monotonous quality without textural contrasts. There are no differences in emphasis, no climaxes. Every proposition and conclusion has parity with all the rest and nothing stands out. The danger is that in the end the reader is likely to come away believing he or she has seen everything but remembered nothing.

PETER K. EISINGER
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Scientific Elite: Nobel Laureates in the United States *by Harriet Zuckerman. New York, The Free Press, 1977. 335 pp. $14.95.*

This book traces the careers of ninety-two scientists who won the Nobel prize for research conducted in the United States. It describes their social and religious backgrounds, undergraduate and graduate education, employment histories, publication

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patterns, and relationships with mentors, colleagues, and students. Drawing from published material and her own interviews with forty-one laureates, Zuckerman has filled the book with interesting, well-documented facts about the prize and its recipients. It is no mere compendium, however. Zuckerman's real concern is with elite formation, the ways in which the social system of science generates a small group of highly privileged scientists while withholding most rewards from the vast majority of scientists. In her view, laureates benefit from cumulative advantage, a process in which scientists who are judged successful at any point in time tend to be favored in the allocation of rewards and resources. As a consequence, they are even more likely to be successful in the future.

Cumulative advantage has received widespread attention in the sociology of science, but supporting evidence is still quite tentative. While Zuckerman's data are certainly consistent with the idea, she really doesn't provide much additional evidence. What she finds is that Nobel laureates tend to be increasingly concentrated in elite institutions as their careers progress. Compared with samples of "ordinary" Ph.D.s, the laureates are more likely to have attended prestigious undergraduate schools, much more likely to have received their doctorates from the best departments, and so on throughout their careers. By the time they were full professors, 78 percent of the laureates worked at just thirteen institutions.

These results are hardly surprising. Examining the careers of elite members of any profession, one would surely find a pattern of steadily increasingly concentration in elite institutions. This merely reflects the fact that elite individuals and elite institutions have a mutual affinity, and most mobility occurs in a step-by-step fashion. What *is* surprising is that Nobel laureates are so distinctive at the start. They are almost twice as likely as other scientists to have fathers who were professionals (and most of these were scientists or in science-related professions). Then there is Zuckerman's startling finding that more than half the laureates had worked with other laureates as students, postdoctorals, or junior collaborators.

Clearly the laureates began their careers as a privileged group. Bud did this initial advantage give them a crucial head start over other scientists, or did it merely reflect their already demonstrated talent? And if the head start was crucial, does this mean that the scientific elite is not composed of the best and the brightest? Neither question can be answered with these data, and Zuckerman wisely refrains from making strong claims. While she obviously believes in the importance of cumulative advantage, she hastens to point out that such a process is not necessarily inconsistent with meritocratic or universalistic standards. She also demonstrates that laureates are among the most prolific and most often cited scientists even before they receive the prize.

Future laureates, in fact, tend to be highly prolific even in their late twenties. But contrary to the prevailing belief that great discoveries are mostly made by fledgling scientists, the laureates were 39, on the average, when they made their prize-winning discoveries. After the prize, however, their productivity declined sharply—a result that would surely have displeased Alfred Nobel.

Overall, the book is well written and carefully crafted. Although the analysis is mostly cross-tabular, Zuckerman goes to admirable lengths to adjust indices and introduce appropriate comparison groups in order to rule out competing interpretations.

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There are several valuable appendices including a detailed classification of prizes by specialty and year, a listing of "honorable mentions" for the medicine and physiology award, and a remarkably interesting account of how the interviews were obtained.

Regarding the interviews, I was somewhat disappointed that there were not more direct quotations. In fact, the book is so heavily focused on the "objective" features of the laureates' careers that I suspect it could have been written almost entirely from library research. (Notable exceptions are the discussions of relations with mentors and the consequences of winning the prize). Zuckerman invariably develops plausible interpretations of these career patterns, but it would be nice to hear more from the laureates themselves.

The emphasis on the measurable features of laureates' careers also raises the question of generalizability. Can a study of ninety-two ultra-elite scientists tell us much about the reward system of science that could not be better studied with a representative cohort of scientists? Since such a restricted study can only give suggestive evidence, the main contribution ought to be an increase in our qualitative understanding of the mechanisms involved. While this is by no means absent from the book, a balance in this direction might have been more enlightening.

In short, this is an informative and scrupulously researched book that will interest most scientists and academics. It should be read by all who are interested in stratification in science, and may also be useful to those concerned with elite formation in other areas of life.

PAUL D. ALLISON
Cornell University

Power and Illness: The Political Sociology of Health and Medical Care *by Elliott A. Krause. New York, Elsevier North-Holland, Inc., 1977. 383 pp. $12.95.*

This is an important book, if only because it is one of the few efforts thus far to examine the United States health care system as a problem in macrosociology. The author states that "this book is conceived on a grand scale, and accordingly the risks are such." He goes on to criticize previous efforts, including "the journalists and politicians with their quickly written, lively, and often deeply flawed and incomplete critiques, full of unchallenged assumptions about the possible." Krause tell us that he will give an objective, although liberal, view of the United States health care system, that he will "lay it all out bare, with no Emperor's clothes on, for all to see." Following an excellent and interesting historical preview, he addresses himself to "The Servers and the Served," "The Systems of Care and Neglect," "The Politics of Health," and finally to a section on "Who Will Make the Future?" in which he recommends a national health service.

The volume is cast in the frame of reference of Marxist philosophy, implying that social revolution is the only answer to the problems of the current American health scene. If this is so, and I doubt it, there does not seem to be sufficient public sentiment to support such a revolutionary change in the near future. The pressures in fact are more likely to come from those people concerned with the increasing cost of the present free-enterprise

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system, and they are the currently elected establishment. The immediate result has been more regulation and authoritarianism in health care, but this is certainly not a proletarian movement, nor does it show evidence of becoming one.

Some of Krause's criticisms of others unfortunately may be levelled at himself. For example, if one follows the analogy of "the Emperor's clothes," it is hard to know to whom he refers. Is the Emperor the health care establishment, or the delivery system? Where are the tailors who hoodwinked the Emperor into believing he was being dressed in gorgeous raiment? He does not tell us. It is equally difficult to tell who is the intended audience for this exposé. Is it the public, or is it the author's professional colleagues and students?

A glance at the Notes and References, moreover, indicates to whom the author looks for support and advice and from whence his biases derive. There one finds much Marx and little Weber and a paucity of serious documentation of the ills he cites. In his analysis Krause develops a concept popular today with the defenders of the underdog, which might be termed a paranoid theory of bureaucracy. According to him, bureaucracies are Machiavellian devices of the establishment to gain and consolidate power over the oppressed. He fails to see that power is dynamic, with constant conflict among the various elements in U.S. society for material and other rewards. A more objective view would reveal that our health system, and the society of which it is a part, is now, particularly, in flux. A complete victory of providers over consumers is not the goal, nor the reverse; nor would government bureaucracy be the winner if it subdued all opponents. In my opinion, it is our diversity of views and the dynamic tensions in our society that are the driving forces for democratic decisions and the avoidance of completely disastrous mistakes.

Despite my caveats, I believe Krause's work is an important contribution to an understanding of our society's health care delivery arrangements if only in that it presents forcefully a point of view held by a significant minority—and it does a great deal more than that when it is not colored by ideology. He should not be disappointed that his recommendations for change cannot be conclusive; to my mind, no currently available solution is the final answer, which is just as well in today's state of knowledge and consensus regarding health care delivery. Krause is to be congratulated on his sincere effort to examine the present system and reveal what appear to him to be the deliberate flaws in it.

GEORGE G. READER
Cornell University Medical College

The Master Architects: Building the United States Foreign Service, 1890–1913 *by Richard Hume Werking. Lexington, Ky., The University of Kentucky Press, 1977. 330 pp. $18.75.*

Werking's scholarly study constitutes "the first attempt to present an extensive analysis, based on a variety of published and unpublished sources, of the organization and reorganization of the [United States] foreign affairs machinery between the 1890s and

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World War I" (p. x). He is not content merely to trace administrative structural development, but focuses on the beliefs and behavior of key individuals connected with foreign relations institutions, "to discover whether their attitudes were translated into policy and action, and if so, how?" (p. ix). He is interested also in weighing the relative importance of domestic and foreign factors in shaping the restructuring of the modern foreign affairs machinery, and concluded that the domestic factors were dominant. For instance, the depression triggered by the panic of 1893 helped convince some businessmen and a number of government officials that exporting manufactured products to foreign markets was essential for domestic prosperity and that the State Department and consular service should make an increased effort in the furtherance of foreign commerce. The Boston Chamber of Commerce for intance petitioned Congress for a consular service based on "merit and permanency." Overall, Werking finds that the foundations and general structure of the twentieth century U.S. Foreign Service emerged in the two decades prior to World War I, and did not await the enactment of the well-known Rogers Act of 1924.

The reformers both in and out of government were confronted by the viciousness of the spoils system as applied to the Consular Service during the second Cleveland and McKinley administrations. A "debauch" of the service—"a regular orgy of decapitations" (p. 10) eliminated some 80 to 90 percent of American consular officers by both Democratic and Republican administrations. The dominance of the spoils system prevented the establishment of a career service, unduly enlarged the role of members of Congress in the selection and administration of the Consular Service, and assured weak control by the Department of State. Other conspicuous characteristics of the machinery at the turn of the century were: a separate Diplomatic Service with salaries so low as to require men of independent means; a poorly organized State Department in Washington; a lack of purposeful interchange between the Department and the field; and the absence of any geographical bureaus to coordinate regional policy. And yet by 1900, if not earlier, the United States had already emerged as a world power.

The obvious need for drastic reorganization did not assure its prompt accomplishment. Secretary of State John Hay (1898–1905) was not disposed to work with Congress for needed legislation, and consequently was not effective. But his successor, Elihu Root, was "an ideal Secretary" for bringing a successful conclusion to the movement for consular legislation. He combined a keen interest in reorganization with a strong administrative ability, and good relations with Congress. In 1922 Wilbur Carr described Root as "the Master Architect" of the career service. Root's great contribution was "his ability to translate ideas into reality" (p. 141). But Werking finds that "the ideas came mostly from his subordinates in the service" (p. 141). As knowledgeable an insider as Ambassador Joseph Grew later applied the same accolade to Carr himself. Werking provides a vignette of Wilbur Carr who entered by Civil Service exam in stenography and typing in 1892 (after graduating from the College of Commerce, University of Kentucky) and rose to the highly responsible positions of Chief of the Consular Service and Chief Clerk of the Department. Secretary Root used him to supplement his own work with Congress. The effort was supported by Harry Garfield's efforts to mobilize American business interests in behalf of reform and reorganization. The Master Architects gained ground with a very reluctant Congress (some of whose

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leaders wanted to abolish the Diplomatic Service) by emphasizing the department's responsibilities to push U.S. commercial expansion abroad.

Root's accomplishments included the establishment of efficiency records for consuls, even before legislation could be enacted, and a new classification system of appointment and promotion to classes rather than to specific posts. Root broke with tradition and appeared personally before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (as well as the House Foreign Affairs Committee). When Congress finally adopted amended legislation the remainder of the Root-Carr reform program was accomplished by executive order (1906). The first examination under the new arrangement took place in March 1907. A "new Consular School" was established. The new consular corps developed a greater "spirit of loyalty and energy" in behalf of the country's interests . . . Advancement on merit is not a theory, but a fact, and the results show the wisdom of it," Carr concluded as early as 1911 (p. 120).

A valuable dimension of Werking's painstaking study relates to bureaucratic rivalry, especially between the Department of State and the newly created (1903) Department of Commerce and Labor (chapter 8). Since the promotion of foreign commerce was popular in Congress and an avenue for enlarged budgets, both departments jealously viewed the other. "The State Department's well publicized trade promotion work, along with bureaucratic in-fighting, and high turnover of department heads" (p. 215) had delayed the creation of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce in the Department of Commerce and Labor until 1912. The perceptions of personal and bureaucratic interests as well as national interests are interestingly portrayed. Werking corrects some errors of earlier studies, but the chief value of his study is to demonstrate that a perceptive, imaginative analysis of foreign affairs institutions can be of greater value than some historians have recognized.

S. SHEPARD JONES
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Ethnic Chauvinism: The Reactionary Impulse *by Orlando Patterson. New York, Stein and Day, 1977. 347 pp. $15.00.*

In this captivating book we are treated to an epic spectacle: Orlando Patterson enters the arena, sword flashing, to do single battle with the dragon of ethnicity. He pursues it around the ring twice, though each time he closes in for the kill the monster seems to elude him. But who could really expect the death of a probably immortal beast; what arrests our attention is the artistry of the combat.

In the course of his struggle, Patterson takes us through the whole sweep of Western history and philosophy. He first tries to corner ethnicity as a sociohistorical phenomenon, through a brilliant excursion to the primeval origins of the state. Here he argues that the state arises in two main forms: the "kin-hegemonic" polity, where centralization is the creation of ruling lineages whose metaphors of domination and tribal gods bear the seeds of ethnicity; and the juridico-territorial state, which debouches upon a universalist conception of citizenship and community. Classic Greece and the old Hebraic kingdoms

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are prototypical of the first, while the Roman Empire exemplifies the latter. A third form, the bureaucratic-theocratic (despotic) state, is introduced, but lies outside the realm of Western history in which this analysis is embedded. From this essentially dualistic tradition comes the tension in the modern state between what Patterson sees as the reactionary tug of communal chauvinism (the nation-state), and the healthy pull of the anti-ethnic state (United Kingdom, Tanzania, fitfully the United States).

With ethnicity thus located in the broader processes of historical change, Patterson then pursues it to what he feels are its philosophical roots. These, he maintains, may be understood in terms of two juxtaposed dualities in the Western intellectual tradition: reason versus revelation, and universalism versus particularism. One may readily perceive that this matrix will yield a "progressive" cell of rational universalism, which in the context of political community means nonethnic citizenship, and a "reactionary" one where particularism and revelation coincide. This latter cell, the author finds, is the Hebraic strand in the philosophic tradition, whose malignant modern form is romantic nationalism and unbridled ethnic chauvinism.

So brief a recapitulation cannot possibly capture the richness of texture of the line of reasoning developed, much less the tightly woven fabric of urbanity, acerbity, and wit. It does suggest the breath-taking scope of the work; he flits easily from century to century, from modern Jamaica to ancient Greece. Only a truly imposing fund of knowledge and an unusual clarity of perspective could permit such seemingly effortless movements through time and space.

At the same time, the study is bound to a very particular context: America of the age of ethnic revivalism. As the title suggests, the object of analysis is to slay the beast, or at least to hassle it back into its cage. From this comes the combative mood of the book. Black ethnicity "has become a form of mystification, diverting attention from the correct solutions to the terrible economic condition of the group" (p. 155). White ethnic movements, given respectability by authors such as Michael Novak and Andrew Greeley, carry heavy overtones of "covert antiblack political action, disguised by the use of the famous 'code words' " (p. 158). The "liberal intellegentsia" respond by the "treachery" of a "massive retreat from the universalistic ethic" (p. 153). One can only admire the courage of a writer who will enter the fray against so many potent adversaries simultaneously.

Patterson is at his best in the illuminating treatment of the historical nature of the state, and its interaction with nationalism and ethnicity. The explication of ethnicity as ideology through its linkage to particular strands in Western philosophic tradition is much less convincing. Ethnicity attains high levels of political mobilization, and acquires extensive ideological elaboration in many parts of the globe today where the impact of Western thought is slight. The contrast between universalism and particularism seems too sharply drawn; while there are important distinctions between cultural self-definitions of states in the contemporary world, yet virtually all conceive of the universe as stopping at their frontiers. Ostensible universalism may well be a cloak for ethnic domination; we need look no farther than the Soviet Union or the United States for verification.

With so broad a scope, and so provocative an argument, only the reader who has slept through the book can be expected to agree in all particulars with the author.

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There is no danger of this; Patterson murders sleep, along with many conventional shibboleths in the ethnicity literature. Ethnicity itself lives, despite this lethal assault by Patterson. However, the encounter is one that nobody should miss.

M. CRAWFORD YOUNG
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War against Japan, 1941–1945 *by Christopher Thorne. New York, Oxford University Press, 1978. 772 pp. $29.50.*

Christopher Thorne, whose reputation as an authority on twentieth-century British foreign policy is securely established, has undertaken a vastly ambitious assignment. Dauntlessly, and with considerable literary flair, he has surveyed the complexities of the Anglo-American relationship through the course of the Second World War, particularly as they affected events in the Far East. No less concerned with attitudes than with strategy, his quest has taken him all over the map, both literally (which greatly enhances his research) and figuratively (which tends to diffuse his arguments and inevitably to disrupt his narrative). If the venture does not entirely succeed, it nevertheless commands respectful attention.

Notwithstanding its length, the pace of this book rarely slackens; nothwithstanding its breadth, it evinces throughout the " 'feel' for the subject" (p. xiii) to which the author, with no false modesty, lays claim. The work is rich in its insights about the motives of statesmen, whose personal deficiencies and political predicaments are critically assessed. It is likewise acute in its judgments on the intellectual traditions, financial considerations, and, especially, the mutual misperceptions that influenced diplomacy. The tone is combative, sometimes querulous. That, too, one may assume to have been dictated by Thorne's "feel," which occasionally gets the better of him.

Exactly how special was the "special relationship," as successive British prime ministers have gamely invoked it? Was it more than a figment of the fertile imagination of Winston Churchill, who celebrated it in his multivolume pastiche, *A History of the English Speaking Peoples* (1956–58)? Sentiments, if indeed they existed to any meaningful extent from 1939 to 1945, proved difficult to translate into policy. Thorne, who emphasizes the various areas of misapprehension and mistrust, but certainly does not exaggerate them, presents a pattern of love-hate relations, as described by Stephen Spender. "I do not want to be unkind or rude to the British," Franklin Roosevelt assured Oliver Stanley, the Colonial Secretary, "but in 1841, when you acquired Hongkong, you did not acquire it by purchase." "Let me see, Mr. President," Stanley rejoined, "that was about the time of the Mexican War, wasn't it?" (p. xxiii). Thus, even in the gibes with which they baited each other, American and British officials recognized an underlying affinity. "The seeming 'helplessness' of our cousins strikes me as amusing when it is not annoying," Admiral King of the U.S. Navy complained to his British counterpart. "I am sure that what they wish in their hearts is that we would haul down the Stars and Stripes and hoist the White Ensign in all of our ships" (p. 296). Yet, all the same, King spoke of the British as "cousins."

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It was in the Pacific, where the racial question figured as "one of [the] vital aspects" (p. 7), that the Anglo-American partnership acquired a dimension which, in turn, invests Thorne's title with a dual significance. Previously, the interests of the two nations in the area had diverged markedly. After Pearl Harbor, as Dr. (later Dame) Margery Perham quickly recognized, there occurred "a very practical revolution in race relationships" (p. 10), which directly threatened British supremacy in India and portended disruption in the multiracial society of the United States. Churchill had already identified himself in the India debates of the 1930s as "a notable but idiosyncratic racist" (p. 6), although more on the Edwardian than the Victorian model, as Thorne (echoing Lord Moran and others) suggests. "We would never stand by and see a British Dominion overwhelmed by a yellow race," he told the Cabinet in August 1940 (p. 7). Spokesmen in Australia, New Zealand, and (not surprisingly) South Africa vowed the same determination to reassert the prestige of the white race. Far more significantly, we find that President Roosevelt "in private . . . was burbling away in his hare-brained fashion about the possibility of bringing about a cross-breeding of European and various Asian races in the Far East in order to produce a stock less delinquent than the Japanese, whose skull pattern, he suspected, being less developed than that of the Caucasians, might be responsible for their aggressive behaviour" (p. 8). It is well to be reminded "that the Germans were not alone at this time in thinking of fellow human-beings as *Untermenschen*" (p. 9), and Thorne persistently returns to this theme as he follows the permutations of the Anglo-American alliance.

Divided by their responses to China, by their varying commitments to European governments-in-exile (particularly the French), and by their contradictory interpretations of the Atlantic Charter, British and American leaders also had to contend with different sets of pressures from their respective colleagues and opponents at home. Thorne renders a valuable service in his investigation of the divergences of opinion and goals within the governing structures at London and Washington, as well as between them, the tensions generated by political tacticians on both sides, and the rivalries between the various armed services and, most openly in Whitehall, the various administrative departments (the Foreign Office and the India Office, for example). His most severe strictures are directed at the professional diplomats and publicists who compounded wartime difficulties by pursuing sectional interests or, like William Bullitt, by trying to settle old scores.

He shies away, however, from any outright condemnation of the main protagonists, even when he has marshalled the facts against them. Churchill's blunders and prejudices are made clear; yet he remains "a man of greatness, and an incomparable war leader" (p. xii), and it is stated that "historian and reader alike can be thankful that they will never be called upon to shoulder the burdens carried by Churchill in 1940–41" (p. 56). Roosevelt, although "a poor administrator" who admitted to Felix Frankfurter that "I use the wrong end of the telescope and it makes things much easier to bear," receives similar dispensation for "the vast extent of those burdens" (pp. 114–15). And Truman, faulted for his misguided China policy, is excused on the grounds of "the daunting array of problems which the new President, totally unprepared by his dying predecessor, was called upon to face at short notice" (p. 572). It is a defect of Thorne's interpretation that so little sympathy is allowed to percolate down to the lower echelons.

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That there were conflicts between these "common-law allies," and sharp exchanges that punctuated their reciprocal tributes, should come as no surprise. The balance of power within the relationship shifted steadily during the progress of the war, leaving Britain more dependent than her leaders cared to admit or, for that matter, than the American guarantors of Lend-Lease cared to assume. "Mutual ignorance" persisted; and the superficial resemblances to which Churchill, for one, attached such importance, only "helped exacerbate genuine differences and foster suspicions that were based upon misunderstanding or on a stereotyped image of the other nation" (p. 701).

Like Churchill, Harold Macmillan boasted a trans-Atlantic pedigree. As early as 1944, he had cast his countrymen to play the role of "Greeks" to the new "Roman Empire" in the west (p. 139). It was a metaphor which he was rehearsing for his own premiership in the 1950s. Richard E. Neustadt, who has carried the study of Anglo-American relations into the age of Macmillan, discerned "each side comprised of men intent upon their own concerns. . . . Comprehension of the other's actual behavior is a function of their own concerns" (*Alliance Politics* [New York, 1970], p. 66). In peace, as in war, that is the way alliances work, even those between allies of a kind.

STEPHEN KOSS
Columbia University

The Politics of International Economic Relations *by Joan Edelman Spero. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1977. 326 pp. Cloth, $12.95; paper, $4.95.*

Textbooks, like social science definitions, must be judged by their usefulness. And Professor Spero's new book succeeds on these terms. It provides a concise, readable introduction to some of the central political issues in the world economy. It includes major sections on the Western System (that is, on trilateral relations), the North-South System, and East-West economic relations. Along the way, Spero provides policy-oriented accounts of money, trade, aid, and investment. Other chapters cover multinational firms and producer cartels. The footnotes and bibliography provide a brief but very serviceable guide to each subject.

Perhaps the most striking feature of Professor Spero's text is its emphasis on policy making and issue management. The overview chapter is entitled, "The Management of International Economic Relations since World War II," and the title is revealing. The book is limited to postwar events: the calamities of the 1930s are mentioned only as prologue; Britain's nineteenth century leadership is hardly mentioned at all. The result is a sharp focus on modern international institutions and the United States' role in shaping and sustaining them. Their origins and vicissitudes are analyzed with care and sophistication, and in some detail. The discussion of international finance, for example, begins with Bretton Woods and provides a lucid introduction to the transformation of that system.

Nevertheless, Spero's focus on policy management and international institutions imposes significant limits on the analysis. First, the text provides little guidance to the interpretative disputes in the field or to the main conceptual problems. The role of

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hegemonic power, the analytic status of nonstate actors (especially multinational firms), the unity of international economic order or its fragmentation by issues, the uncertainty of durable trilateral cooperation—these questions are left aside. Second, the text deflates the meaning of politics by limiting it chiefly to the examination of prominent institutions and their policies. Structural characteristics of the international system are treated only briefly, as are the sources of systemic transformation and their institutional consequences. As a result, it is difficult to relate institutions (and their policies) to any larger political order. That relationship is critical if one is to discuss the independent impact of organizational arrangements or their durability in light of European and Japanese economic strength. Likewise, the focus on policy management obscures questions of domestic politics. Except for U.S. trade policy, domestic economic and social structure, even political organization, are ignored. It is hard, then, to understand the stakes of international economic conflicts or the sources of alternative national policies.

Despite these important gaps, *The Politics of International Economic Relations* provides a valuable introduction to postwar institutions and a number of substantive issues. It presents these difficult issues clearly and, most significantly, requires no training in international economics.

CHARLES LIPSON
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Multinationals from Small Countries *edited by Tamir Agmon and Charles P. Kindleberger. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1977. 224 pp. $18.95.*

Agmon and Kindleberger observe that many recent discussions of multinational corporations (MNCs) have been passionately preoccupied with alleged American efforts to use political power to protect America's direct foreign investments. This preoccupation with MNCs as symbols of American imperialism, they complain, has made it difficult to assess carefully and calmly MNCs' crucial economic ramifications. They therefore want to remove politics from the consideration of MNCs. To this end, they invited several distinguished economists to MIT to present and discuss papers dealing with MNCs in small countries. Since these small nations presumably do not have the political power to protect or extend their foreign investments, the discussion of their MNCs can be disentangled from the emotional controversy over imperialism. Unlike American MNCs, MNCs from small nations are rarely associated with espionage and sabotage. To put it more concretely, while any discussion of the United Fruit Company or ITT may elicit memories of covert CIA operations in Guatemala and Chile, consideration of the Swiss Nestlé company is not likely to conjure up images of Swiss operatives carrying out clandestine missions to topple regimes hostile to Swiss capital investments.

Of the seven papers, three look at small, affluent nations (Switzerland, Sweden, and Australia); two focus on small, developing nations of Asia and Latin America; one examines the attitudes of France as a host nation to foreign investments from large, middle-size and small nations; and one offers a general, theoretical discussion of the financial constraints to the formation of MNCs from small countries.

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The authors largely succeed in keeping politics in the background as they dispassionately consider such issues as the conditions that lead to the formation of MNCs; costs and benefits of MNCs to firms, host nations, and home nations; and, most interestingly, how small nations, which have been hosts to foreign investments from the industrial giants, become capital exporters, in part, by adapting products and production techniques to smaller, exotic markets more successfully than MNCs from larger countries.

The papers are uniformly good; the authors deal with these complex issues imaginatively and intelligently. True, they often must rely on skimpy data, especially when they are dealing with MNCs from smaller countries. But they make the most of the available qualitative and quantitative evidence. They offer intriguing theoretical speculations (couched in appropriately cautious terms, given the limitations of their data) about the origins and impact of MNCs. And they also present fascinating detailed accounts of the involvement of MNCs in everything from the French computer industry to an Australian shoe-polish factory in Indonesia. And while they do sprinkle their work with professional jargon (for example, "firm-specific adaptation" and "production-possibility function"), their presentations are sufficiently nontechnical and lucid that political scientists should have no trouble following their arguments. Comments following four of the papers, as well as the editors' useful, brief summaries of each paper in their introduction, facilitate appreciation of the authors' positions. It is unfortunate, however, that the editors made no effort to synthesize or draw general conclusions from the papers' findings. This failure seriously limits the value of the book.

Despite the editors' intentions to focus exclusively on economic considerations, the image of MNCs as agents of imperialism surfaces throughout the book. Thus MNCs threaten host nations' political autonomy; for example, Gilles Bertin underscores that France was afraid to rely on U.S. computer firms for the development of its thermonuclear force, and, as a result, France has attempted, at great public expense, to create its own computer industry. MNCs exploit host nations. According to Helen Hughes and Louis Wells, Jr., Australia and less developed Asian nations resent the MNCs from large, industrial countries which have tended to exclude the indigenous populations from ownership and control over local subsidiaries. Sensitive to the abuses they have endured from foreign capital investments, Hughes and Wells argue, MNCs from these smaller nations have encouraged local participation in their investments abroad.

In other contexts, the issue of exploitation is disguised by technical language. Jürg Niehans, for example, accounts for the development of Swiss MNCs in terms of "vertical specialization of nations." He suggests that MNCs locate in Switzerland because the Swiss enjoy a "comparative advantage" in managerial skills, but they do extensive business abroad because the Swiss do not have a "comparative advantage" in markets, cheap labor, or raw materials. Such radical critics of MNCs as Gabriel Kolko or Harry Magdoff might argue that "vertical specialization of nations" is a polite, technical euphemism for economic imperialism, and that the Swiss "comparative advantage" in managerial resources is an unfair advantage which generates enormous profits for Swiss MNCs and is sustained by a profoundly unjust international economic order perpetuated by dominant rich nations, large and small alike.

This argument is obviously debatable, but it is not debated in this book. Nor are any political issues treated systematically by the authors. For this reason, students of interna-

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tional politics who have only a peripheral interest in MNCs may find these papers too arcane. But for those political scientists directly concerned with the role of MNCs as actors in the international system, this book should be quite valuable.

JEFFREY OBLER
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

The Inequality of Nations *by Robert W. Tucker. New York, Basic Books, 1977. 214 pp. $10.95.*

Robert Tucker is always stimulating and original, usually clear-headed, and often persuasive. At its best, as in his contributions to *Force, Order and Justice* (with Robert Osgood), his work is superb. He is never dull (*viz.* his *Commentary* article suggesting American military intervention against OPEC), but he is not always right. His brilliance and courage, which are scarce resources among foreign policy analysts, are to be cherished. This particular contribution, however, does not deserve immortality.

It starts promisingly, with the straightforward recognition that, however global economic inequalities may have originated from unequal natural endowments, they were rapidly magnified many times by the nineteenth and twentieth century global political and economic system that stressed "*self-help*" among *nations*. "Among unequals in social-economic development an unimpeded right to trade—and to invest capital—would . . . increase inequalities between the backward and developed regions" (p. 15). No cant here about the fault of underdevelopment being solely that of those who are underdeveloped; rather a clear statement about the international capitalist system as a magnifying if not originating force for inequality.

The next step leads him to say that, having been dominated in such a system, the elites of the new states seek "a collective status that will insure their recognition as equals" (p. 63), and that they interpret equality "largely as the absence of restraint upon the state's freedom of action" (p. 59). The challenge, then, is to their status within the system, not to the system itself. Most important—and this premise is stated repeatedly in various qualified forms, but in its starkest terms is absolutely crucial to Tucker's argument—"the *basic* demand of the new states is a demand for redistribution of *power*" (my emphasis, p. 187). "That redistribution will be facilitated by concessions on economic issues," but those concessions are sought "as means for effecting a new structure of power."

Thus, and centrally, the new states will not "be satisfied by what are little more than marginal changes in the present order" (pp. 187–88). They want far more than we can imaginably concede willingly. Because these elites accept the interstate system (though not their current status within it) they are concerned far more about inequalities between states than within states. (They are quite content with the gross inequalities within underdeveloped states, because there they are on top.) Thus, for instance, developed states' acceptance of a moral obligation to provide a minimal level of subsistence for all people in the world would not satisfy these elites' central demands. Nor, least of all, do these elites accept any obligation to satisfy demands for liberty within their states: economic human rights, perhaps; political human rights, no.

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Tucker is a clear, forceful logician. He is excellent at demolishing others' fuzzy arguments. (In this respect many of his footnotes are joys to the reader, so long as he/she happens not to be a victim.) Usually he is good at distinguishing between arguments about states and arguments about individuals, a distinction that others often muddle. Yet his focus on states (or on undifferentiated "elites" of less-developed states) leads him to begin his logic with some premises that are at best arguable, empirically unsubstantiated, and ultimately tendentious. His argument about elites' alleged demand for power is the most important example. Which elites? Where? When?

Early in the book he notes the role of liberalism and ideological commitment to equality within nation-states as leading to a decay of the will to maintain colonialism over subject peoples within traditional European empires. Yet on p. 111 he opines that "a more egalitarian America need not mean a greater willingness to reduce global inequalities of wealth, all the more so to the extent that egalitarianism takes place within the cultural and value setting of 'traditional' America."

Similarly, he makes the extraordinary remark that, faced with the prospect of terrorism and "wars of redistribution," well before that capability had been realized the rich nations "would have begun the process of a radical decoupling from the poor." How that might be done, or what it might entail, seems of no interest to Tucker. He simply asserts, "there is every reason for believing that the rich nations would make the effort" (pp. 91–92). There is in fact almost every reason for believing they would *not* make the effort, or certainly that they would not succeed. Moreover, on p. 200 he (correctly in my opinion) notes that "the logic of the challenge to inequality is ultimately the logic of nuclear proliferation." I doubt that is a good ingredient for a recipe of "decoupling."

His logic leads him to the conclusion that the major demands of most new states cannot be satisfied; that satisfying the minor demands, or major demands of a few states, in a cooptation strategy is the best that can be done and the prospects for that succeeding are poor; and that the failure may not hurt us much anyway. Clear logic from faulty premises leads to faulty conclusions.

BRUCE RUSSETT
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Ethnic Conflict in the Western World *edited by Milton J. Esman. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1977. 399 pp. $17.50.*

This book grew out of the Conference on Ethnic Pluralism and Conflict in Contemporary Western Europe and Canada held at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, in May 1975. It consists of fifteen chapters by sixteen authors. (One author, editor Esman, is represented by two chapters, and two other chapters are co-authored by pairs of scholars.) Four of the chapters are general and theoretical, while eleven are devoted to specific cases of ethnic conflict and its attempted political management in Spain (Basque region), Belgium, France (two chapters), Canada (two chapters), Ulster, Scotland, Italy (South Tyrol), Switzerland, and Yugoslavia. Omitted from this study are the ethnic tensions arising from the large numbers of immigrant "guest workers" from southern

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Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East in industrial north and west Europe, as well as the politics of ethnicity in the American urban context. In other words, the ethnic groups that come within the purview of this book are ancient and indigenous peoples who form the local majorities in their historic substate regions, yet are minorities and/or subordinates within their contemporary modern states.

As is usual, perhaps inevitable, in books that grow out of single four-day conferences, the result, while coherent, is nevertheless not edited tightly. Different authors subscribe to different theoretical paradigms. This fact reflects, of course, not only the particular circumstances of the genesis of this book, but the general scholarly condition of theory-disarray in the face of resurgent ethno-nationalism in the contemporary developed (Western) world. Precisely because so much scholarly energy and attention has been devoted over the past three decades to the phenomenon of politicized ethnicity in the developing states of the so-called third and fourth worlds, Professor Esman and his current co-authors are to be applauded and supported for giving us a volume which studies the no less significant and, indeed, potentially no less explosive ethno-national question in some of the older states of the developed world, where seemingly long-dormant ethnic groups have recently reawakened to political activism. Many of the chapter-authors in this book suggest that this phenomenon is a reaction to the discriminatory manner in which ethnic regions have been incorporated into the metropolitan economies of their several states and thus into the contemporary trans-European and international economies as well. Hence the resultant anti-state and within-state regional ethno-nationalisms in the developed Western states, though indeed still supported by such traditional elites as the local clergies and humanistic intelligentsia, increasingly also draw the endorsement of the ethnic groups' modern industrial elites and technocratic intelligentsia and, perhaps most interestingly, are for the moment tilting toward the general political Left in a problematical but potentially potent association.

Other interpretations—some supplementing, others ignoring, still others contradicting—this structural explanation of resurgent ethno-nationalism in the West may be found in this stimulating book, all of whose authors appear to be united by an understandable belief that the politics of ethnicity is, or is becoming, the cutting edge of Western politics in general. Perhaps so. Yet, as the editor, Professor Esman, alerts us in the book's concluding sentence, the politics of class, occupational, and corporate cleavages will remain, together with ethnic politics, on the agenda of industrial and postindustrial societies for the indefinite future (p. 390). The next task in theory-building is to link these several cleavages—their origins, their dynamics, their management, their outcomes, their interactions—in a comprehensive analysis.

In addition to editor Esman, the other contributing authors are Walker Connor, Arend Lijphart, Lawrence Scheinman, Darydd J. Greenwood, Aristide Zolberg, William R. Beer, Suzanne Berger, Donald V. Smiley, Jacques Brazeau, Edouard Cloutier, David E. Schmitt, Peter J. Katzenstein, Jürg Steiner, Jeffrey Obler, and Susan Bridge.

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD
Columbia University

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Elite Recruitment in Democratic Polities: Comparative Studies Across Nations *edited by Heinz Eulau and Moshe M. Czudnowski. New York, Halsted Press, 1976. 299 pp. $17.50.*

Recent years have seen a rapid increase in highly descriptive, methodologically sophisticated studies of the backgrounds and attitudes of political elites. Much of this work has added to our factual knowledge about elite composition and recruitment. Often, however, empirical rigor has not been matched by adequate attention to the linkage between the new data and the older questions that are the rich legacy of traditional elite theorists. The strengths and the weaknesses of current research on elites are faithfully represented in this collection of research papers.

The central question that most needs posing about elite recruitment patterns is "so what?" Dwaine Marvick puts the point clearly: "Political recruitment study is an empty and futile exercise if it merely asks 'who governs?' instead of asking how governance is shaped by the skills, contacts, and values of those who participate" (p. 29). Several of the papers in this volume valiantly address this issue in empirical terms. Unexpectedly, and to some extent inadvertently, their evidence suggests that easy assumptions about obvious consequences of recruitment practices may be wrong.

Chong Lim Kim, Justin Green, and Samuel C. Patterson draw on surveys of U.S. state legislators to assess the consequences of party-controlled recruitment, but the patterns they discover are surprisingly weak and inconsistent. Neither in terms of role conceptions nor in terms of roll-call behavior do party-recruited legislators differ significantly from their self-recruited colleagues. Galen A. Irwin's Dutch replication of the Eulau-Prewitt study of Bay Area city councillors demonstrates that party plays a more important role in recruitment in Holland, but the evidence that party thereby plays a more important role in ensuring electoral accountability in the Netherlands is inconclusive. In an unusually thoughtful paper, Sidney Tarrow and V. Lamonte Smith show that a disproportionate share of French and Italian mayors were initially inducted into politics during periods of national crisis. However, the measurable differences in outlook and behavior between these "crisis-recruits" and their conventionally recruited colleagues are neither statistically significant nor cross-nationally consistent. In short, these studies provide more question marks than exclamation points about the impact of recruitment patterns on political attitudes and behavior.

Somewhat hidden in the masses of descriptive material in this volume are some nuggets of unusual interest and potential significance. Moshe Czudnowski's exhaustive report on the value structures of Illinois political activists includes the intriguing finding that, as compared to ordinary citizens, politicians place much more emphasis on "an active, challenging life" and much less emphasis on economic security. Werner Kaltefleiter's annotated returns from a survey of West German elites suggest that political elites are consistently and significantly more accessible to recruits from a variety of social backgrounds than are elites in business, administration, science, and the mass media. Michael R. King and Lester G. Seligman offer some suggestive evidence that "linkages among electoral realignment, turnover patterns, elite recruitment, and policy changes . . . set apart critical elections from other presidential elections" (p. 265). In one of the volume's most interesting papers, Kenneth Prewitt and William McAllister report the bittersweet

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discovery that the ratio of lawyers to Ph.D.s at the top of the American federal executive fell from 7:1 under Hoover to less than 2:1 under Nixon.

Recognition of the importance of theoretical orientation is not absent from this volume. The paper by Heinz Eulau on the conceptual contributions of Harold D. Lasswell to elite analysis is a remarkable integration of Lasswell's wide-ranging and sometimes frustratingly obscure insights into the nature and distribution of power in contemporary polities.

Few of the papers in this volume will become required reading for the profession. But many may provide useful empirical grist for the theoretical mills of scholars wishing to return to those broader issues of elite performance and democratic prospects that were evoked by Lasswell.

ROBERT D. PUTNAM
University of Michigan

The Politics of Bureaucracy: A Comparative Perspective *by B. Guy Peters. New York, Longman, 1978. 246 pp. Cloth, $12.50; paper, $6.95.*

Teaching a course on comparative administrative politics encourages one to connect the significant actualities of different government systems to everything from macro theories about socialization or Wittfogelian irrigation empires to micro aspects of civil service elites, organizational behavior, budgeting, and national planning. These poles comprehend much of what is fairest and important in history and the social sciences. Yet the vastness of what is relevant constitutes a pedagogue's problem and a pedant's nightmare.

The teaching problem is lessened at advanced levels where students bring a basic knowledge of comparative politics, public administration, and social and economic theory. Even then the data and theories are so plethoric and disparate that some seek coherence by excluding American government or developing countries; others make the subject manageable by avoiding macro theories about recent changes. A common defensive response is to concentrate on only one element in any of the several dyads within the total subject: comparative politics/public administration; empirical/theoretical; institutional/policy.

To his credit, the author of this book tried to avoid all these easy paths, although in practice he gives priority to political theory at some cost to empirical, institutional, and policy aspects. Assuming his reader lacks starting knowledge of comparative politics and public administration, he offers elementary explanations of such subjects as structural-functionalism, bureaucracy, public administration, systems, program budgeting, interest groups, and political culture. But the author aims at more than a safe textbook. He wishes to modernize our way of seeing the subject, and he seeks to present all the important aspects of comparative administrative politics in terms of a conceptual apparatus that will more closely link politics and administration while also bringing greater order, meaningfulness, and comprehensibility.

It is regrettable but not surprising that these goals are not all realized in 211 pages

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of exposition. Part of the problem is architectural. The conceptual categories do not tame the dragons of plethora, disparity, and noncoherence. Important actualities keep protruding from the 4 x 4 boxes, and the author's laborious justifications of some of these boxes may entangle rather than enlighten. Often, subjects cannot be contained under the broader chapter headings, either, with the result that there is fragmentation, buck-passing, and contradiction between chapters. Another cost is truncation. For example, the administrative politics of nationalized industries are confined in two paragraphs under a chapter on accountability that also deals summarily with administrative law, professionalism, congressional staffs, trade unions, and "gray power" client groups. The book's architecture also tolerates hurtful omissions. Despite a gallant opening pledge to deal with postindustrialism and with developing countries, development politics are given small attention, and the current public administration politics of both transnationalism and state policy making for, and investment in, industrial modernization (as in Holland's *The State as Entrepreneur*) are largely ignored. So are sophisticated administrative power aspects of cabinet politics.

In execution the author is usually conscientious, but there are occasions when the student may be misled into accepting for more than they are worth declarations that a careful assessment would show to be completely valid in relatively few countries: for example, the generalization on p. 31 that senior civil servants' "careers are largely untouched by politicians." Many generalizations stem from Scandinavian, British, or American stimuli but may be read as if they had universal applicability, especially since little is said about the operational politics of Japan and other important non-Atlantic governments. One also needs to be alert for the blend of speculation and data-arrangement (pp. 87–88) that masks an assumption that a French *directeur* and a British principal are about equidistant from the peaks of their respective bureaucracies. (Incidentally, the author of the British data was Richard, not Brian, Chapman.)

Despite shortfalls, this is a useful book. It offers some valuable ideas and bibliographic notes. The author has been erudite, original, and generous in his vision of the subject. One salutes his courage in trying to use a limited vehicle to achieve heroic purposes.

EDWIN A. BOCK
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Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation *edited by Robert C. Tucker. New York, W. W. Norton and Company, 1977. 332 pp. $19.95.*

This unusually interesting symposium consists of thirteen chapters—including the editor's "Stalinism as Revolution from Above"—plus the editor's brief introductory and concluding remarks. All of the contributions are of high quality and the work as a whole is a major addition to scholarly literature on Soviet and East European history, politics, and comparative communism—and to a lesser degree on economics, law, and literature. Despite the unity flowing from focus on "Stalinism"—to the reinterpretation of which participants Alexander Erlich, Moshe Lewin, Robert Tucker, and Stephen Cohen, in

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particular, have previously made distinguished contributions—the methods and concepts used by the authors of this volume are diverse, and their interpretations and conclusions, in some cases, differ startlingly. I, for one, find this diversity and the lack of any imposed central tendency in the book refreshing. However, one may surmise that it could have been interesting if all of the contributors had tested the applicability of the approach developed by Robert Tucker.

Tucker, Robert Sharlet in his "Stalinism and Soviet Legal Culture," Katerina Clark in "Utopian Anthropology as a Context for Stalinist Literature," and Gordon Skilling in "Stalinism and Czechoslovak Political Culture," all apply "cultural" approaches, though Clark, unlike Sharlet and Skilling, makes no use of the formulation, developed by Tucker, which, based partly on the writings of Anthony Wallace and Ralph Linton, defines "culture" much more broadly than did the pioneers of the "political culture" concept, Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba, and Lucian Pye. If one judges the value of Tucker's approach by some of the apparent results of its application—such as his major, highly original psychobiography, *Stalin as Revolutionary*, or his chapter in the work being reviewed, one can predict substantial future benefits from its possible future diffusion. However, I am not sure that in less skillful hands than those of Tucker this broad-purpose tool will produce outputs of anything like the same quality. Of course, a similar warning would be in order with respect to any approach or concept for which its author or proponent makes ambitious claims. More specifically, I have reservations on several levels. Tucker, unlike Almond and Verba, defines culture exceptionally broadly, to include not merely what Almond refers to as "underlying propensities" but also institutions, such as the Communist party. For certain purposes, this very broad conception may, it seems to me, blur the important distinction between apparent current reality and latent, or emerging forces generated by elements in culture that have not yet been manifested clearly and openly in the form of movements and organizations.

Also, Tucker seems, if I understand him, to suggest in his introduction that an approach to the study of communism derived from history, culture, and personality be substituted for approaches based on "the contemporary social sciences." While I think that the historical-cultural methods employed by Tucker, supplemented, in his case, by his expert use of neo-Freudian psychology, have yielded brilliant results, his methodological prescription seems narrow. I hope that scholars in the field will bring to bear the ideas and methods developed by empirical theorists such as Robert Dahl, Charles E. Lindblom, Gabriel Almond, and many others—and also that outstanding work by earlier tillers of the rather barren soil of Communist studies, especially Barrington Moore, Jr., will not be forgotten. I am favorably impressed by the relatively modest, yet strong recommendations (with examples) for the use of the political culture approach, in conjunction with other perspectives, contained in *Political Culture and Political Communist States*, recently edited by Archie Brown and Jack Gray.

T. H. Rigby's chapter in the Tucker book demonstrates, it seems to me, the usefulness of organization theory, as well as of Aristotle's classic political theory, for the analysis of Stalinism and its consequences. Lewin's and Erlich's chapters fruitfully apply a combination of economic and sociological concepts, including Marxist formulations to, respectively, the concentration and power in the 1920s that facilitated Stalin's rise to despotic power and the similarities and differences among Marx's, Lenin's and Stalin's theories

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of economic growth. Stephen Cohen eloquently and spiritedly argues the case for discontinuity—in ideology, institutions, the functions of terror, etc.—rather than continuity, as between "bolshevism" and "Stalinism." I am impressed by his critique of authors who obviously exaggerated the similarities between Lenin's and Stalin's doctrines and practices. However, refuting the false view that Lenin "caused" Stalin is only a first step, albeit a useful one, to explaining the similarities and the differences, between Russia in the "Lenin" and the "Stalin" periods.

Cohen, and of course Tucker, and indeed most of the contributors perform the enormously valuable service of identifying, more clearly than most previous investigators of Soviet political developments, the possible alternatives, paths, and the choices, that were made and that might have been made. This is a valuable exercise, both in terms of scholarship, which it enlivens, deepens, and enriches, and of public policy, which it can instruct. The more we know, not only about what happens in the past, but about what might have been, the more, I feel, we can know about what may occur in the future. I have, due to consideration of space and the constraints imposed by my preferences, neglected to deal with some of the most interesting chapters in the book, such as Roy Medvedev's fascinating discussion of new historical evidence on Stalin (he again raises the question of Stalin's possible service in the tsarist secret police) and the startling debate (in effect) between Leszek Kolakowski and Mihajlo Markovic on the relationships between Marx and Stalin. Like everything else in this volume, these chapters will surprise some readers, perhaps enrage some, but should, I believe, he read by all who wish to keep abreast of creative thinking in Communist studies—and the many areas of thought and concern to which these studies are urgently relevant. In conclusion, let me say that the extraordinary richness of thought offered in this book makes it a reviewer's despair, but a reader's delight.

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN
Yale University

Japanese International Negotiating Style *by Michael Blaker. New York, Columbia University Press, 1977. 253 pp. $15.00.*

Michael Blaker's analysis of how the Japanese negotiate is based on a careful study of eighteen cases, from the treaty of 1895 with China to the abortive Japanese-American conversations of 1941. Tokyo's prewar diplomacy was characterized by what the author calls "The Great Bind," a necessary response to contradictory demands, from foreign powers for more compromise, and from domestic forces for less. Japanese negotiators tried to preserve and enhance the national interest, avoid unnecessary risk, and yet permit "defensive expansion." Since they were quick to adopt Western methods of diplomacy, traits which are distinctly Japanese are sometimes difficult to separate from those which can be called universal. For example, of the author's five norms of Japanese bargaining action, only one is peculiarly Japanese: the dispelling of Western resistance. The others are norms any negotiator would follow: the necessity to consider domestic opposition, secrecy, careful deliberation, and situational adaptation.

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Clearly certain characteristics, amply illustrated by examples from the cases cited, have consistently determined Japanese negotiating style. One, which Blaker calls "the most prized Japanese bargaining virtue" (p. 30), is "true grit" or perseverance and tenacity. Pursuance of this seemingly inflexible and often exasperating tactic has led to misperceptions by adversaries. As the author points out, it usually represented conviction plus the inherent difficulties imposed by the decision-making process on changing a position once fixed, rather than mere stalling or intentional delay.

Compromise is an element which presents inconsistencies. Japanese practitioners of diplomacy have written copiously about the essentiality of "give and take" yet, in the author's words, "far from searching for areas of compatibility between their own interests and those of the opposition, Japan's leaders and diplomats focused almost exlusively on their own bargaining goals" (p. 40). "Never was there recognition of negotiation as an honest confrontation between divergent points of view" (p. 50). This may be an exaggeration. The Japanese have made compromises, interpreted, however, as the author himself suggests, as bowing to the inevitable or manifesting sincerity of purpose.

The pre-Pearl Harbor talks of 1941 contribute prominently to the author's conclusions. It is difficult to assess diplomacy on the basis of one side's record alone. I would disagree with Blaker's judgment that Japan's proposed troop withdrawals from China and Indochina were not more than "jokers" (p. 206) and would question his belittling of the proposal for a Konoye-Roosevelt meeting as a Japanese attempt to reach a settlement "merely by adjusting their negotiating methods" (p. 196). A slim chance did exist for an agreement, to be endorsed by the emperor. American obduracy is a factor against which any Japanese bargaining patterns must be judged. In his discussion of Japanese last-minute crisis tactics, Blaker neglects to mention that this was also an American practice; it was President Roosevelt who tried to appeal to the emperor on the eve of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Blaker justifiably gives the Japanese high marks for their negotiating techniques, noting that they succeeded in all but four of the eighteen diplomatic experiences which he examines. He ably analyzes the domestic restraints on Japanese diplomacy and, above all, convincingly demonstrates the dedication of Japanese policy makers and diplomats. The gap between their motivations and actions and the outside perception of their behavior engendered the undeserved reputation of "perfidious Japan." As Blaker concludes, "A blend of idealism, naiveté, optimism, fatalism, and arrogance spawned the belief that Japan could pursue assertive, expansionist policies without the opposition such actions inevitably generate." He adds, "Even during the 1930s Japan wanted to be loved. . . ." (p. 213).

JOHN K. EMMERSON
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American Foreign Relations 1975: A Documentary Record *edited by Richard P. Stebbins and Elaine P. Adam. New York, New York University Press, 1978. 641 pp. $26.50.*

American Political Science Research Guide, vol. 1 *edited by George W. Johnson. New York, Plenum Publishing Corporation, 1977. 225 pp. $20.00.*

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To the Editor:

I read with interest the review of my book, *Why Poor People Stay Poor*, by Ms. Sylvia Ann Hewlett in *Political Science Quarterly*, Fall 1977. I must, however, protest against her quoting only part of a sentence, which reverses the sense of what I have to say.

The reviewer writes, "I would agree wholeheartedly with Lipton when he states that '. . . only revolution can substantially improve the access of the rural poor to income and power' ". What in fact I write on p. 329 is: "At the opposite extreme to a 'light of pure reason' approach is the view that only revolution can substantially improve the access of the rural poor to income and power. In some poor countries this is true, but social scientists are not qualified to advise them. How to make revolutions, how to ensure that they benefit the rural poor—social scientists neither know these things, nor have the right to sacrifice human life to their ignorance. If they are concerned with relieving mass rural poverty, therefore, they should refrain from advising, or otherwise assisting, such countries."

The remainder of the text makes it perfectly clear that I regard such countries, where revolution is the only hope of the rural poor, to be a very small minority of the developing world.

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

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

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

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

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

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